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THE QUICK AND THE DEAD: 
CESSATION OF PRODUCTION AND SHUT-INS 
DURING THE SECONDARY TERM OF 
AN OIL AND GAS LEASE 
R. NEAL PIERCE,* KATERINA E MILENKOVSKI,** AND RYAN S. BUNDY*** 
ABSTRACT 
 
Historic characterization of the oil and gas leasehold estate developed 
into two primary views of mineral ownership and the nature of a lessee’s 
interest acquired under an oil and gas lease.  Classifications of the leasehold 
estate are an important foundation in assessing the ongoing viability of 
maintaining a lease in the secondary term by profitable production.  Today, 
courts and leasing parties employ various equitable and contractual 
approaches to protect prudent lessees from the potentially harsh 
consequences of cessations of production in the secondary term.  This 
Article focuses on two such savings concepts – the common law temporary 
cessation of production doctrine and related lease clauses, and the 
contractual use of shut-in royalty clauses.  For each of these savings 
concepts, this Article presents a general discussion centered on the law in 
Texas and Oklahoma, as exemplars of the two primary schools of 
classification of the interests created by an oil and gas lease, followed by a 
survey of the law regarding temporary cessation and shut-in clauses in oil- 
and gas-producing states.  Finally, the authors discuss possible directions 
the law may take in select jurisdictions such as North Dakota where the 
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shale revolution shows serious potential, but guiding precedent remains 
incomplete.  This latter discussion is grounded in indications from existing 
cases as to which school of thought the relevant jurisdiction has favored in 
the past when considering the oil and gas lease as a property interest. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The dramatic and sustained exploration and development of United 
States shale resources over the past decade inevitably brings with it 
renewed focus by legal scholars, practitioners, and affected parties, on the 
“camel”1 at the heart of the development process:  the oil and gas lease.  
The legal issues associated with oil and gas leases seem endless in their 
variety, complexity, and resistivity to being reduced to articulate rules of 
application.  When a significant new development play begins to overlap 
with historic leases operating in their secondary term, renewed attention to 
the terms and obligations of these leases can be expected, which reopens 
dormant concerns about the ongoing viability of historic leases.  No single 
article could hope to address all the issues related to operation of oil and gas 
leases in the secondary term; rather, it is hoped that this Article will provide 
an adequate discussion of a narrow class of issues related to the 
preservation of leases in the secondary term, specifically, lease provisions 
which address continuation in the secondary term due to ongoing 
production, or the extent to which interruption or temporary cessation of 
production will be contractually or legally permitted to preserve a lease. 
To approach this discussion, this Article will present a treatment of 
cessation and shut-in clauses based on the law in significant producing 
states, where long development history has produced a detailed and 
nuanced jurisprudence, as well as a survey of the related law in other oil 
and gas producing jurisdictions.  Finally, an attempt will be made to 
analyze the law in jurisdictions with developing shale potential, but with 
incomplete or nascent case law.  The goal is to make useful observations as 
to the direction those jurisdictions’ courts might move as they are faced 
with consideration of the issues in real world disputes. 
 
1. A camel, it is popularly said, is a horse created by a committee, which seems an 
appropriate appellation for the unique and wondrous collection of concepts found in contemporary 
oil and gas leases. 
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II. CESSATION OF PRODUCTION – GENERAL DISCUSSION OF 
TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 
It is no surprise that the law regarding cessation of production after the 
primary term has been most fully developed in two of the largest oil 
producing states in the United States:  Texas and Oklahoma.  An 
examination of these two states readily demonstrates a split in approaches 
to characterizing the oil and gas leasehold estate created in the various 
producing states.  The distinguishing characteristic between Texas and 
Oklahoma (with most other jurisdictions taking one approach or the other), 
which directly impacts their distinctive opinions concerning the effect of 
production cessation during the secondary term, varies as to the type of 
estate created by the oil and gas lease by the habendum clause.  
Traditionally, the habendum clause contains a primary term for an express 
number of years, and a secondary term of an indeterminate duration such as 
“for so long thereafter as oil and gas produced in paying quantities.”2  
Generally, one of two separate types of estates is deemed to be created by 
the oil and gas lease:  the fee simple determinable or the profit a prendre.  
The fee simple determinable interest vests the lessee with a perpetual right 
in and to the oil and gas underlying the leased premises itself; or in place, 
once oil and gas has been produced from the subject premises in paying 
quantities, for as long as oil and gas continues to be produced.  Conversely, 
the profit a prendre only conveys a right to explore and develop the leased 
premises for the purpose of producing oil and gas, if found, and the actual 
interest in and to the oil and gas only vests once it has been severed from 
the land by production. 
In Texas, the law with regard to the leasehold estate, or the interest 
transferred by the oil and gas lease, was established by the Texas Supreme 
Court’s rulings in Texas Co. v. Daugherty,3 and Stephens County v. Mid-
Kansas Oil & Gas Co.4  In Texas Co. v. Daugherty, the court considered 
whether the interests in the oil and gas transferred to the lessee by several 
instruments were considered real property interests subject to taxation.5  
The court concluded the instruments transferred “a defeasible title in fee to 
the oil and gas in the ground, if oil and gas in place are capable of 
ownership and conveyance.”6  The court further stated, “[i]t is our 
conclusion that these instruments had the effect to confer upon the plaintiff 
 
2. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 778-79 (9th ed. 2009). 
3. 176 S.W. 717 (Tex. 1915). 
4. 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923). 
5. See generally Texas Co., 176 S.W. at 717. 
6. Id. at 719. 
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in error an interest in the several tracts of land described, the value of which 
was assessable against it for taxation.”7  Accordingly, the court established 
the transfers of the oil and gas conveyed defeasible real property interests in 
the leased premises and that said interests were subject to taxation.8  The 
court further stated that said instruments operated to convey a fee simple 
subject to a condition subsequent.9 
However, in Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co.,10 the 
Supreme Court of Texas changed its position with regard to the interest 
created by the oil and gas lease.  In this case, the court once again was 
confronted with whether an instrument, specifically an oil and gas lease, 
operated to transfer an interest in property that would be subject to 
taxation.11  The court ultimately concluded, the oil and gas lease did in fact 
convey a taxable interest in the leased premises.12  However, in its analysis 
of the issue the court stated, “it was intended by all parties that the lands 
should be used for no other purpose than the specified mineral exploration 
and production, and that the grants were to be enjoyed only while such use 
continued and were to immediately terminate on cessation of the use.”13  
The court continued, “[a]t common law, a grant of land for such a term and 
for such use and purpose-and–no other–created the estate called a base, 
qualified or determinable, fee. . . .”14  Accordingly, the court determined 
that the oil and gas lease created a fee simple determinable that would 
automatically terminate upon cessation of the intended use of the 
property.15  The Supreme Court of Texas has since clarified this position by 
declaring that a lease automatically terminates upon cessation of production 
after the primary term.16 
A detailed discussion of the nature of the leasehold estate as a profit is 
found in the Wyoming case of Denver Joint Stock Land Bank of Denver v. 
Dixon,17 which examined the historic legal commentaries of Blackstone, 
specifically focusing on the nature of hereditaments.  According to the 
 
7. Id. at 722. 
8. See id. 
9. Id. at 719; see also Bruce M. Kramer, The Temporary Cessation Doctrine:  A Practical 
Response to an Ideological Dilemma, 43 BAYLOR L. REV. 519, 522-23 (1991). 
10. 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923). 
11. Stephens County, 254 S.W. at 291. 
12. Id. at 296. 
13. Id. at 295. 
14. Id. 
15. See Kramer, supra note 9, at 522-23; see also W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 
19 S.W.2d 27, 28-29 (Tex. 1929). 
16. Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1941); see also infra footnotes 45-53 
and accompanying text. 
17. 122 P.2d 842 (Wyo. 1942); see also infra footnotes 351-53 and accompanying text. 
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court, Blackstone recognized two separate types of hereditaments, the 
corporeal and the incorporeal.18  The court, citing Blackstone, described a 
corporeal hereditament as being something with a physical embodiment, or 
manifestation, such that it can be experienced by the senses, or as the court 
states, “handled by the body.”19  However, the court recognized the 
incorporeal hereditament as a very different type of interest.20  It 
distinguished the incorporeal hereditament as being something of a more 
abstract nature.21  In the words of the Supreme Court, “incorporeal 
[hereditaments] are not the subject of sensation, can neither be seen nor 
handled, are creatures of the mind, and exist only in contemplation.”22  The 
court continued, “[a]n incorporeal hereditament is a right issuing out of a 
thing corporate whether real or personal, or concerning, or annexed to, or 
exercisable within the same.”23 
After establishing the two distinct categories of hereditaments, the 
Supreme Court of Wyoming continued its examination of the historical 
commentaries of Blackstone, focusing on “rights in common,” as an 
example of an incorporeal hereditament.24  Citing Blackstone, it stated that 
a right in common “appears from its very definition to be an incorporeal 
hereditament, being a profit which a man hath in the land of another, as to 
feed beasts, to catch fish, to dig turf, or cut wood or the like.”25  The court 
further concluded such rights are commonly referred to as profit a 
prendre.26  Although the Supreme Court of Wyoming recognized in the 
aforementioned case this definition of incorporeal hereditaments does not 
necessarily seem to define a real property interest, the court relies on the 
historical authorities that have recognized that a real property interest 
“consist[s] of lands, tenements and hereditaments.”27  In addition, the court, 
relying on the analysis of Lord Coke, concluded that a profit a prendre 
interest is included within the definition of tenements and, as such, would 
be included in the definition of real property.28  Therefore, the court stated, 
“the right to take oil and gas from the land is of the same nature as the 
 






24. Id. at 847. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 846. 
28. Id. at 847. 
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incorporeal hereditament mentioned by Blackstone.”29  In the same vein as 
Wyoming, the courts in Oklahoma have articulated a different view than 
Texas with regard to the estate granted by the oil and gas lease.  In Danne v. 
Texaco Exploration and Production Inc.,30 the Court of Appeals held the oil 
and gas lease does not transfer or convey an actual interest in the leased 
premises, as the Texas courts concluded, but rather transfers the right to 
explore and mine the leased premises.31  As the court stated, “[i]n the 
primary term, before hydrocarbons are discovered, the lessee has the right 
to explore for a fixed period of time.”32  Therefore, the interest transferred 
by the oil and gas lease in Oklahoma is much more like an incorporeal 
hereditament or profit, than a corporeal interest in property, as the Texas 
courts have viewed the leasehold.33  The court further held that once oil and 
gas are produced from the subject tract, thereby extending the lease into the 
secondary term, “the lessee has proved a valuable asset and has established 
a right to develop that asset.”34  Accordingly, the court in Danne 
distinguishes the estate vested in the lessee in Oklahoma from that of Texas.  
While Texas courts hold that a lease conveys a real property interest in the 
leased premises, the court in Oklahoma concluded that during the primary 
term the lease only operates to transfer a right to explore and develop the oil 
and gas underlying the leased premises.35  The actual right in and to the oil 
and gas itself does not vest until the lessee has established production.36 
In Danne, the court discussed several issues including whether a lease 
extended into its secondary term can expire automatically when or if oil and 
gas cease to be produced in paying quantities.37  The District Court had 
concluded that the oil and gas lease can automatically terminate and entered 
a judgment for the lessors.38  However, in its consideration of this matter, 
the Court of Appeals yet again distinguished itself from Texas and other 
jurisdictions by stating, “Oklahoma does not, however, take the view that 
habendum clauses are special limitations; rather, Oklahoma views the 
habendum clause as an estate on condition subsequent creating only a right 
of entry in the grantor.”39  The court continued, “[w]ith such an estate, the 
 
29. Id. 
30. 883 P.2d 210 (Okla. 1994). 
31. Danne, 883 P.2d at 214. 
32. Id. (emphasis added). 
33. See id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id.  
36. Id.; see infra footnotes 45-53 and accompanying text. 
37. Id. at 212. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 213. 
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grantor must bring an action to cause forfeiture of the estate.”40  Ultimately, 
the court established that the habendum clause of an oil and gas lease 
creates a fee simple subject to condition subsequent that does not 
automatically terminate upon cessation of production.41  Therefore, on the 
issue of whether an oil and gas lease extended into its secondary term can 
automatically expire, the Court of Appeals determined it could not and 
overruled the trial court.42 
In coming to this conclusion, the court in Danne relied heavily on the 
opinion of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Stewart v. Amerada Hess 
Corp.43  In Stewart, the court considered whether a cessation of production 
operated to terminate the lessee’s interest in and to the subject lease.44  The 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated, “[t]he thereafter clause is hence not 
ever to be regarded as akin in effect to the common law conditional 
limitation or determinable fee estate.”45  The court continued, “[r]ather, the 
clause is to be regarded as fixing the life of a lease instead of providing a 
means of terminating it in advance of the time at which it would otherwise 
expire.”46  Ultimately, in Stewart, the court concluded that cessation of 
production does not automatically result in the termination of the lessee’s 
interest in the oil and gas lease during the secondary term.47 
Texas and Oklahoma clearly differ in their approaches with regard to 
the estate created by the oil and gas lease.  However their courts’ positions 
regarding the effect of cessation of production after the primary term have, 
in some measure, rendered the distinctions between the two states’ 
perspectives on the estate created by the oil and gas lease less significant in 
application.  The following discussion, illustrates this similarity in 
application, despite the two states divergent views on the nature of the 
interest created by an oil and gas lease. 
Traditionally, it is well established that a fee simple determinable estate 
includes a limiting event, the occurrence of which will result in the 
automatic termination of the estate.  It is further established by the court in 
Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co.,48 that the state of Texas 
views the lessee’s estate as a fee simple determinable estate,49 as to which 
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 214. 
42. Id. 
43. 604 P.2d 854 (Okla. 1979). 
44. Stewart, 604 P.2d at 856. 
45. Id. at 858. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923). 
49. See supra footnotes 5-13 and accompanying text. 
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the Texas courts have concluded that the oil and gas lease will terminate 
when oil or gas ceases to be produced in paying quantities.50  
Acknowledging the potential harshness of this rule, the Texas Court of 
Civil Appeals in Scarborough v. New Domain Oil and Gas Co.,51 
recognized the inequity that could result from automatic termination upon 
cessation of production under the fee simple determinable estate.52  
Accordingly, the court established what has developed into the equitable 
principle known as the temporary cessation of production doctrine.53  In this 
case, the issue was whether temporary cessation of production from the 
premises would result in the termination of the oil and gas lease.54  
Specifically, the issue was whether a lease would terminate when a 
producing gas well became inoperable and ceased production in March 
1920, but the lessee was able to drill and establish production from an oil 
well by July 1920.55  The court held that a temporary cessation of 
production should not result in a forfeiture, or termination, of the lease, if 
the cessation of production were “unforeseen and unavoidable” and if “the 
lessees in good faith used reasonable diligence to resume production, and at 
great outlay of money, and did, within a reasonable time . . . resume 
production.”56 
In Watson v. Rochmill,57 the Supreme Court of Texas further explained 
its position with regard to the temporary cessation of production doctrine.  
The issue in this case was whether the oil and gas lease could be preserved 
under the temporary cessation of production doctrine when the cessation of 
production was due to the lack of a market for the oil being produced 
therefrom.58  The court concluded that the oil and gas lease terminated due 
to the cessation of production, because said cessation was not temporary or 
caused by “mechanical breakdown or other condition in connection with the 
well or the equipment used in connection therewith.”59  Accordingly, the 
court established that a lease would not automatically terminate if “[the] 
temporary cessation of production [was] due to sudden stoppage of the well 
 
50. See Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W. 783, 784 (Tex. 1941); see also supra footnotes 42-45 
and accompanying text. 
51. 276 S.W. 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). 
52. Scarborough, 276 S.W. at 336. 
53. See id. at 335. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 334-35. 
56. Id. at 336. 
57. 155 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. 1941). 
58. Watson, 155 S.W.2d at 784. 
59. Id. 
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or some mechanical breakdown of the equipment used in connection 
therewith, or the like.”60 
In Midwest Oil Corp v. Winsauer,61 the Supreme Court of Texas 
applied the temporary cessation of production doctrine to a term royalty 
deed.  In so doing, it concluded that the determinable interest created by the 
deed would not automatically terminate, provided the “operator in good 
faith exercises diligence.”62  In this case, the court was forced to consider 
whether a cessation of production from a well, due to mechanical 
breakdown, and litigation, would result in an automatic termination of the 
term royalty deed.63  The Texas Supreme Court concluded the cessation of 
production was temporary, and therefore did not result in automatic 
termination of the interest therein.64  In its analysis of this case, the court 
seems to imply that temporary cessation of production provisions will be 
implied in all instruments purporting to convey an interest in the oil and gas 
for a term of years and as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying 
quantities.65  The Supreme Court of Texas suggests that a court should 
consider all the “surrounding facts and circumstances” in determining 
whether production was abandoned or temporary.66 
Similarly, the courts in Oklahoma have adopted the doctrine of 
temporary cessation of production.67  In 1958, the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma, in Cotner v. Warren,68 adopted the temporary cessation of 
production rule established by the courts in Kentucky in Lamb v. 
Vansyckle.69  In Cotner, the court quoted the holding in the Kentucky case, 
which stated “the lease continues in force unless the period of cessation, 
viewed in the light of all the circumstances is for an unreasonable time.”70  
The issue in Cotner was whether an oil and gas lease terminated when the 
owner of the property and well operator voluntarily shut the well down in 
an effort to terminate the lease such that the plaintiff would be precluded 
 
60. Id. (emphasis added). 
61. 323 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1959). 
62. Midwest Oil Corp., 323 S.W. at 948. 
63. Id. at 945. 
64. Id. at 948. 
65. See generally id. 
66. Id. at 947-48. 
67. See Fisher v. Grace Petroleum Corp., 830 P.2d 1380, 1386-87 (Okla. Civ. App. 1991). 
68. 330 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1958). 
69. 266 S.W. 253 (Ky. 1924). 
70. Cotner, 330 P.2d at 219 (quoting Lamb v. Vansyckle, 266 S.W. 253, 254 (Ky.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
1924)); see also Hunter v. Clarkson, 428 P.2d 210, 212 (Okla. 1967) (determining that voluntary 
cessation of production resulted in a termination of the oil and gas lease because under the 
circumstances there were no reasons justifying the continuation of the lease); Pack v. Santa Fe 
Minerals, 869 P.2d 323, 326 (Okla. 1994). 
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from operating the well.71  The court established that they must consider 
“the surrounding facts in each case” in determining whether a lease or 
mineral estate was terminated.72  In its analysis, the court stated that the 
“controlling factual finding is whether the temporary stoppage in 
production was for an unreasonable length of time.”73  In addition, in 
Townsend v. Creekmore-Rooney Co.,74 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
stated “[t]he lease terminates by its own provisions when oil or gas are no 
longer produced after the primary term, except where there are equitable 
considerations which justify a temporary cessation of production.”75  In 
Townsend, the court addressed whether an oil and gas lease terminates 
when production of oil and gas ceases without explanation for a period of 
seventeen months.76  The court concluded that “the unexplained cessation 
of marketing of oil or gas from the leases for an extended period of several 
months is prima facie sufficient to justify cancellation.”77 
Accordingly, both Texas and Oklahoma recognize a similar rule with 
regard to temporary cessation of production.  In addition, both states agree 
that when considering a case involving a possible temporary cessation of 
production, the courts must look at all the circumstances surrounding the 
cessation to determine whether the cessation should be considered 
permanent or temporary.  As a result, both states courts will make this 
decision on an ad hoc basis.  However, Oklahoma courts seems to 
emphasize the duration of the cessation rather than the actual cause, while 
Texas weighs heavily on the actual cause of the cessation of production.  
Ultimately, by adopting the common law rule of temporary cessation of 
production, both states have limited the effects of cessation of production 
with regard to the respective leasehold estates created therein.  Despite their 
distinctions, both Texas and Oklahoma courts agree that upon a 
determination that the cessation of production is permanent, the oil and gas 
lease is forfeit or terminated under its terms. 
Additionally, the two states agree that when a lease contains a cessation 
of production clause, the terms of the oil and gas lease clause will control 
over the general rule discussed above.  As the Supreme Court of Texas 
stated in Samano v. Sun Oil Co.,78 “[t]he sixty day provision is an integral 
 
71. See generally Cotner, 330 P.2d at 219. 
72. Cotner, 330 P.2d at 219 (citing Beatty v. Baxter, 258 P.2d 626 (Okla. 1953)). 
73. Id. 
74. 332 P.2d 35 (Okla. 1958). 
75. Townsend, 332 P.2d at 37 (citing Brown v. Shafer, 325 P.2d 743 (Okla. 1958)). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 37-38. 
78. 621 S.W.2d 580, 584 (Tex. 1981). 
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part of the drilling or reworking operations while the contract is in effect 
during the secondary period.  Neither precedent nor sound reason exists for 
striking down that agreement.”79  In this case, the issue was whether a sixty 
day drilling or reworking clause was intended to apply to both the primary 
term and the secondary term of the lease, such that it would define the 
period for temporary cessation under the oil and gas lease.80  In discussing 
whether the temporary cessation of production doctrine would apply, the 
court also stated, “under the lease here the parties agreed and stipulated 
what would constitute temporary cessation.”81  Applying the terms of the 
contract, the court held that when production stopped in the secondary term 
of the lease, the lessee had an express period of time to reestablish 
production and the lessee’s failure to resume production during that period 
of time resulted in the termination of the oil and gas lease.82 
In Hoyt v. Continental Oil Co.,83 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
stated, “[w]here the parties have bargained for and agreed on a time period 
for a temporary cessation clause that provision will control over the 
common law doctrine of temporary cessation allowing a ‘reasonable time’ 
for resumption of drilling operations.”84  In Hoyt, the issue was whether the 
cessation of production clause would preserve the oil and gas lease if the 
well still produces but fails to produce in paying quantities.  In its analysis, 
the court stated, “[a]fter the primary term, the effect of the cessation of 
production clause is to modify the habendum clause and to extend or 
preserve the lease while the lessee resumes operations . . . .”85  The court 
explained that if the lessee fails to reestablish production during this period 
of time, the oil and gas lease will cease to be preserved by the clause at the 
expiration of said time and will terminate based on a failure to satisfy the 
habendum clause.86  Both Texas and Oklahoma are in accord that the terms 
of the cessation of production clause will prevent the courts from applying 
the equitably remedy known as the temporary cessation of production 
doctrine and, instead, the parties will be bound to their agreement.  This 
means that, although a cessation of production clause may ensure a period 
of preservation in the event of a cessation of production, it also provides an 
absolute end to the period of preservation if production is not restored, and 
 
79. Samono, 621 S.W.2d. at 584. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. (quoting Woodson Oil Co. v. Pruett, 281 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex. App. 1955). 
82. Id. 
83. 606 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1980). 
84. Hoyt, 606 P.2d at 563. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
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may result in a briefer period cure than might be allowed where the terms of 
the lease do not address temporary cessation. 
III. TEMPORARY CESSATION OF PRODUCTION – 
A MULTI-STATE ANALYSIS 
Various producing states take varying approaches to evaluating the 
issue of temporary cessation of production.  Most however, tend to 
generally follow either the Texas or Oklahoma model in their treatment of 
the issue.  This Part analyzes various court opinions to provide a sense of 
the approach taken in these jurisdictions and the extent to which they can be 
characterized as being aligned with either the Texas model or the Oklahoma 
model.  The states include: New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, 
Kentucky, Virginia, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Illinois, 
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Kansas, Arkansas, Nebraska, Arizona, New 
Mexico, Utah, Arizona, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, California, and 
Alaska.  They are presented in this Article grouped by geographic 
proximity to one another. 
A. NEW YORK 
In New York, the law is unclear as to what interest an oil and gas lease 
conveys.  In Caflisch v. Crotty,87 the court noted New York adheres to the 
rule of capture.  “[U]nder New York’s ‘rule of capture[,]’ title to subsurface 
oil and gas vests in the party which first brings it to the surface and reduces 
it to possession.”88 
At least one case, Wagner v. Mallory,89 has held an oil and gas lease is 
an incorporeal hereditament.90  By comparison, in Buck v. Cleveland,91 the 
court held an agreement apparently dealing with hard minerals granting an 
“exclusive right to prospect for, mine, quarry and take away all kinds of 
minerals,” did not grant any “title to the lands or the minerals dissevered 
therefrom, but only a corporeal hereditament which did not pass to his heirs 
 
87. 774 N.Y.S.2d 653 (N.Y. 2003). 
88. Caflisch, 774 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (quoting In re Envirogas, Inc. v. Chu, 497 N.Y.S.2d 503, 
505 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)), aff’d, 503 N.E.2d 693 (N.Y. 1986). 
89. 62 N.E. 584 (N.Y. 1902). 
90. Wagner, 62 N.E. at 586; see also Jones Cut Stone Co., v. New York, 166 N.Y.S.2d 742 
(N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1957) (dealing with quarrying and not oil and gas leases, but which held that a lease 
giving the right to quarry stone “gave to claimant an incorporeal hereditament, a right to quarry 
and take stone from the area involved.  This stone became the property of claimant only upon its 
actual severance.”). 
91. 128 N.Y.S. 864 (N.Y. App. Div. 1911). 
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but to his administrator . . . .”92  Finally, in Banach v. Home Gas Co.,93 the 
court found a reservation of mineral rights is a profit a prendre.94 
New York has little case law regarding cessation of production during 
the secondary term of an oil and gas lease.  However, two New York 
appellate division court decisions indicate New York courts would apply 
the temporary cessation of production doctrine in certain circumstances.  In 
the case of Hill v. Trenkle,95 “market conditions” and the refusal of bank 
financing resulted in a lessee being unable to produce.96  The duration of 
the failure to produce is not known.97  The New York court refused to hold 
that the lease had terminated for failure to produce, and found the lessee had 
been prevented from proceeding with production by circumstances outside 
of their control (e.g. market conditions and inability to obtain financing) 
and that the cessation was temporary.98  This decision suggests that New 
York, unlike Texas, acknowledges inability to market as acceptable grounds 
for a temporary cessation. 
In the subsequent case of Peckham v. Dunning,99 a lessee failed to 
produce in paying quantities for multiple years during the secondary term of 
an oil and gas lease as required under the habendum clause.100  As a result, 
the lessor sought termination of the lease.101  In its decision, the Peckham 
court cited Hill v. Trenkle102 for the rule that a “temporary cessation of 
production does not terminate [a] lease.”103  Nonetheless, the court did not 
find a temporary cessation, and held the lessee’s failures to produce in 
paying quantities for multiple years during the secondary term of the lease 
was not “from causes not within the control of the [lessee].”104 
 
92. Buck, 128 N.Y.S at 865. 
93. 199 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. 1960), aff’d, 211 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961). 
94. Banach, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 865. 
95. 297 N.Y.S. 1020 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937). 
96. See 2 W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 14-7 (3d ed. 2012); Hill, 297 N.Y.S. 
at 1022.  Note, only a memorandum opinion of the case is available from the reporting services, 
and so the full facts of the case are not known including the nature of the “market conditions” that 
resulted in application of the doctrine. 
97. As previously indicated, only a memorandum opinion is available from the reporting 
services, so the known facts are limited to those recited in secondary materials such as Summers 
Oil and Gas and American Law Reports. 
98. SUMMERS, supra note 96, § 14-7. 
99. 125 N.Y.S.2d 895 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953). 
100. Peckham, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 898. 
101. Id. at 897. 
102. Hill, 297 N.Y.S. at 1022. 
103. Peckham, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 898-99. 
104. Id. at 899. 
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B. PENNSYLVANIA 
In Pennsylvania, the nature of a mineral interest depends on the 
language used to create it.  In Snyder Brothers, Inc. v. Peoples Natural Gas 
Co.,105 Appellants, fee simple owners of the land, granted a mineral lease to 
the Plaintiff.  According to the court: 
a lease of minerals in the ground is a sale of an estate in fee simple 
until all the available minerals are removed; this leaves the lessor 
with only an interest in the royalties to be paid under the lease, 
which are personal property. . . .  Specifically, the interest granted 
to lessee is a fee simple determinable; the lessor retains a 
reversionary interest.  The interest reverts to the grantor upon the 
occurrence of a specified event.106 
Yet, in Kelly v. Keys,107 the court held that Funk v. Haldeman108 and its 
progeny had consistently recognized that “a grant of exclusive rights to 
explore for oil and gas did not create an estate in land or in the oil but was 
an incorporeal hereditament.”109 
As was observed by the court in United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge,110 
minerals, like gas, are part of the property in which they are held and, while 
in the ground, belong to the property owner.  Ownership of minerals can be 
transferred only through a grant by the property owner, or by the minerals 
migrating from below the property onto the property of another.111 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has addressed the temporary 
cessation of production issue on one occasion.112  In an action by a 
landowner claiming a royalty payment owed to him by a lessee, the court 
rejected the lessee’s argument that the lease was abandoned and thus 
payment excused as a result of lessee disconnecting the well from the 
pipeline for a “brief” period.113  Citing the fact that “a temporary cessation 
of production is not sufficient to terminate a lease,” the court found the 
 
105. 676 A.2d 1226 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). 
106. Snyder Bros. Inc., 676 A.2d. at 1230 (citing Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 32 A.2d 227 
(Pa. 1943); Higbee Corp. v. Kennedy, 428 A.2d 592 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)). 
107. 62 A. 911 (Pa. 1906). 
108. 53 Pa. 229 (1867). 
109. Kelly, 62 A. at 912. 
110. 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983). 
111. United States Steel Corp., 68 A.2d at 1383 (internal citations omitted). 
112. “A temporary cessation of production is not sufficient to terminate a lease.”  Cole v. 
Phila. Co., 26 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1942) (citing 2 W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 305 (3d 
Ed. 2012)). 
113. Cole, 26 A.2d. at 923. 
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lease had not been terminated and therefore the royalty payment was due.114  
The court in dicta observed: 
The cost of developing an oil or gas territory so as to make it yield 
a profit is ordinarily very heavy.  It requires both time and money.  
A cessation of operations for a short time does not signify the 
same intention as the abandonment of a place of residence or 
mercantile room.  The time of abandonment or cessation of 
operations has important bearing on the question of intention, but 
it is obviously not controlling; for abandonment of the premises 
for a very short time, accompanied by other acts showing 
unequivocal intention not to return to the property or to do further 
work thereon, would amply justify [terminating the lease] FalseOn 
the other hand, the circumstances and conditions may be such as 
clearly to negative intention to give up the premises when 
operations have been suspended for a considerable time.115 
C. WEST VIRGINIA 
In an early West Virginia case, Sult v. Hochstetter Oil Co.,116 the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed an intricate mineral title 
dispute over an oil and gas leasehold allegedly passed through a web of 
deed reservations, lease assignments, intestate succession, and corporate 
dissolution.  The details of this ownership morass can be left aside to focus 
on three relevant discussion points in the decision:  (1) a description of the 
oil and gas lessee’s interest; (2) a common law of “minerals” under a deed 
reservation; and (3) an explanation of lease abandonment. 
1. Nature of Lessee’s Interest 
The court affirmed equity jurisdiction to settle the competing rights of 
two lessees claiming rights under separate leases from the same party.  The 
court clarified that an oil and gas lessee acquires a mere “license, conferred 
by the contract of lease, an incident of which is the right to sever, and carry 
away, the minerals, a part of the corpus of the land.”117  This interest, 




115. Id. (quoting Sult v. A. Hochstetter Oil Co., 61 S.E. 307, 313 (W.Va. 1908)). 
116. See Sult v. A. Hochstetter Oil Co., 61 S.E. 307, 308-10 (W.Va. 1908). 
117. Id. at 310. 
118. Id. 
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2. “Minerals” Defined 
The court addressed the critical dispute of whether deed language 
reserving “all minerals in and under” specified acreage included a 
reservation of all oil and gas to be produced therefrom.119  After contrasting 
the traditional “English rule” with the then-developing “American rule,”120 
the court adopted the former’s broad construction of “minerals” to include 
oil, gas, and all other minerals generally extracted for profit absent contrary 
language in the contract.121 
3. Oil and Gas Lease Abandonment 
Most relevant to issues of temporary cessation, the court laid down key 
comments in deciding whether an oil and gas lease expired by virtue of 
nonproduction.  Put simply, the court explained “[t]hough a lease, so 
terminated [by abandonment] is said to have come to its end by operation of 
law, the legal result arises from the acts of the parties” expressing the intent 
of both lessor and lessee.122  The court further explained that the unique 
aspects of oil and gas production mean that “acts tending to show 
abandonment . . . differ in their nature and probative weight” from other 
lease relationships.123  As such, the court held that lapses in production and 
their duration are facts relevant to, but not determinative of, lease 
termination: 
The time of abandonment or cessation of operations has important 
bearing on the question of intention, but it is obviously not 
controlling; for abandonment of the premises for a very short time, 
accompanied by other acts, showing unequivocal intention not to 
return to the property or to do further work thereon, would amply 
justify resumption of possession by the lessor and the execution of 
a new lease to another party.  On the other hand, the circumstances 
and conditions may be such as clearly to negative intention to give 
up the premises when operations have been suspended for a 
considerable period of time.124 
 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 310-11 (finding English decisions consistently held “that mineral will, prima 
facie, include every substance which can be got from underneath the surface of the earth for the 
purpose of profit,” while “some American decisions say the parties to a contract are presumed not 
to have intended, by the use of the term, anything other than solid substances. . . .”). 
121. Id. at 311. 
122. Id. at 329. 
123. Id. at 330 (“A cessation of operations for a short time does not signify the same 
intention as abandonment of a place of residence or a mercantile room.”). 
124. Id. 
          
746 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:727 
In sum, the court articulated an early formulation of the temporary cessation 
of production doctrine and its underlying principles – no period of 
nonproduction will terminate a lease automatically if such would contradict 
the intent of the leasing parties as evidenced by their conduct.125 
According to the West Virginia Supreme Court in Bryan v. Big Two 
Mile Gas Co.,126 factors to be considered in determining whether the 
cessation is “temporary” include the length of time without production, the 
cause of the delay, and whether the lessee exercised reasonable diligence to 
resume production.127  In Bryan, the plaintiff lessor sued the lessee, 
asserting that the lessee had lost its right to operate a gas well due to two 
periods of cessation of production.128  The lease was a fixed rate lease 
providing for a royalty of one cent per Mcf.129  The lessee paid no royalty 
during the periods of nonproduction.130  The court found in favor of the 
lessor and awarded the lessor “reasonable royalty” (determined to be 1/8th) 
on the gas produced from the well.131  Both parties appealed.132  On appeal, 
the court found a cessation of mineral production will automatically 
terminate a lease unless it is excused under the “temporary cessation of 
production” doctrine.133  The court held a “temporary” cessation of 
production is excusable if it is (1) not unreasonably protracted, (2) 
incidental to the normal operation of the lease, and (3) if it can be said that 
the possibility of such a period of cessation would be contemplated by 
objectively reasonable parties to such a lease.134  The court found that there 
was sufficient evidence that the cessation from 1979-80 was an excusable 
cessation, but that the period from 1987-90 was inexcusable, creating a 
forfeiture of the lease.135 
A cessation of production clause in a West Virginia oil and gas lease 
provides a grace period during which production may stop and restart, and 
the lease will not terminate.136  If the lease includes a cessation of 
production clause, the length of time stipulated in the lease will control.  If 
the lease does not include a cessation of production clause, then cessation of 
 
125. Id. 
126. 577 S.E.2d 258 (W.Va. 2001). 
127. Bryan, 577 S.E.2d at 266. 
128. Id. at 263. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 264. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 269-70. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 266. 
136. McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek, 346 S.E.2d 788, 795 (W.Va. 1986). 
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production during the secondary term of the lease typically will result in the 
automatic termination of the lease.137  However, courts have held that a 
mere “temporary” cessation of production does not terminate the lease.138  
Typical events that qualify as “temporary” include the types of delays that 
are not normally protracted and which are incidental to the normal 
operation of the lease, such as repair or technical problems, and reworking 
operations.139 
In McCullough, the original lessee (McCullough) brought an action 
against its assignees and the new lessor, claiming that the surrender of the 
lease by its assignees constituted abandonment that should have triggered a 
reversion of the lease to McCollough.140  The trial court granted summary 
judgment for the new lessor, holding that the oil and gas lease was not 
abandoned, but was automatically terminated when the lessee failed to 
resume operations within sixty days after production ceased during the 
secondary term of the lease.141  The court affirmed.142  The lease provided 
that if, after the primary term of the lease, production ceased for any reason, 
“this Lease shall not terminate, provided Lessee resumes operations within 
sixty (60) days from such cessation.”143  The lease also provided that no 
default of payment or performance, and thus no forfeiture, could be 
declared without giving notice to the lessee and allowing ten days to cure 
the default.144  The lessee admitted that there was no activity or effort to 
produce oil or gas, and no payment of royalties or rentals, for a period of six 
years.145  The court held that the self-executing terms of the habendum 
clause terminated the lease automatically.146  As the lessor argued for 
automatic termination and not forfeiture, the court concluded that the 
original lessee was not entitled to notice under the “notice and demand” 
clause.147  The court noted many leases contain a “savings” clause called a 
“cessation of production” clause, which extends a grace period to the lessee 
if there is a cessation of production during the secondary term of the 





140. Id. at 792. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 798. 
143. Id. at 791. 
144. Id. at 797. 
145. Id. at 792. 
146. Id. at 795. 
147. Id. at 796. 
148. Id. at 793-94. 
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“temporary” cessation of production doctrine, where a mere “temporary” 
break in production during the secondary term does not result in automatic 
termination.149  The lease involved in McCullough did not contain a savings 
clause but provided for automatic termination if production ceased for sixty 
days.150 
D. KENTUCKY 
In Kentucky, the courts were early adopters of the cessation of 
production doctrine.  The Kentucky Court of Appeals held in Lamb v. 
Vanscykle,151 an oil and gas lease remained intact despite a fifty-six-day 
period of nonproduction in the secondary term.152  After first achieving 
production sufficient to survive a two-year primary term, the lessee 
experienced financial trouble and ceased production for fifty-six days in the 
wake of creditor litigation.153  The court, holding that the circumstances 
were such that the lease did not terminate,154 provided a fact-based 
approach that mirrors today’s temporary cessation of production doctrine: 
[W]e [are not] willing to adopt the rule that a lease which is to 
continue for a definite period, and so long as oil or gas is produced 
in paying quantities, ipso facto terminates whenever production or 
development ceases for a brief period of time.  On the contrary, we 
have reached the conclusion that the only fair and just rule is to 
hold that the lease continues in force unless the period of 
cessation, viewed in the light of all the circumstances, is for an 
unreasonable time.155 
The issue of what is an unreasonable time must be determined by the 
facts and circumstances surrounding each case.156  Where wells had not 
been producing profitably for ten years and where it had become necessary 
to water flood if any production were to occur, the court found that no 
actual production in over two years was sufficiently unreasonable to 
 
149. Id. at 795. 
150. Id. at 792. 
151. 266 S.W. 253 (Ky. 1924). 
152. Lamb, 266 S.W. at 254. 
153. See id. 
154. See id. at 254 (“Here, there was a delay of only fifty-six days . . . at a time when the 
rights of creditors had intervened . . . [and] no one [was] willing to undertake further operation of 
the lease until the rights of the parties were adjusted.  In view of these circumstances we conclude 
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terminate the lease under the provisions of the habendum clause.157  The 
court noted a strong public policy against a lessee holding land for an 
unreasonable length of time simply for speculative purposes, or because of 
a lack of due diligence, where the lessor’s only revenue results from royalty 
payments received from continued production.158 
In evaluating what is reasonable, the court is influenced by the actions 
and intentions of the parties.  Where a well had minimal production for a 
period of years, and no actual production after 1945, the court nevertheless 
found that the well had not ceased production until that time that both the 
lessor and the lessee agreed that it had,159 indicating: 
Notwithstanding lack of actual production . . . it appears that the 
lessor and the lessee both considered this well as one of some 
continuing prospect and some remaining possibility right on up 
until the fall of 1946 or the early part of 1947, when these parties 
met and thereupon definitely discussed a final cessation of 
production.  The well, uncapped and unsealed, seems to have 
remained ready, until late 1946, for productive efforts, just like a 
fertile field waiting for a plow under the springtime sun.160 
The court found that until the parties met and agreed that production from 
the well would cease, the well was still potentially – albeit marginally – 
productive.161  “[T]he uncapped, unpumped well of this lease remained in 
production until the judgment of these parties was pronounced against it in 
late 1946 or early 1947.  Production, in a broad sense, is not a continuing 
usage.  Rather, it is a continuing possibility, we believe . . . .”162 
E. VIRGINIA 
Virginia oil and gas jurisprudence is quite underdeveloped, and no 
Virginia court has addressed the issue of temporary cessation of production 
directly.  Perhaps the best indication of how Virginia courts are likely to 
treat temporary cessation is provided by a recent decision of the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Virginia.163  In this case, the court 
looked to Colorado case law as persuasive on a number of other oil and gas 








163. See generally Legard v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:10cv00041, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 2943 
(W.D. Va. Jan. 11, 2011). 
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production costs from royalty payments and what duties are implied in oil 
and gas leases.164  The district court held that Virginia would likely 
recognize an implied duty on the part of lessees “to operate diligently and 
prudently, including a duty to market the gas produced.”165  “Without 
recognizing an implied duty on the part of the operator to act diligently and 
prudently, royalty owners would have no assurance of ever receiving any 
benefit of their bargain.”166  In that spirit, Virginia would likely require 
lessees to act prudently in regaining production as the circumstances 
allowed.  Virginia has also determined that “an implied duty cannot be used 
to override or modify any explicit contractual term or right.”167  Therefore, 
the contract negotiated by the parties will generally control, suggesting that 
an express contract term would be considered controlling over a general 
doctrine regarding cessation. 
F. LOUISIANA 
As a general rule, leases that contain the typical “thereafter” clause will 
terminate if no production is obtained at the end of the primary term, as the 
clause is construed as a special limitation.168  Although Louisiana courts 
have not formally adopted the temporary cessation of production doctrine, 
they have addressed the issue of whether a lease should terminate for failure 
of production.  In an action by a lessor to cancel an oil and gas lease 
because no oil or gas had been produced for six months, the lessee defended 
its failure to produce by invoking a force majeure provision.169  The court 
determined that seasonal rains were to be expected, and the defendant had 
not established that he used due diligence in attempting to dispose of the 
 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at *38-39. 
166. Id. at *38. 
167. Id. at *35 (citing Ward’s Equip., Inc. v. New Holland N. Am., Inc., 493 S.E.2d 516, 520 
(Va. 1997); Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
168. See 3-6 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 604.1 
(1991); Taylor v. Kimbell, 54 So. 2d 1, 2 (La. 1951) (“Under the plain terms of the lease contract, 
the primary term having expired, all rights granted the lessee under the lease have terminated 
unless the record shows that the gas well drilled on the premises can be classed as a producer in 
paying quantities and was shut in because of no market or demand for the gas.”). 
169. Logan v. Blaxton, 71 So. 2d 675, 676 (La. Ct. App. 1954) (“Defendant further alleged 
that oil was produced . . . until the month of November, 1951, at which time it was necessary to 
temporarily discontinue operations for the production of oil, due to the fact that the storage tanks 
located on said lease were full, and that the condition of the road over which said oil had to be 
transported to market was impassable due to excessive rains, . . . and that, therefore, he had been 
. . . prevented from selling, marketing and delivering such crude oil by Force Majeure . . . .”). 
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production.170  For that reason, the court determined the force majeure 
clause did not save the lease.171 
However, the court went on to apply a separate provision in the lease 
that provided as follows: 
[I]n the event lessor considers that operations are not being 
conducted in compliance with this contract, lessee shall be notified 
in writing of the facts relied upon as constituting a breach hereof 
and lessee shall have sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice to 
comply with the obligations imposed by virtue of this 
instrument.172 
Because the contract is “law between the parties,” the plaintiff lessor must 
give the required notice in order to bring suit for termination.173 
The court further stated that without the foregoing provision in the 
contract, “it would appear that a putting in default would be necessary 
before bringing an action for the dissolution of the contract.”174  This 
conclusion was based on the court’s analysis that where a time period is not 
express, but is a reasonable time, or work is to be done with reasonable 
diligence, that the issue of default is one of fact and not as a matter of law, 
so that an express notice of default was required.175  Based on the foregoing 
analysis, in the absence of a clause requiring additional drilling or 
reworking within a specified time after cessation of production, the lessee is 
held to a “due and reasonable diligence” standard, and the lessor may be 
required to put the lessee in default prior to bringing suit. 
The more common set of facts includes a provision similar to the one at 
issue in Trinidad Petroleum Corp. v. Pioneer Natural Gas. Co.:176 
If prior to discovery of oil, gas, sulfur or other minerals on said 
land, lessee should drill a dry hole or holes, thereon, or if after 
discovery of oil, gas, sulfur or other mineral, the production 
thereof should cease from any cause, this lease shall not terminate 
if lessee commences operations for additional drilling or 
reworking within sixty days thereafter.177 
 
170. Id. at 677 (acknowledging that it would not have been economical to connect the well 
with any pipe lines in the area, but noting the “defendant made only one effort to produce 
transportation for the oil”). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 678. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. (citing Temple v. Lindsay, 161 So. 8, 12 (La. 1935)) (emphasis added). 
176. 416 So. 2d 290 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
177. Trinidad Petrol. Corp., 416 So. 2d at 296. 
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Louisiana courts have construed such a provision as creating an express 
resolutory condition, i.e., the cessation of production for a period of sixty 
days, the occurrence of which will effectively terminate the lease.178  In 
Trinidad Petroleum, the plaintiff lessee sought to confirm that its lease was 
still effective under a force majeure clause and to determine that the 
defendant lessor’s purported new lease to a third party was void.179  The 
court noted that Louisiana jurisprudence “has strictly limited the application 
of force majeure as an excuse for performance.”  Rejecting force majeure 
defenses, the court rejected both arguments, stating that the lessee had “the 
right either to continue the lease in effect by commencing drilling or 
reworking operations within [sixty] days or the right to allow the lease to 
expire.”180  Because the failure to commence such operations within sixty 
days worked a termination of the lease, the lessor need not place the lessee 
in default prior to bringing judicial proceedings to cancel the lease.181  In 
other words, the lessee was put in default pursuant to the express resolutory 
condition contained in the lease, with no additional actions needed on the 
part of lessor.  Several cases have covered the issue of what constitutes 
“reworking” sufficient to maintain the lease pursuant to a savings clause.  
This issue commonly arises when a lessor seeks to terminate a lease, 
arguing work done was “maintenance” that does not qualify as 
“reworking.”182 
When a lessor files suit questioning the validity of a lease or to 
terminate a lease, an issue may arise as to the extension of the lease term 
due to the litigation.  The lessor, by bringing such action, deprives the 
lessee of “the exercise of the rights granted to him by the lease” and he 
should be granted an extension beyond the primary term equal to the length 
 
178. Id. at 298; see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carruth, 512 So. 2d 571, 574 (La. Ct. App. 
1987) (“‘[N]o cessation’ clauses can state resolutory conditions.”).  The court in Carruth looked 
to Talley v. Lawhon, 90 So. 427 (La. 1922), and Woods v. Ratliff, 417 So. 2d 1375 (La. Ct. App. 
1981) for the proposition that “no cessation” clauses can state resolutory conditions.  Id.  The 
leases in those cases contained language explicitly causing the lease to terminate upon failure to 
meet the condition (e.g., “lease payments . . . waived . . . as long as . . . no cessation of work of 
over 60 days” and “lease could be maintained only so long as the lessee either . . .”).  Id. 
(emphasis added).  The lease in Carruth did not contain such durational language, but the court 
stated that “the lease as a whole indicates that failure to pay rentals or conduct operations as 
defined by paragraph six will result in termination of the lease.”  Id. 
179. Trinidad Petrol. Corp., 416 So. 2d at 291. 
180. Id. at 300. 
181. Id. at 296.  Note that in a dissent, Judge Doucet determined that the force majeure 
provision did save the lease, and, as such, the lessor was not required to put the lessee in default.  
Id. at 303-07.  Interestingly, Judge Doucet wrote the majority opinion for Acquisitions, Inc. v. 
Frontier Explorations, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1095 (App. La. 1983), the following year, which focused 
heavily on the need to place lessee in default for failure to properly pay shut-in payments if 
classified as royalties. 
182. See generally House v. Tidewater Oil Co., 219 So. 2d 616 (App. La. 1969). 
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of the litigation.183  However, if the challenge comes subsequent to the 
expiration of the primary term, the lease will either be found viable or not, 
without regard to the litigation itself affecting the term.  But, if the lessor 
brings a suit for termination for a reason other than cessation of production 
in paying quantities, a lessor may not “complain thereafter when production 
drops below paying quantities because of the lessee’s decision not to 
expend the funds necessary to maintain the lease during the pendency of the 
lawsuit.”184 
In the foregoing cases, the courts of Louisiana have shown little 
tolerance for continued cessation of production.185  If production or 
reworking activities can resume through any means, the courts will 
typically require the operators to diligently pursue those other avenues.  On 
the other hand, the Louisiana courts show a willingness to withhold a 
remedy to a lessor who does not put his lessee in default prior to bringing 
suit for termination of the lease if the lease has not yet expired by its own 
terms; for example, the time of an express contract provision has not run.186  
If the provision has expired, the lease will terminate, unless the lessee can 
demonstrate that it has commenced “reworking” or drilling operations 
sufficient to maintain the lease.187 
G. ALABAMA 
In Alabama, cases have come to varied conclusions on the nature of a 
mineral interest.  Some have held a mineral lease is a corporeal 
hereditament,188 whereas others have said that an oil and gas lease creates 
an incorporeal hereditament, with title remaining in the lessor.189  However, 
the court in NCNB Texas National Bank, N.A., v. West190 stated the 
Alabama rule most clearly: 
Alabama determines ownership of oil and gas under the 
nonownership theory, which recognizes the migratory nature of oil 
and gas and requires actual possession to establish ownership.  The 
owner of property containing gas has the right to reduce the gas to 
 
183. Id. (citing Hanszen v. Cocke, 246 So. 2d 200, 203 (La. Ct. App. 1971)). 
184. Noel v. Amoco Prod. Co., 826 F. Supp. 1000, 1014 (W.D. La. 1993). 
185. See supra footnote 178 and accompanying text. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. See Willcutt v. Union Oil Co., 432 So. 2d 1217, 1221 (Ala. 1983). See generally 
Williams v. Kitchens, 74 So. 2d. 457 (Ala. 1954). 
189. Moorer v. Bethlehem Baptist Church, 130 So. 2d 367, 371-72 (Ala. 1961); Lake v. 
Sealy, 165 So. 399, 401 (Ala. 1936); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Massey, 33 So. 896, 897 (Ala. 
1902). 
190. 631 So. 2d 212 (Ala. 1993). 
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possession or to sever the gas rights by conveyance.  The 
nonownership theory of gas ownership, because it recognizes the 
migratory nature of oil and gas, requires actual possession to 
establish ownership of the resource, and the right held by the 
landowner is “the right to reduce the oil and gas to possession or to 
sever this right for economic consideration.”191 
In Griffen v. Crutcher-Tufts Corp.,192 the court was presented with the 
question of whether an oil and gas lease is held open by production of a 
well drilled outside of the primary term of the lease.193  The relevant facts in 
Griffen were that an oil and gas well that had been producing for several 
years during the primary term of the lease was shut down for workover 
operations shortly before the January 15, 1980 expiration of the primary 
term.194  Those workover operations were unsuccessful and the well was 
abandoned on April 10, 1980.195  In May of 1980, a new well was drilled at 
a different location.196  Griffin claimed that the lease had expired at the end 
of the primary term, because there was no production.197  Crutcher-tufts 
Corp. argued that a “drilling operations clause” in the lease extended the 
lease while the second well was being drilled and produced.198  The drilling 
operations clause provided in part, that if the lessee is engaged in drilling or 
reworking operations within sixty days of the expiration of the primary 
term, the lease would remain in effect “so long as operations are prosecuted 
with no cessation of more than sixty (60) consecutive days, and if they 
result in the production of oil or gas or other mineral . . . .”199  The Griffen 
court agreed with Griffin and held that under the drilling operations clause 
in the lease, it was necessary for production to have been obtained as a 
result of the reworking operations that were occurring at the end of the 
primary term.200  Drilling a second well in April, which was more than sixty 
days after the end of the primary term, could not maintain the lease.201  
Griffen stands for the proposition that Alabama considers an oil and gas 
 
191. NCNB Tx. Nat’l Bank, 631 So. 2d at 223 (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Oswell, 62 So. 2d 783, 
787 (1953)). 
192. 500 So. 2d 1008 (Ala. 1986). 
193. Griffin, 500 So. 2d at 1012. 




198. Id. at 1009-10. 
199. Id. at 1010. 
200. Id. at 1011. 
201. Id. at 1010.  The court noted that the Defendants could have included a “continuous 
drilling operations clause,” which would have allowed the second well to have maintained the 
lease.  Id. 
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lease to be a fee simple determinable because the court treated the lease as 
expired once the producing well holding the lease was abandoned and the 
primary lease had expired.202 
In Sheffield v. Exxon Corp.,203 the Supreme Court of Alabama 
recognized that many oil and gas leases contain cessation of production 
clauses that generally provide for termination of the lease “in the event that 
certain time periods expire without the operator or lessees having 
prosecuted ‘drilling’ or ‘reworking’ operations.”204  As a result, the court 
set out to define, generally, what operations constitute “drilling” or 
“reworking,” noting that each case will be fact specific.205  Looking 
favorably to Oklahoma law, in particular, Hoyt v. Continental Oil Co.,206 
the court noted the key factor for evaluating drilling or reworking 
operations, where a lease does not expressly dictate what operations will 
defeat a cessation of production clause, is that the operations be associated 
with the physical site of the well or unit.207  Negotiations or other non-site 
efforts that do nothing to make the well capable of production are not 
sufficient activities to constitute “drilling or reworking.”208  Furthermore, in 
Alabama, a well generally must be capable of producing in paying 
quantities to be considered “producing.”209  The Sheffield court did not 
reach the question of what period of time it takes to trigger cessation of 
production as the court appears to be assuming that leases will generally 
contain time triggers with regard to cessation of production.210 
H. MISSISSIPPI 
As a general rule in Mississippi, an oil and gas lease will terminate if 
no production is obtained at the end of the primary term.211  However, 
Mississippi has formally adopted the temporary cessation of production 
 
202. Id. at 1011. 
203. 424 So. 2d 1297 (Ala. 1982). 
204. Sheffield, 424 So. 2d at 1302. 
205. Id. 
206. 606 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1980). 
207. Sheffield, 424 So. 2d at 305. 
208. Id. at 1302-03. 
209. Id. at 1303 (“We emphasize that our treatment of the ‘capable well’ issue—a well 
capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities—is limited to the context of the instant case 
and is not necessarily to be given the same treatment in other contexts.”). 
210. Id. at 1305. 
211. Mississippi has not expressly stated whether actual production is required to extend a 
lease beyond the primary term.  However, a federal district court opinion upholding Mississippi 
law has held that the drilling of a discovery well prior to the expiration of the primary term was 
enough to hold past the primary term, especially because the “actual drilling thereafter proceeded 
with diligence until the well was spudded.”  D’Lo Royalties, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 389 F. Supp. 
538, 549 (S.D. Miss. 1975). 
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doctrine in the case of Frost v. Gulf Oil Corp.212  In this case, the Supreme 
Court of Mississippi, decided a lease dispute in which lessors argued that 
the lessee’s cessation of production terminated the lease.213  The court 
initially declared that mineral leases are to be construed against the lessee 
and in favor of the lessor and that general rules of construction are to be 
used.214  The court went on to state: 
The authorities agree that temporary cessation of production after 
the expiration of the primary term does not terminate the lease, 
ipso facto.  A reading of the numerous cases cited by the parties 
clearly indicate that the courts have generally applied the rule of 
reasonable construction to the question of when and under what 
circumstances cessation of production after the expiration of the 
primary term will terminate a mineral lease.  Consideration must 
be given to the contract itself and the circumstances attending the 
cessation and whether the cessation is a reasonable incident to the 
continued production of minerals.215 
The most important factor for a court to consider is “whether or not the 
temporary stoppage in production was for an unreasonable length of time,” 
with five to six months being considered acceptable though no maximum 
time period was set.216  In Frost, the court stated that after the lessee had 
expended considerable resources for the well and because production was 
only on hold for four months while the lessee could obtain a required 
permit, “such cessation of production pending these administrative 
procedures was an incident to the proper production of gas . . . and was 
therefore not an unreasonable delay . . . .”217 
In many cases, the general cessation of production doctrine will not be 
applicable because the lease will expressly provide a set period of time in 
which the lessee must undertake reworking operations or drill a new well in 
order to maintain the lease.  In those situations, reasonableness will no 
longer be the test.  Rather, the question will be whether the lessee has in 
fact resumed the required operations within the time period specified by the 
lease agreement.218 
 
212. 119 So. 2d 759 (Miss. 1960). 
213. Frost, 119 So. 2d at 761. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 761-62. 
216. Id. at 762. 
217. Id. at 764. 
218. Lone Star Prod. Co. v. Walker, 257 So. 2d 496, 501 (Miss. 1971) (indicating the rule 
developed in Frost should be applied).  “The Frost case had under consideration a lease which did 
not contain the sixty (60) day clause which is in appellants’ leases and held that temporary 
cessation of production after expiration of the primary term of a mineral lease does not terminate 
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If a well is shut-in, it is a “producing well that has been closed down 
temporarily for repairs, cleaning out, building up pressure, lack of a market, 
etc.,”219 and a cessation of production clause may have a different effect.  In 
Mississippi, if a well subject to a cessation clause is shut-in, the cessation 
clause does not take effect in situations where the well is under constructive 
production because the lessee is tendering shut-in royalties.  The lease will 
not be terminated if the lessee did not undertake reworking or drilling 
operations in line with the cessation clause (unless the terms of the lease so 
require), because the shut-in clause is applicable. 
One issue encountered in interpreting cessation of production clauses is 
how to handle declines in production.  If production is originally found in 
paying quantities, but then declines to something less than that, though still 
nominal production, is the cessation of production clause triggered?  In a 
Mississippi case, the lease at issue used the word “production” as follows: 
“[i]f prior to the discovery of oil, gas or other mineral on said land or on 
acreage pooled therewith, [l]essee should drill a dry hole or holes thereon, 
or if after the discovery of oil, gas or other mineral, the production thereof 
should cease from any cause.”220  The court determined that because 
“production” is an unambiguous word, the court should interpret it by its 
plain meaning; if the parties had meant “production in paying quantities,” 
those are the words they should have used.221  Therefore, the production 
will not be considered to have “ceased” until no actual production is had 
from the well. 
Additionally, cessation clauses commonly identify “reworking 
operations” as one of the actions that will maintain the lease.  Yet, an exact 
definition of the term “reworking operations” has eluded the court, as it is 
difficult to formulate with exactness considering “the problems of capturing 
and producing oil and gas located thousands of feet below the surface of the 
earth are many and varied.”222  Generally, reworking includes “testing, 
evaluation and other acts performed necessary to reworking a given well, 
and each case will have to be considered in light of facts peculiar to that 
 
the lease, ipso facto.”  Id.  “Appellants’ leases contained provisions that if production ceased for 
sixty (60) days and drilling or reworking operations were not conducted without cessation for 
more than sixty (60) days, the leases would terminate; therefore, the rule in Frost has no 
application to this case.”  Id. 
219. Cavanaugh v. O’Connell, 732 So. 2d 912, 915 (Miss. 1999) (citing 8 HOWARD R. 
WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS ANNOTATED 1026 (1996)). 
220. Roberts v. Corum, 112 So. 2d 550, 553 (Miss. 1959) (emphasis added). 
221. Id. at 554-55. 
222. Lone Star Prod., 257 So. 2d at 500. 
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operation.  One of the prime requirements is that the acts of the operator 
constitute a bona fide effort to rework a given well.”223 
I. TENNESSEE 
In Tennessee, a lease will terminate upon the expiration of the primary 
term if no production is obtained.  “Production” is defined in Tennessee to 
mean production “in paying quantities.”224  Tennessee has not formally 
adopted the temporary cessation of production doctrine.  Based on 
Tennessee case law, a lessee whose production temporarily lapsed will be 
held to the highest standards of prudence and diligence in order for a court 
to find that the lease had not permanently lapsed.  Tennessee has 
determined the purpose for granting an oil and gas lease is for the 
development of the leased property, therefore, the terms of the oil and gas 
lease, specifically those dealing with production, or the lack thereof, should 
be interpreted in favor of the lessor.225  However, such inquiries are fact-
based and depend on the totality of the circumstances. 
Tennessee has recognized that the “purpose of the cessation of 
production clause is to ‘describe the rights of the lessee to resume 
operations if production should cease.’”226  In P.M. Drilling, Inc. v. 
Groce,227 the lease at issue contained a habendum clause allowing shut-in 
payments to constitute production, and a cessation of production clause that 
required operations to be commenced within ninety days after production 
ceased for any cause.228  The court determined the meaning of “production” 
in the habendum clause included constructive production by the payment of 
royalties, while the meaning of “production” in the cessation of production 
clause was the definition traditionally given to the word in Tennessee – 
production “in paying quantities.”229  When actual production ceased, the 
lessee paid shut-in payments but did not resume operations for the drilling 
of a new well within the ninety days provided.230  Therefore, although the 
lease did not lapse under the habendum clause, it lapsed under the cessation 
 
223. Id. 
224. P.M. Drilling, Inc. v. Groce, 792 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). 
225. Waddle v. Lucky Strike Oil Co., 551 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Tenn. 1977) (citing Mountain 
States Oil Corp. v. Sandoval, 125 P.2d 964, 967 (Col. 1942)). 
226. P.M. Drilling, Inc., 792 S.W.2d at 721 (citing 4 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 47.3 (1972)). 
227. 792 S.W.2d 717 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). 
228. P.M. Drilling, Inc., 792 S.W.2d at 719. 
229. Id. at 721-22. 
230. Id. at 723. 
          
2012] THE QUICK AND THE DEAD 759 
of production clause.231  The court in P.M. Drilling acknowledged that 
these facts produced “a strange result.”232 
A common term used in cessation of production clauses is 
“reworking”: 
If at the expiration of the primary term oil or gas is not being 
produced on said land but lessee is then engaged in drilling or 
reworking operations thereon, this lease shall remain in force so 
long as operations are prosecuted with no cessation of more than 
sixty days, and if they result in production of oil or gas so long 
thereafter as oil or gas is produced from said land.233 
Tennessee has defined reworking operations to include “work performed on 
a well after its completion, in an effort to secure production where there has 
been none, restore production that has ceased, or increase production.”234  
Reworking can include “testing, evaluation, and all acts necessary to 
reworking a given well.”235  Therefore, the lessee should have great 
flexibility in meeting the requirements of such clause, although a court will 
still likely hold it to a high standard of prudence and diligence. 
J. ILLINOIS 
Due to the “fugacious qualities” of oil and gas, Illinois law establishes 
that oil and gas cannot be separately owned until it is severed or extracted 
from the ground, at which point the possessory interest in the oil and gas 
becomes vested in the producer.236  In Transcontinental Oil Co. v. 
Emmerson,237 the court undertook a review of the various types of property 
interests, ultimately concluding that the instrument at issue in that case: 
A form of oil and gas lease . . . conveys a freehold interest in the 
real estate to which it applies, and is, in effect, a sale of a part of 
 
231. Id. at 722. 
232. Id. (“Here, production ceased because of a lack of market for the gas.  The drilling of a 
new well and discovery of more gas would not have an effect on the marketability of the gas.  The 
only practical effect of the cessation of production clause under the facts of this case would be if 
the new well produced a discovery of oil and, if that oil proved to be marketable as opposed to the 
unmarketable gas.  Although such a result appears unlikely, we must give effect to the plain 
language of the lease.”). 
233. Cali-Ken Petroleum Co. v. Slaven, 754 S.W.2d 64, 66 n.3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) 
(emphasis added). 
234. Id. at 66 (citing 8 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 
MANUAL OF TERMS 758 (1986)). 
235. Id. (citing Lone Star Prod. Co. v. Walker, 257 So. 2d 496, 500 (Miss. 1971)). 
236. Triger v. Carter Oil Co., 23 N.E.2d. 55, 56 (Ill. 1939) (citing Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 
105 N.E. 308, 311 (Ill. 1914); Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughetee, 88 N.E. 818, 820 (Ill. 1909); Watford 
Oil and Gas Co. v. Shipman, 84 N.E. 53, 54 (Ill. 1908)). 
237. 131 N.E. 645 (Ill. 1921). 
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the land.  Oil and gas in the earth cannot be the subject of an 
ownership distinct from the soil.  They belong to the owner of the 
land only so long as they remain under the land, and his grant of 
them to another is a grant only of such oil and gas as the grantee 
may find, and no title to it vests in the grantee until it is actually 
found.  The conveyance, however, of the right to enter upon the 
land for the purpose of prospecting and operating for oil and gas, 
laying pipe lines, and building powers, stations, and structures to 
produce, save, and care for the products is a conveyance of an 
interest in the land itself, which, if of indefinite duration, is a 
freehold estate in the land.238 
Illinois law follows the view that an oil and gas lease containing a 
typical “thereafter” habendum clause conveys to the lessee a freehold estate 
subject to the special limitations regarding commencement of production in 
the primary term and continued production thereafter.239  The Illinois 
Supreme Court has expressly stated that despite the nature of the lessee’s 
estate, “such freehold interests are [not] always subject to a condition 
subsequent.”240  Rather, in construing the habendum clause as one of 
limitation, it follows that the lessee’s interest will terminate automatically 
upon nonproduction at the end of the primary term or cessation of 
production during the secondary term.241  The lessor is not required to 
notify the lessee for termination to be effective.242 
The leading case on temporary cessation of production in Illinois, 
Gillespie v. Wagoner,243 holds: 
We believe the proper rule to be that temporary cessation of 
production after the expiration of the primary term is not a 
cessation of production within the contemplation and meaning of 
the “thereafter” clause if, in the light of all surrounding 
circumstances, reasonable diligence is being exercised by the 
lessee to continue production of oil or gas under the lease.244 
In Gillespie, a well was shut down for over two years, and the motor was 
removed from the pump jack without any explanation.245  The only reasons 
 
238. Transcon. Oil Co., 191 N.E. at 649. 
239. See Dethloff v. Zeigler Coal Co., 412 N.E.2d 526, 530 (Ill. 1980). 
240. Id. at 531. 
241. See id. (citing HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 
604 (1977)). 
242. See generally Gillespie v. Wagoner, 190 N.E.2d 765 (Ill. 1963). 
243. 190 N.E.2d 765 (Ill. 1963). 
244. Id. at 767 (citing Lamb v. Vansyckle, 266 S.W. 253, 254 (Ky. 1924)). 
245. Id. at 765. 
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given for failure to produce were that the operators were in financial 
trouble, it took time to contact the numerous working-interest owners, and 
the weather was bad at times.246  According to the appellate court, these 
circumstances failed to show reasonable diligence in producing the well and 
the trial court was entirely justified in holding that the lease had 
terminated.247  Once the lease had terminated, it could not be revived by 
commencing production almost simultaneously with plaintiff’s action to 
declare the lease void.248  Other Illinois cases have similarly held that 
failure to run pumps because oil prices are depressed does not constitute 
reasonable diligence to continue to produce oil.249 
Reasonable diligence was found to exist where production of oil had 
ceased, temporarily, due to a number of circumstances beyond the control 
of the lessee.250  In that case, the lessee testified that he had trouble with the 
motor on the well and with access to the well site due to poor weather.  
There was also testimony that the lessor may have tampered with the pump, 
hampering the lessee’s efforts to restart production.  The court concluded 
that while no actual production had occurred for two years, “the failure to 
produce commercial quantities of oil was beyond [lessee’s] control, where 
the uncontroverted evidence showed that they suffered continual problems 
with the well machinery.”251  According to the court, the lessee had made 
good faith efforts to keep the motor running so that production could 
continue, even if those efforts had not succeeded.252  However, where water 
flooding was allowing production to occur elsewhere in a unit, merely 
examining programs to change the pattern of water flooding, performing 
dye tests, and converting some wells into injection wells in an effort to 
obtain production from a well that was not located in the unit, did not 
constitute reasonable diligence to maintain production from that well and 
was insufficient to negate seven years of nonproduction.253 
Normally, to extend a lease beyond the fixed term by production, the 
oil or gas must be produced from the land in question.  An exception to this 
rule exists when a valid unitization agreement is entered into.254  Several 
Illinois cases have evaluated whether production from a pooled or unitized 
 
246. Id. at 767. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. See generally Dart v. Leavell, 795 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Smith v. Duncan, 
595 N.E.2d 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
250. Duncan, 595 N.E.2d at 648. 
251. Id. at 647-48. 
252. Id. at 648. 
253. Belden v. Tri-Star Producing, Inc., 435 N.E.2d 927, 936-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
254. Id. 
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tract is sufficient to maintain a lease when production from the leased tract 
itself has ceased.255  In one leading case, a conveyance of one-half interest 
in the oil and gas under two separate tracts was made in one deed.256  The 
conveyance was for a stated term and “as long thereafter as oil or gas or 
both shall be produced therefrom.”257  Within the stated primary term, both 
tracts yielded production.258  However, after the expiration of the primary 
term, production ceased on one tract (the North 40) but continued on the 
other (the South 40).259  The case considered the issue of whether the 
continuous production on the second tract served to extend the grantee’s 
ownership on one-half interest of the oil and gas in the first tract.  The 
Illinois Supreme Court held that it did: 
Arising first in decisions relating to oil-and-gas leases, it is the rule 
of the vast majority that where a number of land owners demise 
their lands in a single lease, whether contiguous or not, and 
provide that after a designated period the interest covered by the 
said instrument will continue for as long as there is production 
upon said land, production which is sufficient to continue the 
interest as to any of the land described is sufficient to continue the 
interest as to all of the land described.260 
The courts have extended this logic to term mineral deeds holding that 
production from one tract will maintain the lease into the secondary term as 
to another tract covered by the same instrument regardless of whether they 
are contiguous or not.261  Citing cases from Kansas, another Illinois court 
similarly held that in a single lease of multiple tracts for a term of twenty 
years and as long thereafter as oil and gas are being produced from “said 
land,” the words “said land” refer to the entire acreage.  As a result, 
production on any tract is sufficient to extend the lease as to all tracts.262 
Where wells on a leased tract are shut in, production from an adjoining 
tract that is unitized with the lease, but that is outside of the unit, has no 
bearing on the validity of the lease and cannot be relied upon to maintain 
 





260. Id. at 344 (citing A. Veeder Co. v. Pan Am. Prod. Co., 17 So. 2d 891, 896 (La. 1944); 
Lynch v. Davis, 92 S.E. 427, 428-29 (W.Va. 1917); Southland Royalty Co. v. O’Daniel 287 
S.W.2d 182, 186-87 (Tex. App. 1956); Hunt Prod. Co. v. Dickerson, 135 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Tex. 
App. 1939); Lusk v. Green, 245 Pac. 636, 637 (Okla. 1926)); see also 2 W.L. SUMMERS, THE 
LAW OF OIL & GAS § 295 (Perm. ed. 1927). 
261. Dickerson, 169 N.E.2d at 345. 
262. Baker v. Hugoton Prod. Co., 320 P.2d 772, 794 (Kan. 1958) (citing Cowman v. Phillips 
Petrol. Co., 51 P.2d 988, 991 (Kan. 1935); Wilson v. Holm, 188 P.2d 899, 905 (Kan. 1948)). 
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the lease.263  A statutory provision, however, provides that when multiple 
tracts are pooled and developed as a unit, production from any tract in the 
unit is considered to be production from all of the tracts.264  As a result, 
unitized production from wells off an eighty acre leased tract constituted 
continuous production from the eighty acre tract so as to keep the lease 
alive.265  Because the statute expressly states that production from any tract 
shall be regarded as production from each tract, the court found that the 
production from a well located on a different parcel of land that was part of 
the same unitized pool was sufficient to sustain the lease. 
In Belden v. Tri-Star Producing, Inc., the court held that where a holder 
of the working interest or royalty refuses to sign a unit agreement, the pre-
existing oil and gas leases and other contracts of the non-signers remain in 
effect and unmodified by the unit agreements.266  As a result, a lessor who 
does not sign a unitization agreement is due royalties only from that 
produced on his leasehold.267  Additionally, a lessor and lessee relationship 
is enumerated in the original lease.268  Therefore, to extend a lease under its 
habendum clause when the lease is within a unit not joined by the lessor, 
production cannot be from anywhere but the leasehold.269 
K. INDIANA 
The Indiana Supreme Court has held a “title to natural gas does not 
vest in any private owner until it is reduced to actual possession.”270  
According to Halbert v. Hendrix,271 “the owner of lands does not have an 
absolute title to the oil and gas in place as corporeal real property, but rather 
has the ‘exclusive right’ to explore for oil and gas and reduce it to 
possession and to a consequent absolute ownership.”272 
 
263. Edwards v. Dhom, 507 N.E.2d 1253, 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
264. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 725/23.2(a) (2012); see also id. 725/22.2(d) (2012) (“All 
operations, including, but not limited to, the commencement, drilling, or operation of a well upon 
any portion of a drilling unit shall be deemed for all purposes the conduct of such operations upon 
each separately owned tract in the drilling unit by the several owners thereof.  That portion of the 
production allocated to a separately owned tract included in a drilling unit shall, when produced, 
be deemed, for all purposes, to have been actually produced from such tract by a well drilled 
thereon.”). 
265. Shelton v. Andres, 462 N.E.2d 549, 554 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 




270. State v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 809, 812 (Ind. 1898). 
271. 95 N.E.2d 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1950). 
272. Id. at 223 (citing Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs, 56 N.E.2d 672, 663 (Ind. 1944); Campbell 
v. Smith, 101 N.E. 89, 95 (Ind. 1913); Fairbanks v. Warrum, 104 N.E. 983, 986 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1914); Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co., 95 N.E. 225, 226 (Ind. 1911)); see also Callihan v. Bander, 73 
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Indiana is somewhat unique in that its temporary cessation of 
production doctrine is codified as a matter of statute.  Of the four cases in 
Indiana that give any discussion to the concept of cessation of production 
and whether an oil or gas lease in the secondary or “thereafter” phase 
survives temporary cessation of production, three cases relied heavily on 
that statute, Indiana Code provision, section 32-5-8-1,which provided (at 
the time those cases were decided), in relevant part: 
All leases for oil and gas heretofore and hereafter entered of record 
in this state shall become null and void after a period of one (1) 
year has elapsed since the last payment of rentals thereon as 
stipulated for in such lease or contract, or since operation for oil or 
gas has ceased, both by the nonproduction of oil or gas and the 
nondevelopment of said lease . . . .273 
In 2002, the Indiana Code was recodified, section 32-5-8-1 was repealed 
and a virtually identical provision is now found in section 32-23-8-1274: 
(a)  Leases for oil and gas that are recorded in Indiana are void: 
(1)  after a period of one (1) year has elapsed since: 
(A)  the last payment of rentals on the oil and gas lease as 
stipulated in the lease or contract; or 
(B) operation for oil or gas has ceased, both by the 
nonproduction of oil or gas and the nondevelopment of 
the lease; and 
(2)  upon the written request of the owner of the land, 
accompanied by the affidavit of the owner stating that: 
(A)  no rentals have been paid to or received by the owner 
or any person, bank, or corporation in the owner’s behalf 
for a period of one (1) year after they have become due; 
and  
(B)  the leases and contracts have not been operated for 
the production of oil or gas for one (1) year. 
In Wilson v. Elliott,275 the lessor argued the lessee’s failure to sell any 
oil between August 1987 and April 1989 caused the lease to terminate.276  
 
N.E.2d 360, 361 (Ind. 1947) (citing Heller v. Dailey, 63 N.E. 490, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 1902).  
Accord Heeter v. Hardy, 76 N.E.2d 590, 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 1948) (“Oil and gas leases create an 
interest in real estate known to the law as an incorporeal hereditament.”). 
273. Text of repealed statute quoted from references in cases, including Wilson v. Elliott, 589 
N.E.2d 259, 262-63 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). 
274. To date, no cases have interpreted the new statutory provision. 
275. 589 N.E.2d 259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). 
276. Wilson, 589 N.E.2d at 261. 
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The record showed that the lessee had pumped the wells and produced oil 
continuously from 1973 until the end of 1987.277  “In 1986, prices for crude 
oil dropped and many oil and gas lease operators slowed production 
pending a rebound in crude oil prices.”278  Oil not sold was stored in 
tanks.279  During 1987, the lessee engaged the services of a geologist to 
evaluate the future production potential of the lease.280  The lessee also 
replaced two bottom-hole pumps on the wells.281  Oil was pumped and 
produced in October and November of 1988, and in January and April of 
1989.282  “Oil was sold in May and August of 1987, and oil from storage 
was sold in April and May of 1989.”283 
According to the appellate court, the evidence was more than sufficient 
to support the trial court’s judgment that there was no one-year period 
between August of 1987 and April of 1989 when there was both 
nonproduction and nondevelopment of the lease.284  Quoting the former 
Indiana Code section 32-5-8-1, the court observed: 
The Indiana legislature has codified rules to determine when 
cessation of production after the primary term of the lease expires 
causes a lease to terminate.  Under IND. CODE 32-5-8-1, a 
landowner may claim cancellation of the lease when a one-year 
period has elapsed and the lessee has not paid rentals as stipulated 
for in the lease or contract, or the operator has not conducted 
operations, both by not producing oil, and by not developing the 
lease.285 
Because there had been ongoing efforts to develop the lease, even while 
production was temporarily ceased, the lease remained in effect.286 
Neither the statute nor the parties’ contract provides for 
cancellation of the lease solely because of [lessee’s] failure to pay 
[lessor] for more than a one-year period. . . .  Because a payment 
provision is not a term of the contract and the statute does not 
provide for cancellation based on failure to pay unless the 
provision is in the contract or lease, the trial court did not err when 
 
277. Id. at 260. 




282. Id.  
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 264. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. 
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it concluded the lease did not terminate when [lessee] did not pay 
[lessor] for over a one-year period.287 
In Plymouth Fertilizer Co. v. Balmer,288 Plymouth failed to pay the 
rent, made no effort to physically maintain the wells, and invested no 
money to maintain the wells for more than a one-year period.289  
Furthermore, between 1963 and 1979, Plymouth made no serious attempts 
to find a market for the gas that was discovered on the property.290  The trial 
court held that Plymouth’s oil and gas lease could be cancelled by filing an 
affidavit pursuant to the now-repealed section 32-5-8-1.291 
The lessor in Plymouth Fertilizer Co. had used gas from the well for 
domestic purposes during the time in question, and had argued that such use 
was tantamount to rent.292  The court disagreed.  Quoting from an Illinois 
Appellate Court case,293 the Plymouth Fertilizer Co. court stated: 
From a reading of the entire instrument it is evident that the 
royalty provision is a primary matter, while the provision for free 
gas, like the provision for burying lines below plow depth, is a 
secondary matter.  Nor does the acceptance of free gas constitute 
an estoppel.  Under the terms of the lease, lessor was entitled to 
free gas and to have the lease terminate at the end of the primary 
term unless there was production.  These rights are not in the 
alternative.294 
Adopting the Illinois reasoning, the court concluded that mere provision of 
free gas was not sufficient to preserve the lease.”295 
In Barr v. Sun Exploration Co.,296 the court again relied on then-
existing Indiana Code section 32-5-8-1, finding the legislature intended that 
both the nonproduction of oil and gas, and the nondevelopment of the lease 
together be shown to prove a cessation of operations for oil and gas.297  
While Sun produced no oil in 1979, there were activities to repair, maintain, 
and operate the oil well geared toward the eventual production or attempted 
 
287. Id. 
288. 488 N.E.2d 1129 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
289. Plymouth Fertilizer Co., 488 N.E.2d at 1132. 
290. Id. at 1137. 
291. Id. at 1135. 
292. Id. 
293. Metz v. Doss, 252 N.E.2d 410, 412-13 (Ill Ct. App. 1969); see also Pieszchalski v. 
Oslager, 470 N.E.2d 1083, 1090 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984). 
294. Plymouth Fertilizer Co., 488 N.E.2d at 1136. 
295. Id. 
296. 436 N.E.2d 821 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
297. Barr, 436 N.E.2d at 825. 
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production of oil.298  “Several times during 1979, Sun attended the well and 
worked on the pump.”299  Testimony revealed that the pump had been 
struck by lightning and shut down by floods during severe thunderstorms in 
the spring and summer of 1979.300  Moreover, Sun paid a pumper monthly 
wages from January 1979 through and including January 31, 1980.301  
According to the court, these activities constituted operation sufficient to 
maintain the lease.302 
In Barrett v. Dorr,303 the appellant argued the temporary cessation of 
production over a one year period rendered the lease void, and that 
appellee’s failure to pump the well was indicative of intent to abandon the 
well.304  Appellee argued failure to pump was due to conditions beyond its 
control, including weather.305  In particular, there had been only intermittent 
production between March of 1960 and March 1961, due to rain and 
floods.306  In 1961, appellee hired a new operator, who made certain repairs 
and increased production from the well from six barrels per day to twenty-
one barrels per day.307  In light of the evidence, the Barrett court found that 
the temporary cessation of oil production did not terminate the lease.308  
The court stated: 
We believe the proper rule to be that temporary cessation of 
production after the expiration of the primary term is not a 
cessation of production within the contemplation and meaning of 
the ‘thereafter’ clause if, in the light of all surrounding 
circumstances, reasonable diligence is being exercised by the 
lessee to continue production of oil or gas under the lease.309 
L. MICHIGAN 
The Michigan Court of Appeals gave a detailed discussion of mineral 
interests in Stevens Mineral Co. v. State.310  In that case, the court noted: 
 
298. Id. at 825-26. 
299. Id. at 826. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. 
302. Id. at 825-26. 
303. 212 N.E.2d 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965). 




308. Id. at 36. 
309. Id. at 34 (citing Gillespie v. Wagoner, 190 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1963)). 
310. 418 N.W.2d 130 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). 
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The owner of the land surface owns the minerals beneath his 
land. . . .  Ordinarily, a deed of land conveys the soil and all which 
it contains within the boundaries of the description in the deed. . . .  
However, ownership of minerals in place may be severed from the 
remainder of the land by the proper conveyances. . . .  If the 
grantor retains title to the mineral interests described in a deed, it is 
an exception . . . .  At common law, this created a fee estate in the 
minerals, a corporeal hereditament. . . . The deed conveyed no 
interest in the excepted part to the grantee.  Therefore, when the 
grantor excepted all mineral rights, there was no need to expressly 
state that the right to sever or remove the minerals was an incident 
of ownership. . . .  On the other hand, a reservation is generally 
seen as the creation of a new right or interest in the grantor.  A 
reservation is really a legal fiction which treats the grantor’s 
reservation as an implied grant from the grantee back to the 
grantor.  Normally, a reservation is an incorporal hereditament, 
like rent or a profit a prendre . . . .311 
In the Stevens Mineral Co. case, the court found that a reservation of 
the “right to operate, produce and remove” minerals from the land was a 
profit a prendre.312  A profit a prendre is “the right to acquire, by severance 
or removal from another’s land, something previously constituting part of 
the land, such as minerals. . . .  A profit a prendre in the form of a right to 
carry on mining operations transfers no present interest in the minerals in 
place.”313 
There is virtually no case law in Michigan that considers temporary 
cessation of production in the secondary term of an oil and gas lease.  In 
Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. Michigan Nat’l Bank,314 a public utility 
had obtained a certificate of necessity as a prerequisite to filing a 
condemnation action and made plans to convert producing wells to storage 
wells.  The court found a curtailment of production by the operator in 
anticipation of the impending condemnation did not constitute a cessation 
of production so as to terminate the lease.315  Rather: 
 
311. Id. at 133 (citing Mfr. Nat’l Bank of Detroit v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 362 N.W.2d 572, 
577 (Mich. 1984); Pellow v. Arctic Iron Co., 128 N.W. 918, 925 (Mich. 1910); Rathbun v. State, 
280 N.W. 35, 40 (Mich. 1938); Negaunee Iron Co. v. Iron Cliffs Co., 96 N.W. 468, 4 (Mich. 
1903); Van Slooten v. Larsen, 299 N.W.2d 704, 705 (Mich. 1980)). 
312. Stevens Mineral Co., 919 N.W.2d at 133. 
313. Id. at 134 (citing VanAlstine v. Swanson, 417 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); 
Evans v. Holloway Sand & Gravel, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)). 
314. 324 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
315. Mich. Wis. Pipeline Co., 324 N.W.2d at 545. 
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[T]he sale of the field for purposes of storage appeared to represent 
the optimum form of development for both the holders of the 
lessee and lessor interests. . . .  [W]hile normally leaving gas in 
place does not promote its production or marketing, in the present 
case, the gas “in place” constituted the most marketable and 
productive form.  Thus, the decision not to produce the gas . . . by 
severing it from the ground but rather to “produce” it by leaving it 
in its more valuable state served the interests of all who had 
interests in the field.316 
The court noted that “a lessee-operator need only make payments under a 
shut-in royalty clause if production has ceased,” but where wells were shut 
in pending condemnation, the court, applying the reasonable and prudent 
operator standard, found that the lessee-operator continued “production” by 
“wisely working to market the remaining gas in the field by leaving it in its 
most valuable state, to-wit: in place.”317 
M. OHIO 
Ohio’s position regarding the nature of the interest created by an oil 
and gas lease is unsettled.  Early Ohio cases viewed oil and gas in place as 
part of the realty, capable of separate reservation or conveyance.318  
However, a 1953 Ohio Supreme Court case, Back v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co.,319 
found that an instrument of conveyance that granted “oil and gas rights” 
had “the earmarks of a license.”320  Whether the Back decision represents 
the law of Ohio on the nature of an oil and gas interest has been questioned 
in more recent decisions.  The appellate court noted as recently as 2000: 
Although the Supreme Court [in Back] concluded that the 
“instrument in question is a license rather than a deed of 
conveyance,” . . . , only the syllabus law is binding on this 
court. . . .  The syllabus in Back do not address the issue of 
whether a grant or reservation of “oil and gas rights” constitutes a 
grant or reservation of a license or of the mineral estate.  
Furthermore, in an opinion issued after Back, the Supreme Court 
 
316. Id. at 545-46. 
317. Id. 
318. Pure Oil Co. v. Kindall, 156 N.E. 119, 123 (Ohio 1927); Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 
N.E. 399, 400 (Ohio 1897). 
319. 113 N.E.2d 865 (1953). 
320. Back, 113 N.E.2d at 867. 
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has itself presumed that a person may own “the fee of mineral 
rights in the property.321 
Stocker & Sitler, Inc. v. Metzger,322 also noted several cases have 
“recognize[ed] that mineral rights in place may be corporeal and subject to 
exception or reservation in fee simple, [but] have never been overruled by 
the Supreme Court of Ohio.”323 
The Ohio courts follow the prevailing view that a cessation of 
production in and of itself will not terminate an oil and gas lease either 
under the terms of the lease or by forfeiture.  The Ohio Supreme Court in 
Wagner v. Smith324 states: 
Courts universally recognize the proposition that a mere temporary 
cessation in the production of a gas or oil well will not terminate 
the lease under a habendum clause of an oil and gas lease where 
the owner of the lease exercises reasonable diligence and good 
faith in attempting to resume production of the well. . . .  A critical 
factor in determining the reasonableness of the operator’s conduct 
is the length of time the well is out of production. . . .  
Additionally, in determining the reasonableness of the lease 
owner’s conduct, all attendant circumstances must be taken into 
account.325 
The key legal issue to be determined is what constitutes a temporary 
cessation of production.  In Ohio, is a case by case evaluation depending 
not only on the lease language, but on the totality of circumstances, 
including subsequent production or efforts to get the well producing, 
duration of the cessation of production, and the subsequent acceptance by 
the lessor of royalty or shut in royalties, all may be considered in 
determining what constitutes a temporary cessation that does not result in 
lease termination. 
 
321. Bath Twp. v. Raymond C. Firestone, Co., 747 N.E.2d 262, 266 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) 
(citing Ohio Sand & Gravel Co., v. Masheter, 199 N.E.2d 573, 573 (Ohio 1964).  
322. 250 N.E.2d 269 (Ohio 1969) (referring to Sloan v. Lawrence Furnace Co., 29 Ohio St. 
568 (1876), Gill v. Fletcher, 78 N.E. 433 (Ohio 1906), Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co., 80 N.E. 6 
(Ohio 1907)). 
323. Stocker, 250 N.E.2d at 272-73. 
324. 456 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). 
325. Wagner, 456 N.E.2d at 525-26; see also Am. Energy Serv., Inc. v. Lekan, 598 N.E.2d 
1315, 1321 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (“[C]ourts have recognized that lessees can still have valid lease 
rights after a reasonable period of non-production for certain valid purposes.”); Litton v. Geisler, 
76 N.E.2d 741, 744 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945) (“The mere fact that a lessee under such a lease has 
failed to operate the wells for some time, will not be ground for vacating such lease, where such 
lessee shows good and sufficient reason why it has been impracticable for him to do so.”). 
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In Wagner, the lessee became aware of water problems with the well in 
1978, yet did not undertake repairs until 1981, after the lawsuit was 
initiated.326  The court noted: 
[W]e are not persuaded that justifiable reasons existed for the 
delay in restoring the well to production.  Discovery of the well 
defect and its effect on production occurred in 1978.  It was not 
until approximately six months later that the existence of the 
defect was confirmed.  Thereafter, another year passed until the 
abortive “mudding” repair was started in the summer of 1980, but 
not done because of the nature of the water flow.  While the four-
inch pipe [to repair the well] was contracted for after suit was filed 
in January 1981, . . . it was not installed at time of trial.  
Accordingly, we hold, in the light of the totality of circumstances, 
that appellee did not proceed with the diligence required in respect 
to the rights of the lessors and that the cessation of production was 
for an unreasonable length of time and, thus, was more than a 
“temporary” cessation of production.327 
In Wagner, the lessee had argued that the delay in repairing the well was 
partly due to a disagreement with the other fractional interest owners as to 
the proper approach.328  The court deemed that to be insufficient 
justification, especially in light of the length of the delay, noting that delays 
of two years or more are typically not considered temporary.329 
While Ohio law does not have a formula for evaluating duration, it is 
fair to say that they accept what they believe is the general view that a 
temporary cessation must be fairly short; the longer the cessation the less 
likely a court will find the appropriate level of diligence by the operator.  In 
Wagner, two years was considered too long a period to permit the lease to 
stay in force, whereas in Barrett v. Dorr,330 cited favorably by the Wagner 
court on the general law, a one-year cessation with some activity toward 
bringing the well into production was considered reasonable.331  The 
Wagner court, in dicta, seems to recognize that the issue can be affected by 
the subsequent return of a well to production and acceptance of royalties by 
the lessor.332 
 
326. Wagner, 456 N.E.2d at 527. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. at 526. 
329. Id. at 527. 
330. 212 N.E.2d 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965). 
331. Barrett, 212 N.E.2d at 306-08. 
332. See generally Wagner, 456 N.E.2d at 527. 
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However, the issue of whether subsequent production and acceptance 
of royalties or shut-in royalties will balance the equities to preserve the 
lease, must be approached with caution.  While Ohio courts will consider 
these factors in the totality of circumstances, the tardy payment of shut-in 
royalties after an extended cessation of production will not prevent 
termination of a lease.  For example, in Moore v. Adams,333 the court noted 
that a number of implied covenants have been generally recognized in oil 
and gas leases, including covenants to market the product and to conduct all 
operations with reasonable care and due diligence.334 
The evidence in Moore demonstrated that the well did not operate for 
more than six years and that the equipment was in disrepair.  Moreover, the 
appellant did not attempt to market the gas until the lawsuit was filed.  The 
court noted “[w]hen interruptions occur, the lessee is obligated to exercise 
reasonable diligence to place the well back into production. . . .  Critical to 
this evaluation is how long the well is out of production.”335  The court also 
noted cessation of production has been deemed temporary when the time 
periods are short, but where the cessation exists for two years or more, the 
lessees have been found not to have proceeded diligently.336 
In Tisdale v. Walla,337 the lease in question provided that it would 
remain in effect as long as oil or gas was being produced or being stored on 
the premises.  An annual royalty was to be paid for each well where gas was 
found but was not sold or marketed, and payment of such a royalty would 
cause that well to be considered a producing well.338  Another provision of 
the lease provided that the lease not be forfeited unless it was first judicially 
determined that there has been a failure to perform any of the express or 
implied covenants.339  The lessee argued the lease did not terminate due to a 
lack of production, because the lessor had not sought or obtained a judicial 
determination that the lessee had forfeited the lease.340  The court 
disagreed,341 noting: 
The terminology utilized in the habendum clause (“and as long 
thereafter as”) is generally construed to create a determinable fee 
interest, such that the lessee’s interest automatically terminates 
 
333. No. 2007AP090066, 2008 WL 4907590 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2008). 
334. Moore, 2008 WL 4907590, at *5. 
335. Id. (citing Wagner v. Smith, 456 N.E.2d 523, 526 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982)). 
336. Id. 
337. No. 94-A-0008, 1994 WL 738744 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1994). 
338. Tisdale, 1994 WL 738774, at *5. 
339. Id. at *6. 
340. Id. at *10. 
341. Id. (citing 4 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 
354.6-356, 682.2 (1993)). 
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upon lessee’s failure to satisfy any of the listed provisions which 
would serve to extend the term of the lease.  In such a case, no 
affirmative action on the part of a lessor is required to formally 
terminate the lease; it expires on its own terms.342 
The court went on to note that the judicial ascertainment clause did not 
modify the limitation provision of the habendum clause.343  “Thus, having 
determined that the lease expired by its own terms, it is unnecessary for 
appellant to seek a judicial determination of whether the lessee has forfeited 
the lease.”344 
Interestingly, in Whitmer v. Mack,345 the court held a three-year period 
with no production was fatal to a lease, even though the lessee resumed 
operation after that time.346  The lease terminated automatically, by its own 
terms, when production ceased.347  This suggests that at least in some 
circumstances, a lessor cannot assert an equitable or estoppel defense, based 
upon subsequent production and payment of royalties, where the lease has 
terminated by its own terms due to lack of production. 
N. KANSAS 
The Kansas Supreme Court has consistently held that where the 
primary term of an oil and gas lease has expired and its terms are being 
continued pursuant to the “thereafter clause” by continued production of oil 
or gas, all rights under it terminate when production in paying quantities 
ceases.348  Specifically: 
If there is a halt in production at an oil leasehold, the burden is 
upon the lessee to prove that the cessation is temporary and not 
permanent. . . .  Whether the cessation of production is temporary 
or permanent is a question of fact to be determined by the trial 
court, and such finding will not be disturbed on appeal if it is 
supported by substantial competent evidence.349 
 
342. Id. at *9-10. 
343. Id. at *11. 
344. Id. 
345. No. 5538, 1981WL 6348 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 1981). 
346. Whitmer, 1981WL 6348, at *3. 
347. Id. 
348. See, e.g., Brack v. McDowell, 320 P.2d 1056, 1061 (Kan. 1958); Wagner v. Sunray 
Mid-Continent Oil Co., 318 P.2d 1039, 1049 (Kan. 1957); Baker v. Huffman, 271 P.2d 276, 276 
(Kan. 1954); Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 240 P.2d 465, 465 (Kan. 1952); Wilson v. Holm, 
188 P.2d 899, 905-08 (Kan. 1948); Warner v. Kulp, 217 P. 288, 288 (Kan. 1923); Kahm v. Ark. 
River Gas Co., 253 P. 563, 563 (Kan. 1927); Caylor v. Bankers’ Oil Co., 203 P. 735, 735 (Kan. 
1922). 
349. Eichman v. Leavell Res. Corp., 876 P.2d 171, 174 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). 
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There are three factors relevant to whether a cessation is temporary 
or permanent:  (1) the period of time cessation has persisted; (2) 
the intent of the operator; and (3) the cause of cessation.  In 
general, no one of these elements can be isolated and held to be 
decisive.350 
Courts that have examined the length of a cessation have not established a 
bright line test, as to how long is too long for cessation to be temporary.  
Rather, they look to whether the cessation was for “reasonable time, under 
the circumstances.”351  “Where renewed production depends, if at all, upon 
various prospective but unassured projects and possibilities, termination is 
appropriate.”352 
Where water broke through the casing of a well and caused production 
to stop for more than a year and no effort was made to put the well back in 
production, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the cessation in production 
was permanent, and that the well was shut down for an unreasonable  time, 
terminating the lease.353  In Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. Lawson,354 the court 
noted that while it found an eighteen month period of unprofitable operation 
sufficient to terminate an oil and gas lease under a “thereafter” clause that 
provided that continuation of the lease was dependent upon production in 
paying quantities, the time factor was case specific and was a question left 
open.355 
In Wagner v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co.,356 the court considered the 
intent of the parties in determining whether cessation of production had 
been temporary or permanent.357  The question before the court was 
whether the lease remained in effect despite a cessation of production of oil 
in paying quantities for a period of eight months, between September of 
1953 and April of 1954.358  In their discussion, the court, quoting Wilson, 
stated: 
We believe proper construction of such an instrument requires the 
conclusion that if for any reason there is a cessation of production 
of oil in paying quantities on the land covered by its terms the 
owners of the minerals in place are required to move promptly and 
 
350. Id. 
351. Wrestler v. Colt, 644 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982). 
352. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
353. Wilson, 188 P.2d at 908. 
354. 553 P.2d 885 (Kan. 1976). 
355. Reese Enters., Inc., 553 P.2d at 899. 
356. 318 P.2d 1039 (Kan. 1957). 
357. Wagner, 318 P.2d at 1039. 
358. Id. at 1041. 
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by their efforts actually establish that such cessation, regardless of 
its cause, is temporary, not permanent.  In the event of their failure 
to do so, it is our view production as contemplated by the parties is 
to be regarded as having ceased, their conveyance terminates and 
any estate theretofore held by them under and by virtue of its terms 
reverts to the grantors.359 
The court noted the defendants had not taken prompt action to establish that 
the cessation was only temporary.360  Therefore, the court concluded the 
parties had intended the cessation to be permanent and had treated the 
cessation accordingly.361 
The third factor the courts look to in evaluating whether cessation is 
temporary is the cause of the cessation.  In Kahm v. Arkansas River Gas 
Co.,362 a well that had produced large quantities of gas for several years saw 
its flow decrease and ultimately cease altogether.  In that case, the court 
found that cessation of production was permanent, not temporary, despite 
the fact that the defendant alleged that production had ceased; because the 
only pipeline in the vicinity was a high pressure pipeline into which gas 
from the well could no longer be delivered without compression.363 
In another case, where the operator of a lease ceased production due to 
financial difficulties, the court held that a six to seven month cessation of 
production was not a reasonable time for the lessee to reach an agreement 
with a new operator and for production to commence again.364  Although 
recognizing a temporary cessation of production doctrine, Kansas courts 
routinely hold that express contract terms control, so that there can be no 
extension or reviver contrary to the express terms of a lease or a mineral 
deed.”365  In Welsch v. Trivestco Energy Co.,366 the court held an express 
contractual provision that addresses temporary cessation supersedes any 
generally applicable doctrines, and thus, a lessee “cannot invoke the 
doctrine of temporary cessation to avoid complying with a specific 
provision in the lease that addresses temporary cessation of production and 
requires the lessee to recommence production within a specified period of 
time.”367  The court further noted that some authorities have suggested a 
 
359. Id. at 1046-47 (citing Wilson v. Holm, 188 P.2d 899, 907 (Kan. 1948)). 
360. Id. at 1049. 
361. Id. 
362. 253 P. 563 (Kan. 1927). 
363. Kahm, 253 P. at 564, 566. 
364. Clubine v. Mega Oil Co., No. 56, 687, 1985 Kan. App. LEXIS 774, at *1-2 (1985). 
365. Dewell v. Fed. Land Bank of Wichita, 380 P.2d 379, 382 (Kan. 1963) (internal citations 
omitted).  This case is discussed in further detail under shut-in clauses. 
366. 221 P.3d 609 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009). 
367. Welsch, 221 P.3d at 611. 
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temporary cessation of production clause does not save a lease where the 
cessation could have been saved by the shut-in royalty provisions of the 
same lease.368  Welsch favorably cited a Texas case, Marifarms Oil & Gas, 
Inc. v. Westhoff,369 which held that if a lease contains both a cessation of 
production clause and a shut-in royalty provision, then to preserve the lease 
it is required to make the shut-in royalty payment within the time period 
stated in the cessation of production clause.370 
In Baker v. Hugoton Production Company,371 the Kansas court 
considered the effect of pooling on cessation issues.  Ten gas-drilling units 
included all of the land covered by the lease.372  Gas was being produced 
from seven of those units, containing 2950 acres, but not the other three, 
which contained 680 acres.373  According to the court, the production on the 
seven units, or any one of them, perpetuated the lease on all of the units 
where the lease had granted an interest in the entire 3630 acres and the 
habendum clause indicated the lease was “for a term of twenty years and as 
long thereafter as oil, gas, or either of them, are being produced from said 
land.”374  According to the court, “[t]he words ‘said land’ refer to the 3,630 
acres described in the granting clause.  Production on any part of that 
acreage was production from said land, the legal effect of which was that 
the mineral interest was perpetuated and extended as to the entire 
acreage.”375 
In Rook v. James E. Russell Petroleum, Inc.,376 the leases at issue 
contained clauses that extended the term of the interest beyond the primary 
term for as long thereafter as (1) oil or gas is produced on the property 
and/or (2) the gas storage rights are exercised and/or (3) the storage rentals 
are being paid.377 
The court noted that while leases contain an implied covenant of 
diligent and prudent operation, which requires a lessee to produce and 
market oil or gas after discovery, the covenant is rarely invoked.378  The 
 
368 Id. at 616-17 (citing 4 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 
47.3(f)(2) (1990)). 
369. 802 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App. 1991). 
370. Marifarms Oil & Gas, Inc., 802 S.W.2d at 125-26. 
371. 320 P.2d 772 (Kan. 1958). 
372. Baker, 320 P.2d at 773. 
373. Id. at 774. 
374. Id. 
375. Id. (citing Cowman v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 51 P. 2d 988, 988 (Kan. 1935); Wilson v. 
Holm, 188 P.2d 899, 905 (Kan. 1948)). 
376. 679 P.2d 158 (Kan. 1984). 
377. Rook, 679 P.2d at 165. 
378. Id. at 166.  Kansas has codified this implied covenant: 
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reason is because, ordinarily, a failure to produce after the primary term will 
result in termination of the lease.379  The court pointed out, however, that 
the leases in question contained an express provision in the habendum 
clause relative to gas storage rights, so that the lease remained in effect 
through that clause, even without diligent and prudent operation.380  The 
court went on to review the facts, which showed that there had been no 
production from any of the wells on the leases in question for fifteen years 
and the operator had not physically been at the site for many years.381  As a 
result, the court determined that the oil and gas production portion of these 
leases had been abandoned and could be severed from the gas storage 
rights, which remained intact.382 
In Short v. Cline,383 the plaintiff landowner sought to quiet title to the 
oil and gas under his 160-acre parcel of property.  He alleged that the 
defendants’ interest had terminated by nonproduction from the 160 acres.384  
The defendants were the royalty interest holders who claimed that a pooling 
agreement kept the lease alive, despite the lack of production from the 
plaintiff’s land.385  The court sided with the defendants on equitable 
principles.386 
The ownership of the various interests is convoluted but integral to the 
court’s analysis.  The key facts are that in 1973, the plaintiff landowner 
acquired the working interest in oil and gas leases that had originally been 
granted in 1923.387  In 1977, the plaintiff acquired the real property on 
which those leases had been granted, subject to the original lessors’ 
reservation of a royalty right in one stratum of the land; this stratum 
reverted to the landowner in the event that production ceased.388  In 1956, 
before the landowner had acquired any interests in the leases or the land, a 
pooling agreement had been signed by the then-existing royalty interest 
 
As a matter of Kansas public policy, all oil and gas leases and subleases for the 
exploration, development and production of oil, gas or other minerals, or any 
combination thereof, which are held by production shall be presumed to contain, in 
addition to any expressed covenants therein, an implied covenant to reasonably 
explore and to develop the minerals which are the subject of such lease.  Such implied 
covenant shall be a burden upon the lessee and any successor in interest. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-223 (2011). 
379. Rook, 679 P.2d at 166. 
380. Id. 
381. Id. at 167. 
382. Id. 
383. 676 P.2d 76 (Kan. 1984). 
384. Short, 676 P.2d at 77. 
385. Id. 
386. Id. at 84. 
387. Id. at 78-79. 
388. Id. 
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holders, but not the landowner.389  At the time the lawsuit commenced, 
production from the landowner’s one hundred sixty acres had ceased, but 
production was ongoing on adjacent property pursuant to the pooling 
agreement.390  The royalty interest holders argued that the pooling 
agreement extended their interests as long as any land covered by the 
agreement was producing, even though the land in which they originally 
had an interest ceased producing.391  The landowner argued that the pooling 
agreement did not apply to him, because his predecessor in interest did not 
sign it.392  The court found that equity precluded the relief sought by the the 
landowner.393  The plaintiff was wearing two hats: he was the lessee who 
had purchased the lease subject to the pooling agreement and the royalty 
interests, and he owned the surface land and other strata of the land and 
would become vested in another stratum if production ceased.  As lessee, he 
was obligated to continue production for the benefit of all; as the owner of 
the reversion, he wished to exterminate the royalty interests. 
O. ARKANSAS 
In Arrington v. United Royalty Co.,394 the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
considered the issue of whether a royalty interest in an oil and gas lease 
would take priority over a mortgage interest on the property when the 
mortgagee failed to bring suit prior to the passing of the statute of 
limitations.395  The court’s discussion was focused on whether the royalty 
interest in the oil and gas lease was a real property interest or a personal 
property interest.396  Ultimately, the court held that “royalties in gas or oil, 
until brought to the surface and reduced to possession, are interests in real 
estate and not personal property.”397  The court therefore affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment that the royalty interest would take priority over the 
mortgaged interest.398  However, in their consideration of this matter, the 
court also defined Arkansas’ understanding of the oil and gas estate.399  
Specifically, the court stated “where the lease may endure for an 
indeterminable period, it creates an estate in that nature of a qualified 
 
389. Id. at 78. 
390. Id. at 79. 
391. Id. at 80-81. 
392. Id. at 80. 
393. Id. at 81. 
394. 65 S.W.2d 36 (Ark. 1933). 
395. Arrington, 65 S.W.2d at 37. 
396. Id. 
397. Id. at 38. 
398. Id. 
399. Id. 
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fee . . . .”400  As a “qualified fee”401 has long been considered the same as a 
fee simple determinable interest, the court established that if the lease 
contains a traditional habendum clause, one that provides for a primary term 
for years and an indefinite secondary term conditioned on the production of 
oil and gas in paying quantities, the oil and gas lease will terminate upon 
the occurrence of the limiting event, or the cessation of production from the 
lease premises.402 
However, in Reynolds v. McNeill,403 the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
seemingly sets its self apart from other determinable estate states by 
providing that the estate does not vest in the lessee until oil and/or gas are 
produced in paying quantities.  In the court’s words, “[t]he lessee and his 
assignees had spent large sums in successfully attaining production within 
the primary term of six months.  When that event occurred a valuable estate 
vested in the lessee. . . .”404  Although, there are no cases decided by the 
Arkansas courts that appear to address this discrepancy, an examination of 
the interests created by the traditional habendum clause might offer an 
explanation.  In other determinable estate jurisdictions, the traditional 
habendum clause conveys an actual interest in the oil and gas in place.  
However, this interest is only guaranteed for a term of years.  On the other 
hand, the secondary term of an oil and gas lease is not guaranteed at all.  In 
order to preserve their interest into the secondary term, the lessee must 
establish production in paying quantities.  Otherwise, their interest in the oil 
and gas will terminate at the end of the primary term. 
Only after the lessee has established production in paying quantities 
that continues beyond the primary term will his interest become a fee 
simple determinable interest.  Accordingly, the fee simple determinable 
interest is an interest created in the secondary term.  As Bruce Kramer 
explained in his discussion of Texas’s temporary cessation of production 
doctrine, “[i]t has been well ingrained in Texas oil and gas law that the 
typical habendum clause in a lease creates a fee simple determinable estate 
insofar as the secondary term is concerned.”405  Accordingly, in Reynolds, 
as the court states, a valuable estate vested when they established 
production in paying quantities, because their short six month interest in the 
oil and gas became a determinable fee interest once they established 
 
400. Id. 
401. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1036 (9th ed. 2009). 
402. Arrington, 65 S.W.2d at 78. 
403. 236 S.W.2d 723 (Ark. 1951). 
404. Reynolds, 236 S.W.2d at 725. 
405. Kramer, supra note 9, at 519. 
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production during the primary term.406  Therefore, although it seems the 
state of Arkansas has set itself apart from the other determinable estate 
jurisdictions, the reality is that the courts likely were not addressing the 
interest initially transferred by the lease.  Rather it is much more likely that 
the court was addressing the change of the estate from a term of years 
interest to a fee simple determinable interest which would remedy the 
apparent contradiction. 
Reynolds also addressed another issue important to the discussion of 
cessation of production.  As the court stated, “when the lessee’s estate has 
vested it does not automatically terminate upon a temporary cessation of 
production.”407  The court further provided that a lessee has a reasonable 
period of time to reestablish production of oil and gas in paying 
quantities.408  In Reynolds, the plaintiff made several arguments to the 
Chancery Court with regard to why the oil and gas lease should be 
canceled, including that the defendant had abandoned the well which had 
been completed.409  The Chancery Court entered a judgment that the 
defendants had sixty days in which to produce oil and gas in paying 
quantities from the premises.410  The Supreme Court affirmed.411  Herein, 
the court establishes that the state of Arkansas recognizes the temporary 
cessation of production doctrine.412 
Although the courts of Arkansas have adopted a determinable interest 
subject to the temporary cessation of production doctrine, as stated above, 
the lessee must first establish production in paying quantities to create said 
interest.  Reynolds states, “[t]he lessee and his assignees had spent large 
sums in successfully attaining production within the primary term of six 
months.  When that event occurred, a valuable estate vested in the lessee, to 
continue as long as oil or gas was produced in paying quantities.”413  The 
Supreme Court of Arkansas has defined production in paying quantities as 
“production which is profitable to the lessee.”414  Accordingly, the lessee 
must be able to realize a profit from the proceeds of the oil and/or gas 
 
406. Reynolds, 236 S.W.2d at 725. 
407. Id. 
408. Id. 
409. See generally id. 
410. Id. at 724. 
411. Id. at 725. 
412. See id. 
413. Id. 
414. See Turner v. Reynolds Metal Co., 721 S.W. 2d 626, 627 (Ark. 1986) (referencing W.L. 
SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 307; 3 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, 
OIL AND GAS LAW §604.6(a) (1985)); see also Ross Explorations, Inc. v. Freedom Energy, Inc., 8 
S.W.3d 511, 514 (Ark. 2000) (citing Turner v. Reynolds Metals Co., 721 S.W.2d 626 (Ark. 
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production from a well drilled under the lease before they are vested with a 
determinable interest that will preserve the lease during the secondary 
term.415 
P. NEBRASKA 
In general, Nebraska recognizes that an oil and gas lease consists of a 
definite term and an indefinite term.  Where production is established 
during the primary, definite term, the lease may be continued indefinitely as 
long as production continues.  “When . . . continuous production ceases, the 
lease automatically terminates unless there is some other provision which 
would prevent termination.  A cessation of production clause . . . may make 
it possible for the lessee to preserve the lease beyond the primary term by 
resumption of operations if production should cease.”416  “Where the parties 
have bargained for and agreed on a time period for a temporary cessation 
clause, the agreed-on time period will control over the common-law 
doctrine of temporary cessation allowing a ‘reasonable time’ for resumption 
of drilling operations.”417  Similarly, the court will not rewrite a contract to 
include or change the language that the parties agreed to.418 
In Bedore v. Ranch Oil Co.,419 the lease at issue provided that “[i]f 
after the expiration of the primary term, production on the leased premises 
shall cease from any cause, . . . [the] lease shall not terminate provided 
lessee commences operations for drilling a well within sixty (60) days from 
such cessation. . . .”420  The lessee argued its efforts to rework a plugged 
well saved the lease from termination, while the lessor argued that 
removing plugs did not constitute “operations for drilling a well” sufficient 
to keep the lease alive.421  The court sided with the lessor, noting that the 
weight of authority agrees that general reworking operations, which do not 
involve making a new hole, are not “operations for drilling a well.”422  The 
court pointed out that the lease could have used more general language that 
would have allowed reworking operations to save the lease, but because the 
lease specifically required “operations for drilling a well,” the court found 
the lease had lapsed due to nonproduction.423 
 
415. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 414, § 604.6(a). 
416. Bedore v. Ranch Oil Co., 805 N.W.2d 68, 81 (Neb. 2011) (citing 4 EUGENE KUNTZ, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 47.3, at 98 (1990 & Cum. Supp. 2009)). 
417. Id. at 82 (citing Hoyt v. Cont’l Oil Co., 606 P.2d 560, 564 (Okla. 1980)). 
418. Id. at 85. 
419. 805 N.W.2d 68 (Neb. 2011). 
420. Id. at 74. 
421. Id. at 77. 
422. Id. at 84. 
423. Id. at 85. 
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The Nebraska Supreme Court noted in 1982 it had not had occasion to 
define the term “production” as it is used in the habendum clause, but that 
in prior cases, in dicta, it had stated that “after the primary term has expired, 
‘production’ means production in paying quantities.”424  Thus, according to 
the court, any production is sufficient to keep the lease alive during the 
primary, exploratory portion of a lease.425  After that time, however, if 
production is not in paying quantities, the lease expires.  In the Kirby case, 
the court found that there had been a cessation of production for 31 months 
and that as a result, the lease had terminated.426 
Finally, in Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,427 the court clarified the 
distinction between a “drill or pay” lease and an “unless” lease.  Under a 
“drill or pay” lease, the court noted that the lessee expressly promises to 
either drill by a certain date or pay a delay rental in order to keep the lease 
alive.428  Under an “unless” lease, the lease language provides that the lease 
will terminate if drilling is not commenced within one year, “unless” a 
rental is paid on or before a certain date.429  According to the court, the 
difference is that with a drill or pay lease, the lessor is entitled to payment if 
the lessee doesn’t drill.430  Under an “unless” lease, there is no obligation to 
pay anything.  The lessee can simply not drill and at the end of the stated 
term, the lease will expire.  “The provision for payment is looked upon as 
merely stating a condition upon which, in absence of drilling, the lease may 
be continued or terminated.”431 
Q. ARIZONA 
In Arizona State Real Estate Dept. v. American Standard Gas & Oil 
Leasing Services, Inc.,432 the court established that a leasehold interest in oil 
and gas for a period of “10 years and so long as oil and gas is produced in 
paying quantities” created an interest in land known as a qualified or 
determinable fee.433  Based on this case, it can be assumed that a court of 
competent jurisdiction in Arizona would hold, like many other states have 
held, that the determinable fee (or fee simple determinable) interest created 
 
424. Kirby v. Holland, 316 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Neb. 1982) (citing Long v. Magnolia Petrol. 
Co., 89 N.W.2d 245, 251-52 (Neb. 1958)). 
425. Id. 
426. Id. 
427. 89 N.W.2d 245 (Neb. 1958). 
428. Long, 89 N.W.2d at 253. 
429. Id.  
430. Id. 
431. Id. 
432. 580 P.2d 15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). 
433. Az. State Real Estate Dep’t, 580 P.2d at 17-18. 
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by an oil and gas lease automatically terminates upon the cessation of 
production, absent a contractual provision to the contrary.  Arizona Revised 
Statutes Annotated sections 27-555 and 27-556 dealing with leases on state 
lands provide that when production ceases after the primary term or after 
extension of said primary term of an oil and gas lease, “the lease shall not 
terminate if the lessee commences, drilling, completion or reworking 
operations on the land within ninety days from cessation of production.”434  
The statutes continue, “the lease shall remain in force as long thereafter as 
such drilling, completion or reworking operations are conducted or as long 
thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities from the leased 
lands, but in no event to extend beyond two years if production is not 
restoredFalse”435  Accordingly, the legislature has established the duration 
of permissible cessation of production.  To fully understand the conduct 
necessary to preserve the oil and gas lease during a period of cessation, it is 
necessary to know how the legislature has defined completion operations, 
drilling operations, and reworking operations. 
In Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated § 27-551, the legislature defines 
completion operations as, “work performed in an oil or gas well after the 
well has been drilled to the point where the production string of casing is 
set . . . prior to the commencement of the actual production of oil or gas in 
paying quantities.”436  Drilling operations are defined as “any work or 
actual physical or mechanical operations undertaken or commenced in good 
faith for the purpose of bringing about the production of oil or gas in paying 
quantities.”437  Finally, reworking operations are defined as “work 
performed at any depth on a well after its initial completion in and effort to 
secure production where there has been none, or to restore production that 
has been ceased or to increase production.”438  Therefore, if production 
ceases under an oil and gas lease upon state lands and the lessee takes any 
of the actions defined above before the expiration of the ninety day period, 
the lease will be preserved thereafter in accordance with the statute.439 
It must be stressed, however, that the aforementioned legislation only 
preserves oil and gas leases on state lands.  The state of Arizona has not 
promulgated similar laws concerning oil and gas leases on private lands.  
Given the state’s view of a leasehold estate as a fee simple determinable, it 
 
434. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-555, -556 (2011). 
435. Id. 
436. Id. § 27-551. 
437. Id. § 27-551(4). 
438. Id. § 27-551(10). 
439. See id. 
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seems likely that a court would consider the statutory provisions for state 
lands in evaluating cessation questions arising as to leases on private lands. 
R. NEW MEXICO 
In Maralex Resources, Inc. v. Gilbreath,440 the court stated, “[t]he 
typical oil and gas lease grants the lessee a fee simple determinable interest 
in the subsurface minerals within a designated area.”441  The court 
continued, “if the lessee fails to produce oil or gas in paying quantities 
before the end of the primary term, or if production ceases after the primary 
term, the lease will automatically terminate.”442  In Maralex, Norman and 
Loretta Gilbreath were successors in interest to an oil and gas lease 
covering two sections of land situated in San Juan County, New Mexico.443  
The lease’s habendum clause provided “[t]his lease remains in force for a 
term of five years and as long thereafter as oil, gas, casinghead gas, or other 
mineral or any of them is or can be produced.”444  The lessees drilled a 
producing oil and gas well during the primary term that produced gas 
without interruption until it stopped in December 1990.445  After attempting 
to close off the valve to the pipeline and treating the well with foam to 
increase pressure inside the well, the well resumed production in March 
1991.446  Shortly thereafter, the Gilbreaths attempted to negotiate a farmout 
agreement with Maralex Resources, Inc.447  However, during negotiations, 
Maralex obtained a title opinion from a law firm that concluded the lease 
had terminated under the terms of the habendum clause because the 
Gilbreaths failed to pay shut-in royalty payments.448  Maralex brought suit 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1959 lease expired under its own 
terms when the Gilbreaths failed to tender shut in royalties in early 1991.449  
The district court granted summary judgment for Maralex and the Court of 
Appeals and Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed.450 
The court stated in Maralex that “production must be in paying 
quantities, such that the income generated from oil and gas production 
 
440. 76 P.3d 626 (2003). 
441. Maralex Res., Inc., 76 P.3d at 630. 
442. Id.; see also Greer v. Salmon, 479 P.2d 294, 297 (N.M. 1970) (discussed infra footnotes 
299-312 and accompanying text). 
443. Maralex Res., Inc., 76 P.3d at 628. 
444. Id. 
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exceeds the operating costs.”451  Therefore, under Maralex, any production 
is not sufficient to maintain a lease.  If oil and gas production falls below 
the level of production that would result in proceeds exceeding the 
operational costs of production, the lease would terminate unless saved by 
other terms of the lease. 
It appears New Mexico has not adopted or does not recognize a general 
doctrine with regard to temporary cessation of production.  Rather, the New 
Mexico courts have observed that, in order to avoid the harsh consequences 
of the determinable estate created by the oil and gas lease, lessees sought to 
create contractual remedies by including savings clauses, such as the 
cessation of production clauses and shut-in royalty clauses, in their 
leases.452  As the court stated in Greer v. Salmon,453 “the ‘cessation of 
production’ and ‘shut-in royalty’ clauses are designed to give the lessee 
some protection from automatic termination. . . .”454  In Greer, an oil and 
gas lease covering a tract of land containing 40 acres was granted to the 
lessee, Greer, on September 1, 1950.455  The lessee obtained commercial 
gas production from the Pictured Cliff formation prior to the expiration of 
the five year primary term and production continued through September 
1956.456  However, because of a leak in the flow line between the well-head 
and the meter, from October 1956 to June 1960, no gas was produced from 
the well except for 7 MCF produced in May 1958.457  The leak was 
discovered and fixed in May 1960, and production began again in June 
1960 and continued thereafter.458  During the period of cessation, no drilling 
operations were conducted on the lease within a period of ninety days from 
September 1956, and no oil or gas was sold or used during the period from 
October 1956 to May 1960.459 
The lessors conveyed all mineral rights below the base of the Pictured 
Cliff formation to Evan C. Salmon and his wife, who leased the land to 
some of the defendants.460  Thereafter, Evan C. Salmon requested a release 
be executed by the Greers releasing the land from the September 1, 1950 
lease due to the fact that there had not been any production from said lands 
 
451. Id. at 631; see also Greer v. Salmon, 479 P.2d 294, 296 (N.M. 1979); Town of Tome 
Land Grant v. Ringle Dev. Co., 240 P.2d 850, 852-53 (N.M. 1952). 
452. See Greer, 479 P.2d at 296. 
453. 479 P.2d 294 (N.M. 1979). 
454. Id. 
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since September 1956.461  The Greers filed an action to quiet title to the oil 
and gas lease covering the property.462  The defendants, Evan C. Salmon, et 
al., argued the lease had terminated in accordance with its terms.463  The 
district court ordered that the plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed with 
prejudice and granted judgment for the defendants on their counter claim 
for compensatory damages and reasonable attorney fees.  The Supreme 
Court of New Mexico affirmed this judgment.464 
In making this judgment, the court in Greer rationalized that the 
cessation of production clause operates to preserve the lease by granting the 
lessee the right to resume operations to secure further production from the 
lease within a fixed period of time.465  However, the court stressed in Greer 
that the opportunity to preserve the lease under the cessation of production 
clauses was in fact a right and not a duty.466  As the lessee had not 
attempted to secure or resume further production from the leased premises 
and had not paid shut-in royalties, the lease had terminated.467 
In Greer, the lessee had argued that the cessation of production had 
been sudden and only temporary – and that they were entitled to a 
reasonable time in which to resume production.468  Upon considering this 
issue, the court held that “this may be true under the terms of some 
leases. . . .”469  However, in the lease therein the parties had agreed to what 
would constitute temporary cessation by including a cessation of production 
clause.470  As the cessation of production was longer than allowed by the 
clause, it could not be considered temporary.471 
S. UTAH 
In Benton v. Division of State Lands and Forestry,472 the Supreme 
Court of Utah held that the language of the mineral lease created an 
incorporeal hereditament, meaning the lease only granted lessee possession 





464. Id. at 300. 
465. Id. at 296. 
466. Id. at 297. 
467. Id. at 299. 
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lease.473  The remainder of minerals thereunder remained in the possession 
of the property owner.474  This case involved three leases, including one to 
Professional United Development, in 1970.475  This lease was for a term of 
ten years, “and so long as said minerals may be produced in commercial 
quantities from said land.”476 
At no time did United Development conduct mining operations on the 
property during the primary term of the lease.477  However, during this time 
Portland Cement Company of Utah extracted limestone from the property 
pursuant to federal mining claims that were declared invalid in an earlier 
federal court action.478  Professional United Development sought to recover 
the value of the limestone removed by Portland.479  The district court ruled 
that Professional United Development could not maintain an action against 
Portland for the wrongful removal of the limestone.480 
The Utah Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the decision of the 
District Court and granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion.481  In 
making this determination, the court cites several cases from the state of 
New York, which interpreted leasehold provisions similar to that included 
in the subject lease as only transferring “a right to quarry and take stone 
from the area involved.”482  The court further stated that “[t]his stone 
[becomes] the property of [the lessees] only upon its actual severance.”483  
Since Professional United Development never began mining operations on 
the subject property, they never reduced any of the minerals therein to their 
possession.484  Therefore, they did not have any fee interests in minerals 
that would permit them to recover for the wrongful removal of the 
minerals.485 
Although this decision did not involve an oil and gas lease, it indicates 
that courts in Utah have viewed mineral leases as incorporeal 
hereditaments.  However, before making this conclusion, it is necessary to 
point out the law with regard to the estate created by a lease has not been 
 
473. Benton, 709 P.2d at 366 (citing Baker v. Hart, 25 N.E. 948, 948 (N.Y. 1890)). 
474. Id. 
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conclusively established in the State of Utah.  In Commonwealth Coal 
Services, Inc. v. Rushton,486 a federal district court held that, for purposes of 
a bankruptcy proceeding, the interest created in a leasehold estate may be 
considered a real property interest for purposes of maintaining a turnover 
action against parties that violate the automatic stay.487 
To find that the interest created in a leasehold estate may be considered 
a real property interest for purposes of maintaining a turnover action against 
parties that violate the automatic stay, the court agreed with the Trustee’s 
argument that there were legal and equitable rights supporting an action for 
turnover of the purchased coal or its value.488  Namely, the Trustee 
distinguished the lease from a mineral lease, stating the lease provided 
C.W. with a true lease of the property.489  Furthermore, the Trustee stated 
Hiawatha knowingly violated the automatic stay; the coal was mined under 
C.W.’s; and the coal must be determined to be the property of the 
Bankruptcy estate because C.W. was the operator of the mine when the coal 
was mined.490  Furthermore, it is important to note the court identified that 
the scope of the lease, as interpreted by its language, could impact the 
interest transferred.491 
Accordingly, it seems established that a mineral lease will only transfer 
an incorporeal hereditament.492  However, the language of the lease itself, 
specifically with regard to its scope, may impact how the lease is 
interpreted with respect to the interest actually created.  In the absence of oil 
and gas related cases in Utah addressing cessation of production, one is left 
only to observe that other jurisdictions that treat an oil and gas lease as 
being in the nature of a profit rather than a fee simple determinable have 
recognized the temporary cessation doctrine in some form. 
T. NORTH DAKOTA 
North Dakota adheres to the general rule that, where the lease has been 
extended beyond its primary term by production, a temporary cessation of 
production will not automatically terminate an oil and gas lease.493  The 
Feland Court reasoned:  “since there are various justifiable causes for the 
 
486. No. 2:10-MC-0017DAK, 2010 WL 596317 (D. Utah Feb. 16, 2010). 





492. See generally id. 
493. Greenfield v. Thill, 521 N.W.2d 87, 92 (N.D. 1994); Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 
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slowing up, or temporary cessation, of production, it would be harsh and 
inequitable to automatically terminate a lease in all cases of cessation.”494  
This rule holds true whether the habendum clause creates a defeasible-term 
interest or not.495 
Whether the cessation is temporary or permanent is a question of fact.  
In making that determination, the court should consider the following 
factors as adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Greenfield v. 
Thill, from a decision of a Kansas court in Wagner v. Sunray Mid-Continent 
Oil Co.496:  (1) the period of time cessation has persisted; (2) the intent of 
the operator; (3) the cause of cessation; and (4) the totality of the 
circumstances.497  Thill dealt specifically with cessation in the secondary 
term of a term royalty deed, ultimately adopting the Texas and Kansas view 
applying the temporary cessation doctrine to such deeds, and rejecting the 
narrower Oklahoma view as to the application of the cessation doctrine to 
determinable deeds.498 
If the court determines cessation is temporary, the court must decide 
whether the operator fulfilled his obligation to exercise reasonable diligence 
and good faith in restoring production within a reasonable period of time.499  
In Feland, the court held the determination of reasonableness “must be 
decided in light of the particular fact situation, keeping in mind the 
legitimate interests of both lessor and lessee.”500  Ultimately, the court in 
Feland adopted the Texas approach to issues of temporary cessation, which 
states, “it is only to the end that the oil and gas shall be extracted with 
benefit or profit to both that reasonable diligence is required.”501 
As such, subsequent decisions have held that an operator be allowed a 
reasonable time to bring the well or wells back into production.502  What is 
considered “reasonable” is dependent upon the particular circumstances of 
each case.503  The court has also held that “production” for the secondary 
term of an oil and gas lease means “production in paying quantities.”504 
 
494. Feland, 171 N.W.2d at 836. 
495. Greenfield, 521 N.W.2d at 92. 
496. 318 P.2d 1039 (Kan. 1957). 
497. Greenfield, 521 N.W.2d at 89. 
498. See generally Greenfield, 521 N.W.2d at 91 (stating as to determinable deeds, 
“[w]hatever the true state of the law in Oklahoma, we conclude that the Texas and Kansas 
approach is more rational and equitable.  The rule . . . that any cessation of production, regardless 
of cause or duration, will terminate the interest – is too harsh and inflexible”). 
499. See Feland, 171 N.W.2d at 832-33. 
500. Id. at 835. 
501. Id. at 836. 
502. See generally Sorum v. Schwartz, 344 N.W.2d 73 (N.D. 1984). 
503. See generally Feland, 171 N.W.2d 829. 
504. Greenfield v. Thill, 521 N.W.2d 87, 90 (N.D. 1994). 
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It appears North Dakota bases its view of temporary cessation as an 
application of equitable principles.  The court in Feland held that, as a 
result of “the large expense incident to the work of exploration and 
development, and the fact that the lessee must bear the loss if the operations 
are not successful,” it would be “harsh and inequitable to automatically 
terminate the lease in all cases of cessation.505 
U. MONTANA 
In Krutzfeld v. Stevenson,506 the Supreme Court of Montana stated that 
a mineral lease conveys the lessee an interest in the minerals for the 
expressed term of the lease and the lessor retains a reversionary interest 
therein, thus establishing that in Montana, mineral leases create a fee simple 
determinable estate.507  Therefore, in Montana, the leasehold will terminate 
automatically upon the occurrence of a stated event or upon the breach of 
the terms of the oil and gas lease.508  In an attempt to avoid the draconian 
impact of the determinable estate, the court in Somont Oil Co. v. A&G 
Drilling, Inc.,509 officially adopted the temporary cessation of production 
doctrine, stating “[a] temporary cessation in production will not trigger an 
automatic termination of the lease as contemplated in the habendum 
clause.”510 
In Somont, C-W purchased several oil and gas leases in the Kevin-
Sunburst oil field in Toole County, Montana, that were preserved into their 
secondary terms by production on the leased premises.511  Subsequently, 
Somont offered to purchase several of these leases and C-W declined.512  
Somont then acquired new leases from those parties owning property in the 
Kevin-Sunburst oil field and demanded C-W execute releases on the 
properties.513  Somont maintained these leases had terminated due to a lack 
of production.514  Following C-W’s refusal to execute the releases, Somont 
filed suit in the district court to compel C-W’s execution of the releases.515  
 
505. Feland, 171 N.W.2d at 836 (citing Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 695 (Tex. 
1959)). 
506. 284 P. 553 (Mont. 1930); see also Somont Oil Co., Inc. v. A&G Drilling, Inc., 49 P.3d 
598, 604 (Mont. 2002). 
507. Krutzfeld, 284 P. at 556. 
508. See Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., 28 P.2d 187, 191 (Mont. 1933); see also Somont Oil Co., 
49 P.3d at 604. 
509. 49 P.3d 598 (Mont. 2002). 
510. Id. at 604. 
511. Id. at 600. 
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The jury rendered a special verdict in favor of C-W.516  The Supreme Court 
of Montana reversed and remanded for a new trial.517 
In evaluating what would be considered a temporary cessation of 
production, the court relied on the Supreme Court of Texas’ conclusion that 
“cessation must be due to a sudden stoppage of the well or some 
mechanical breakdown of the equipment used in connection therewith, or 
the like.”518  Accordingly, if the cessation of production was the result of 
something other than a sudden stoppage of the well or a mechanical 
breakdown of the equipment, it would be considered a permanent cessation 
of production and would not be saved by the temporary cessation of 
production doctrine.519  The courts in Montana have not elaborated on other 
circumstances that would fall under the temporary cessation of production 
doctrine.  However, in Somont, the court determined financial conditions of 
the producer or economic considerations, i.e., market demand, cannot be 
considered temporary causes of cessation of production.520 
Although Montana courts have held that economic conditions or 
financial conditions of the producers cannot be considered justification to 
establish temporary cessation of production, they will consider such factors 
in determining whether the lease is producing in paying quantities.521  In 
distinguishing Somont from the facts of another case, the court stated, “if 
there is a lack of market; if the lease is capable of producing in paying 
quantities; and if the lessee is using reasonable diligence to market the 
product, Montana law will deem the lease as one which is ‘producing in 
paying quantities.”“522 
In Christian v. A.A. Oil Corp.,523 the court declared the test for 
determining whether the lessee was acting with reasonable diligence to 
secure production in paying quantities is whether the lessee was exercising 
“the diligence which would be exercised by the ordinary prudent operator 
having regard to the interests of both lessor and lessee.”524  Plaintiffs gave 
notice that the lease was declared forfeited because A.A. Oil had not paid 
 
516. Id. 
517. Id. at 606. 
518. Id. at 605 (citing Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1941)). 
519. See id. 
520. Id. at 606. 
521. Id. 
522. Id.  In Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., the Supreme Court of Montana stated that paying 
quantities meant “such an amount of production as would pay a small profit over the cost of 
operation of the well, excluding from consideration the initial cost of bringing the well into 
production.”  28 P.2d 187, 191 (Mont. 1933). 
523. 506 P.2d 1369 (Mont. 1973). 
524. Christian, 506 P.2d at 1373. 
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royalties or rentals and failed to conduct exploration.525  On August 19, 
1963, plaintiffs executed an oil and gas lease to Robert Byrne on the same 
land covered by the aforementioned lease to A.A. Oil.526  Subsequently, 
plaintiffs commenced a quiet title action on the tract in question against 
both A.A. Oil and Robert Byrne.527  The district court found the lease 
owned by A.A. was a valid lease and that Robert E. Byrne’s lease was a top 
lease.528  The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the judgment of the 
district court.529  In making this decision, the court concluded that the 
discovery of gas in commercial quantities during the primary term satisfied 
the habendum clause of a period of time and extended the lease into the 
secondary term.  In the secondary term, the lessee is “required to use 
reasonable diligence in operating the well and marketing the product within 
a reasonable time.  Failure to do so will result in a termination of the 
lease.”530  The court found that Byrne had the burden of proving the well 
was incapable of producing gas in paying quantities.531  Because he failed 
to meet his burden of proof, the A.A. Oil lease continued in full force and 
effect.532 
Finally, in Miami Oil Producers, Inc., v. Larson,533 the Montana 
Supreme Court considered a case in which the oil and gas lease contained a 
cessation of production clause.  In October 1965, plaintiffs executed an oil 
and gas lease to Sun Oil Company on a tract of land containing 520 
acres.534  On March 2, 1968, Sun Oil Company assigned an interest in 320 
acres of that lease to Miami Oil Producers.535  Miami began drilling 
operations on the property sometime later that year.536  In November, they 
completed a well that produced enough oil and gas to allow payment of 
royalties to the lessors.537  Production from that well and royalty payments 
continued through October 1978, at which time, royalty payments 
stopped.538  Subsequently, after several attempts to have Miami execute a 
release of the oil and gas lease, the plaintiffs filed an action to quiet title and 
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to compel the defendants to execute a release of the oil and gas lease, 
claiming that no oil or gas had been produced since 1979 and that no 
drilling or reworking operations had been conducted that would meet the 
requirements of the cessation of production clause in the lease.539  The 
district court entered a judgment against Miami.540  The Supreme Court of 
Montana affirmed.541 
The lease at issue in Miami Oil contained a cessation of production 
clause and a notice provision.542  The cessation of production clause clearly 
stated that if cessation occurred within ninety days prior to the expiration of 
the primary term, or at any time in the secondary term, the lease remains in 
effect if production or operations for drilling or reworking are commenced 
within ninety days.543  The notice provision, in paragraph ten, provided that 
any breach by lessee shall not result in a forfeiture or termination of the 
lease unless lessor first notifies the lessee in writing and affords the lessee 
an opportunity to remedy the breach.544  The lessee, Miami, argued that 
because the lessor had not provided notice pursuant to paragraph ten, the 
cessation of production provision did not work to terminate the lease.545  
The court disagreed.546 
Noting that under the terms of the lease, termination may result from 
one of three contingencies:  (1) failure to commence drilling operations 
within the specified time, absent timely rental payments; (2) failure to 
resume or commence drilling or reworking operations or production within 
ninety days of a cessation after the primary term has expired; or (3) failure 
to remedy a break within sixty days of receiving written notice, the court 
held that the failure to meet the second contingency was sufficient to 
terminate the lease.547  The court noted the notice provision cannot be 
engrafted onto the cessation of production clause, because the continuation 
or resumption of operations during the secondary term, once production has 
ceased, is the lessee’s option and not an obligation.548  Additionally, it 
should be noted Somont made it clear the producer must be diligent in 
reestablishing production in order to preserve their lease under the 
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temporary cessation of production doctrine.549  A producer’s voluntary 
cessation of production or self-serving delay in reestablishing production 
may prevent the lease from being preserved under the temporary cessation 
of production doctrine.550 
V. WYOMING 
In Denver Joint Stock Land Bank of Denver v. Dixon,551 the court 
examined the language of the lease and historical understandings of 
property law in order to determine the nature of the interest granted to the 
lessee by the oil and gas lease.552  The issue in this case was whether a 
reservation of an oil and gas interest in a conveyance was a real property 
interest that would be included in a conveyance by Sheriff’s deed.553  In its 
consideration of this issue, the Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded an 
oil and gas lessee is not vested with an actual interest in the oil and gas until 
the interest is severed and extracted from the land.554  In the court’s words, 
“the right to the mineral in place is not absolute, but may be said to be 
inchoate, to attach definitely when the dormant state is disturbed and the oil 
and gas is on its way to the surface.”555  Therefore, until the lessee actually 
reduces the oil and gas to their actual possession, by bringing it to the 
surface, they are only vested with an incorporeal right to explore and 
develop the leased premises.556 
Additionally, in Boatman v. Andre557 and three other cases, the 
Supreme Court of Wyoming stated the language of the oil and gas leases 
considered therein created a profit a prendre.  As the Wyoming court stated, 
“[t]hat right, created by the lease, is merely to search for oil and gas and if 
either is found, to remove it from the land leased.”558  The court continued, 
“[t]his would appear to make it a profit a prendre and hence an incorporeal 
hereditament, which may be lost by abandonment.”559  In Boatman, the 
issue presented was whether an extensive delay by the lessee in developing 
the leased premises would operate as an abandonment of the oil and gas 
 
549. Somont Oil Co. v. A & G Drilling, Inc., 49 P.3d 598, 605 (Mont. 2002). 
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leases under the laws of Wyoming.  The trial court entered judgments for 
the plaintiffs and quieted titled to the lands that were subject to the 
defendant’s leases.560  On appeal, Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed, 
stating, “there is an implied obligation on the lessee to proceed with 
exploration and development of the land with reasonable diligence, 
according to the usual course of business, and a failure to do so amounts to 
an abandonment which will sustain a reentry by the lessor.”561 
However, Wyoming courts have also concluded a lease will not be 
cancelled due to a temporary cessation of production.562  In Deadwood-
Osage Oil Co. v. Walker,563 the court considered whether an eight month 
cessation of production under an oil and gas lease resulted in a termination 
of the lessee’s interest therein.564  In their analysis, the court cited Adams v. 
Bennet,565 a case heard before the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, El Paso.  
In this case, the Texas court also considered whether an eight month 
cessation of production resulted in a termination of the oil and gas lease.566  
Despite stating the general rule of Texas, that a temporary cessation of 
development or production will not result in the termination of the oil and 
gas lease, the court in Adams concluded that a cessation of operations and 
production for a period of eight months was not considered temporary and, 
therefore, due to this extended period of cessation, the oil and gas lease 
terminated.567  Relying on this analysis, the court in Deadwood-Osage 
concluded that the oil and gas lease terminated and affirmed the judgment 
of the trial court.568  Accordingly, it appears Wyoming, like Texas, would 
conclude that a temporary cessation of production will not warrant a 
cancellation of the oil and gas lease.569  However, under the facts of both of 
these cases, the courts determined that the period of cessation was too long 
to be considered temporary. 
W. COLORADO 
Colorado cases acknowledge the requirements of lessees to satisfy the 
production requirement of a habendum clause, whether it is actual 
production in paying quantities or merely commercial discovery, varies by 
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jurisdiction.570  The Colorado Court of Appeals has addressed this issue, 
and drew the distinction based upon whether marketing is considered an 
essential part of production: 
Jurisdictions vary as to what is required to satisfy an habendum 
clause.  If marketing is not an essential part of production, the 
habendum clause is satisfied by commercial discovery of the 
product. . . .  In jurisdictions in which marketing is an essential 
part of production, the habendum clause requires that the product 
be removed from the earth, which necessarily involves marketing 
where the product is gas, and reduced to possession for use in 
commerce.571 
The court stated that neither the lease at issue in the case nor Colorado case 
law indicated marketing as an essential part of production.572  Therefore, the 
habendum clause is satisfied by discovery in commercial quantities.573 
Although a lease may extend into the secondary term without 
production, a lessee is not free to let a well capable of production sit idle 
indefinitely.  In the absence of specific lease provisions to the contrary, 
Colorado recognizes four implied covenants:  the duty to explore, to 
develop, to produce (including to market), and to protect against 
drainage.574  Lessees must diligently comply with these obligations in order 
to maintain their leases.575 
Understanding Colorado’s treatment of the habendum clause informs 
the question on how Colorado treats production lapses.  Although Colorado 
has not explicitly adopted the “temporary cessation of production doctrine,” 
it has addressed the issue of whether a lease should terminate for failure of 
production.576  The determination turns on the relevant lease provisions, the 
circumstances of the individual case, and considerations of equity.577 
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In Hoff v. Girdler Corp.,578 lessee diligently began drilling under an oil 
and gas lease with a five-year primary term.579  He successfully produced 
helium gas and sold it to the federal government until the government later 
cancelled the contract.580  Lessee was then prevented from exporting to 
Europe and no domestic market existed for helium.581  However, because he 
maintained the pipeline and facilities and diligently researched and 
attempted to market the product, the court found in lessee’s favor in an 
action by lessor to quiet title.582  The Hoff decision appears to rest 
somewhat on the fact that the action was fashioned as one to quiet title, 
alleging abandonment, rather than an action for termination of the lease.583  
A later decision by the Colorado Court of Appeals further supports this 
interpretation. 
In North York Land Associates v. Byron Oil Industries, Inc.,584 the 
court was called upon to determine whether a lease should be cancelled.585  
The leased acreage was considered as two separate portions, the pooled area 
and the non-pooled area.586  Although a well was producing on the pooled 
area, the non-pooled area had not been produced or explored for a number 
of years, and the court stated that it must use the “prudent operator 
standard” to determine if the obligation to explore and develop had been 
breached.587  Because the trial court had found that a prudent operator 
would not have explored or developed the land within any foreseeable 
period, the lessee was not under an obligation to do so.588  Nevertheless, the 
court determined the lease should be cancelled as to the non-pooled area.589  
This decision was based on the following reasoning:  “Production of oil on 
a small portion of the leased tract cannot justify the lessee’s holding the 
balance indefinitely and depriving the lessor not only of the expected 
royalty from production pursuant to the lease, but of the privilege of making 
 
property; therefore, they are properly construed strongly against the lessee to ensure prompt 
development). 
578. 88 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1939). 
579. Hoff, 88 P.2d at 101. 
580. Id. at 101-02. 
581. Id. at 102. 
582. Id. at 102-03. 
583. Id. at 101. 
584. 695 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1984). 
585. N. York Land Assocs., 695 P.2d at 1190. 
586. Id. 
587. Id. 
588. Id. at 1191. 
589. Id. 
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some other arrangement for availing himself of the mineral content of the 
land.”590 
This decision, with its equity driven result, seems consistent with other 
relatively flexible decisions of Colorado courts in which conditional decrees 
are given.591  The North York decision noted a conditional decree, which 
would give lessee time to resume development, was inappropriate because 
no further plans to develop existed, further development on the land was not 
economically justified, and no forfeiture of any well had taken place which 
lessee could reasonably request time to cure.592  It appears, then, the facts 
which caused the jury to decide the lessee had not breached the implied 
covenant to further develop the land were the facts upon which the court 
based its decision to terminate the lease – that further development was not 
justified.  In Graefe & Graefe, Inc. v. Beaver Mesa Exploration Co.,593 the 
lessee was given 120 days to restore production to a well that had ceased 
producing roughly six weeks before trial, although the lessee’s breaches of 
implied covenants terminated the rest of the lease.594  Apparently, 
determining the lessee had not yet breached any implied covenants relating 
to the forty acres surrounding the well, and that the area could potentially 
still produce, the cancellation was thus structured as a conditional order. 
In Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co.,595 just three years later, the Colorado 
Court of Appeals granted another conditional decree.  The lessee had 
abandoned all wells except for one marginal producer.596  This performance 
combined with the lessee’s failure to clear title, his speculative holding, and 
the finding that third parties were interested in drilling and developing the 
leasehold, caused the court to conclude that lessee had violated the implied 
covenant to drill and develop.597  The remedy was conditional cancellation 
such that lessee had sixty days to file a plan of development for the non-
producing area; if he failed to do so, in order for the cancellation to become 
effective, lessor was required to submit his own plan for development.598  
As to the producing area, lessee would be able to maintain that section so 
 
590. Id. (quoting Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petrol. Corp., 292 U.S. 272, 279 (1934)). 
591. See generally Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1984); Graefe & 
Graefe, Inc. v. Beaver Mesa Exploration Co., 635 P.2d 900 (Colo. App. 1981). 
592. N. York Land Assocs., 645 P.2d at 1192. 
593. 635 P.2d 900 (Colo. App. 1981). 
594. Gillette, 694 P.2d at 902-03 (noting that lessees had not undertaken further exploration 
or development for many years).  Interestingly, the opinion does not give any indication of 
whether the lease terms indicated that the lease could be cancelled either in whole or in part; this 
appears to be an equitable remedy of the court.  See id. 
595. 694 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1984). 
596. Id. at 371. 
597. Id. at 372. 
598. Id. 
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long as he made necessary repairs and filed an engineer’s report confirming 
the repairs had been made.599  Here, the court addressed its use of 
conditional orders by stating that breach of implied covenants leaves no 
adequate remedy at law, and therefore the district court is able to grant 
cancellation either in whole or in part.600 
X. CALIFORNIA 
California law follows the view that an oil and gas lease containing a 
typical “thereafter” habendum clause grants the lessee a determinable 
incorporeal interest in the nature of a profit a prendre.601  In theory, this 
interpretation dictates that insufficient production during the secondary 
term will terminate the lease automatically with no need for the lessor to 
notify the lessee or re-enter the premises.602  California courts consistently 
interpret term “production” in a habendum clause as production in paying 
quantities, even where such quantifying language is absent from the 
lease.603  Courts define “paying quantities” as that amount of production 
“sufficient to yield a return in excess of operating costs, even though 
drilling and equipment costs may never be repaid and the undertaking as a 
whole may ultimately result in a loss.”604  Such operating costs may include 
cleaning and servicing of wells, labor costs, taxes, electricity and other 
utilities, and lessor’s royalties.605 
As this definition suggests, courts will consider a sufficient degree of 
profitable production with respect to a habendum clause “so long as the 
lessor receives royalties and the lessee operates at a profit.”606  
Understandably, this has led to litigated disputes over the lessee’s proper 




600. Id. at 373-74. 
601. See generally Dabney v. Edwards, 53 P.2d 962 (Cal. 1935) (explaining that the duration 
of the primary right to produce oil or gas for an indefinite period gives character to the instrument 
as providing for a term of indefinite duration). 
602. See Renner v. Huntington-Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co., 244 P.2d 895, 897-98 (Cal. 1952); 
see also Lough v. Coal Oil, Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 611, 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Montana-Fresno 
Oil Co. v. Powell, 33 Cal. Rptr. 401, 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963). 
603. See Lough, 217 266 Cal. Rptr. at 617 n.1 (citing Barnard v. Gibson, 224 P.2d 90, 94-95 
(1950)). 
604. Renner, 244 P.2d at 899. 
605. See Lough, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 617. 
606. West v. Russell, 90 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775 (1970). 
607. For a good discussion of disputed operations expenses, see Lough v. Coal Oil, Inc., at 
616-19. 
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In Renner v. Hunington-Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co.,608 the California 
Supreme Court found the lease, with no additional provision calling for 
delay or shut-in rentals as an appropriate substitute, terminated 
automatically after non-production in the secondary term.609  Thereafter, the 
lessee remained in possession of the premises and resumed profitable 
operations, for which the lessor continued to accept royalty payments in 
accordance with the now-defunct lease.610  The lessor then filed a quiet title 
action without notifying the lessor that the lease had terminated.611 
The California Supreme Court did not find that waiver or estoppel 
applied, but reversed the lower court’s ruling that the lessee maintained no 
legal right to the property.612  The court borrowed from traditional landlord-
tenant law and held “[i]f a lessee holds over after the expiration of his term 
and his lessor accepts monthly rental payments in the amount of the 
payments which the lessee had been making under the lease, the lessee 
becomes a tenant from month to month.”613  While this decision seems 
unusual, a court in at least one other jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, has found a 
tenancy at will is created in similar circumstances.614  As the lessor had not 
notified the lessee of termination, the court held that the lessee, now a 
month-to-month tenant, had a possessory interest in the property since 
notice was required to end a periodic tenancy.615 
Courts have not formally adopted a temporary cessation of production 
doctrine in California.  Rather, courts will look to evidence of the lessee’s 
operational expenses and returns to determine whether nonproduction 
rendered the lease uneconomic and thus effectuated automatic 
termination.616  Unlike states that focus on the actual cause of cessation like 
Texas, California focuses primarily on the profitability of the enterprise and 
moreover the appropriate time period by which such profitability should be 
measured.617 
There is no definitive standard to determine the time period over which 
a paying quantities analysis is made.618  Despite no formal adoption of the 
 
608. 244 P.2d 895 (Cal. 1952). 
609. See Renner, 244 P.2d at 898. 
610. See id. 
611. Id. at 897. 
612. Id. at 901. 
613. Id. 
614. Derrickheim Co. v. Brown, 451 A.2d 477, 480 (Pa. Super Ct. 1982) (quoting White v. 
Young, 186 A.2d 919, 920 (Pa. 1963)). 
615. Id. 
616. See, e.g., Lough v. Coal Oil Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 611, 617 (1990); Transport Oil Co. v. 
Exeter Oil Co., 191 P.2d 129, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948). 
617. Transport Oil, 191 P.2d at 134. 
618. See Lough, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 617. 
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temporary cessation doctrine, California courts seem to consider 
reasonableness factors, often articulated in a temporary cessation analysis, 
when determining whether production was sufficiently profitable.  For 
example, in discussing the applicable period to assess profitable operations, 
one court noted: 
Obviously, the period cannot be unreasonably short (i.e., a few 
days or even weeks) or else a lessor could claim that lease had 
terminated when in fact it was merely shut-in for repairs or 
maintenance.  On the other hand, using an excessively long period 
of many years could keep a lease “alive” long after it had become 
uneconomic and was no longer producing in “paying quantities” 
by using high initial and very short-lived production rates to claim 
an artificial ‘profit’ years later through averaging.619 
Again, courts acknowledge the absence of any “hard and fast rule for 
determining over what period the paying quantities analysis must be 
made.”620  While no prior holding is dispositive on this issue, courts have 
generally ranged between six months and two years.621  In Transport Oil 
Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., Ltd.,622 the court based its decision on the lessee’s 
financial records over one calendar year after first finding a single month 
“inadequate to provide a reasonably accurate financial picture as to the 
profitability of production.”623  In so holding, the court expressly promoted 
a lessor-friendly view that “the profitability of a lease should, where 
possible, be determined over a relatively long-term period, so that expenses 
subject to wide fluctuations may be exposed to leveling influences of 
time.”624 
Both the length and context of non-production sufficient to terminate a 
lease will depend on facts relevant to the case at hand.  For example, a court 
has considered profitability of a single well over its entire 527-day 
productive life.625  Alternatively, another case presented instances of non-
production among eight wells under a single lease, where the court 
considered respective lapses ranging from six to eighteen months in finding 
termination.626  Due to the more protracted lease term in the latter case, the 




621. See id. 
622. 191 P.2d 129 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948). 
623. Transport Oil Co., 191 P.2d at 134. 
624. Id. 
625. See Barnard v. Gibson, 224 P.2d 90, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950). 
626. See Montana-Fresno v. Powell, 33 Cal. Rptr. 401, 402-04, 409-10 (1963). 
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lease “to determine whether the totality of operations resulted in a loss.”627  
Rather, the court rejected that “total cessations of production for the long 
periods of time shown by the evidence should be overlooked or averaged 
down.”628 
More recently, in considering the above-cited cases, Lough v. Coal Oil, 
Inc.629 looked to the financial condition of the lease over the final fifty-one 
months prior to trial and held that an eighteen-month period of unprofitable 
production during that time terminated the lease.630  While these cases offer 
insight into the courts’ analysis in factual context, it is crucial to note “the 
final decision of an appropriate period is left to the sound discretion of the 
trial court taking into account all the existing facts.”631 
IV. SHUT-IN CLAUSES AND PAYMENTS – A GENERAL 
DISCUSSION OF TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 
The shut-in royalty clause is another savings clause that will permit the 
lessee to preserve the oil and gas lease during the secondary term.632  
Specifically, both Texas and Oklahoma agree that a shut in royalty clause or 
the payment of shut in royalties can operate to preserve the oil and gas lease 
when the lessee is unable to find a market for the oil or gas or when an 
existing market for oil and gas begins to decline.633  As the Texas Court of 
Appeals stated in Amber Oil and Gas Co. v. Bratton,634 shut in royalties are, 
“periodic payments for the privilege of deferring exploration and 
production after the primary term.”635  Or as the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma stated in Gard v. Kaiser,636 a shut in royalty clause “allows the 
continuance of the lease, without actual production and marketing of the 
shut-in product by the substitution of the stipulated payment for the 
royalties which would accrue to the lessor from actual production and 
marketing.”637  In this case, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma was 
confronted with the issue of whether a failure to pay shut-in royalty 
 
627. Id. at 410. 
628. Id. 
629. 217 Cal.App.3d 1518 (1990). 
630. 266 Cal.Rptr. 611, 617-19 (1990). 
631. Lough, 266 Cal.Rptr. at 617. 
632. 3 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 631 (2010). 
633. See Amber Oil & Gas Co. v. Bratton, 711 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex. App. 1986); Gard v. 
Kaiser, 582 P.2d 1311, 1314 (Okla. 1978). 
634. 711 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App. 1986). 
635. Amber Oil & Gas Co., 711 S.W.2d at 743. 
636. 582 P.2d 1311 (Okla. 1978). 
637. Gard, 582 P.2d at 1314 (emphasis added). 
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payments to a lessor would result in termination of the oil and gas lease.638  
The Court of Appeals determined that the lease could only be kept alive by 
production, actual or constructive, i.e., the payment of shut-in royalties.639  
However, on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded “shut-in gas provisions 
are not to be construed as limitations or conditions which would affect 
termination of the leases.”640 
The Court of Appeals of Oklahoma reiterated this position in Roye 
Realty & Developing, Inc., v. Watson.641  In Watson, the court was again 
confronted with the issue of whether an oil and gas lease would terminate if 
the shut-in royalty payments were not paid properly.642  The district court 
granted a temporary injunction to the lessee preventing the lessor from 
interfering with the lessee’s operations in building a pipeline.643  On appeal, 
the appellate court concluded that the oil and gas lease had not terminated 
due to the lessee’s failure to promptly pay the first shut in royalty payment 
as the lessor alleged.644  In the words of the Court of Appeals, “[n]either 
nonpayment of shut-in royalty after the end of the primary term, nor the 
failure to secure actual production prior to the end of the shut-in royalty 
period will terminate the lease if the lessee is acting as a reasonably prudent 
lessee under the circumstances in securing actual production.”645 
It is well established in the State of Oklahoma that a failure to make 
shut-in royalty payments will not necessarily terminate the oil and gas 
lease, provided the lessee exercises the effort that a reasonably prudent 
operator would exercise in finding a market for the oil and/or gas that could 
be produced by the shut-in well.  The courts in the State of Oklahoma have 
further held that a lessor’s only remedy for failure to pay the shut-in royalty 
is to file an action for breach of contract.646  This might explain why courts 
in Oklahoma have not established, or defined, a period within which shut-in 
royalty payments must be paid in order to preserve the lease into the 
secondary term.  Oklahoma focuses more on the actions of the lessee and 
the lessee’s implied duty to market the oil or gas, rather than the passing of 
 
638. Id. at 1312. 
639. Id. at 1314 (emphasis added). 
640. Id. at 1314-15. 
641. 791 P.2d 821, 823 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990). 
642. Roye Realty & Dev., Inc., 791 P.2d at 823. 
643. Id. at 822-23. 
644. Id. at 824. 
645. Id. at 823 (quoting HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 6.5, at 310 (2d ed. 
1983)). 
646. E.g., Danne v. Texaco Exp. & Prod. Inc., 883 P.2d 210, 215 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994). 
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a specific date without payment or production in determining whether an oil 
and gas lease terminates.647 
However, Texas does focus on the payment of shut-in royalties or the 
actual production of oil and gas in paying quantities prior to the end of the 
primary term (or the anniversary of the shut-in payment date).648  In Amber 
Oil and Gas Co.,649 the Court of Appeals of, considered whether timely 
shut-in royalty payments to the wrong person would operate to preserve an 
oil and gas lease when the lessee had been put on notice that a portion of 
the leasehold interest had been assigned.650  The court concluded that a 
“[f]ailure to make either of these payments properly usually results in 
automatic termination of the lease.”651  As the court explained, “[b]ecause 
payment of a shut-in royalty is a substitute for production which keeps the 
lease in effect, failure to make a timely shut in payment is the equivalent of 
cessation of production and the lease automatically terminates.”652  The 
Texas courts have also discussed shut-in royalty payments by referring to 
them as “constructive production.”653 
However, the Supreme Court of Texas has demonstrated some 
flexibility in what is considered timely payment.  The general rule, 
established in Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,654 was that shut-in 
payments must be paid on or before the date that the well was going to be 
shut-in.655  In this case, the court considered whether payments of the shut-
in royalty four months after the beginning of the shut-in period would 
operate to preserve the oil and gas lease.656  The Texas Supreme Court 
overruled the trial court and court of appeals, stating, “the provision for the 
payment of the $50 [shut-in royalty] to declare a potential well a ‘producing 
well’ was an absolute and unconditional agreement on the part of the lessee, 
rather than an option.”657  The court continued, “[this option] had to be 
timely exercised, to-wit, before the expiration of the Primary Term, in order 
to keep the lease in force and effect.”658 
 
647. See McVicker v. Horn, Robinson & Nathan, 322 P.2d 410 (Okla. 1958) (discussing the 
implied nature of the duty to market in an oil and gas lease). 
648. See discussion Part II. 
649. 711 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App. 1986). 
650. Amber Oil & Gas Co., 711 S.2d at 743-44. 
651. Id. at 743. 
652. Id. (emphasis added). 
653. E.g., Mayers v. Sanchez-O’Brien Minerals Corp., 670 S.W.2d 704, 709 (Tex. App. 
1984). 
654. 171 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1943). 
655. Freeman, 171 S.W.2d at 342. 
656. Id. at 341. 
657. Id. 
658. Id. 
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On the other hand, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid659 alludes to the fact that if 
the oil and gas well was producing in paying quantities prior to the 
expiration of the primary term and the lease was extended into the 
secondary term as a result, a cessation of production clause could “delay the 
tender of the royalty payment” until the end of the cessation of production 
period expressed in the lease.660  In this case, the court addressed several 
issues, including whether the shut-in royalty payments tendered after a well 
capable of production in paying quantities had been capped was considered 
timely payment of the royalties such that the lease continued after the 
primary term expired.661  Ultimately, the court concluded since the oil and 
gas well in question had never produced oil and gas in paying quantities, 
the cessation of production clause did not apply.662  Therefore, the oil and 
gas lease terminated upon the lessee’s failure to pay the shut-in royalty 
prior to (or on) the date the well was capped.663 
In Blackmon v. XTO Energy,664 the Texas Court of Appeals established 
yet another exception to the general rule of Texas that a failure to pay shut-
in royalty payments in a timely manner will result in the termination of the 
lease.  Specifically, the court held “if the constructive production defined by 
the clause is the existence of a well on the premises capable of production 
in paying quantities, then the lease should not terminate at the end of the 
primary term even if the shut-in royalties are never paid.”665  Here the court 
considered whether a lease terminated ninety days after a well drilled 
thereunder was shut in because XTO failed to pay shut-in royalties to all 
parties entitled under the lease.666  After examining the terms of the oil and 
gas lease, the court concluded the failure to pay shut-in royalties under the 
lease is a covenant best enforced by a suit for money damages.667 
Despite general agreement as to the role of the shut-in royalty clause in 
preserving the oil and gas lease, Texas and Oklahoma disagree on the 
impact of a failure to make payments pursuant to the terms of the shut in 
clause.  This disagreement is likely the result of each state’s treatment of the 
leasehold estate itself.  As stated previously, the Supreme Court of Texas 
has interpreted the leasehold estate as a fee simple determinable that 
 
659. 337 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1960). 
660. Gulf of Oil Corp., 337 S.W.2d at 271. 
661. Id. at 268. 
662. Id. 
663. Id. 
664. 276 S.W.3d 600 (Tex. App. 2008). 
665. Blackmon, 276 S.W.3d at 607. 
666. Id. at 605. 
667. Id. at 606 (quoting OWEN L. ANDERSON ET AL., HEMINGWAY OIL AND GAS LAW AND 
TAXATION § 6.5, at 278 (4th ed. 2004)). 
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automatically terminates upon the occurrence of the limiting condition.668  
However, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has interpreted the estate created 
by the habendum clause of the oil and gas lease as an estate on condition 
subsequent that does not automatically terminate upon a cessation of 
production or the occurrence of a condition.669  In fact, in Roye Realty & 
Developing, Inc., v. Watson,670 the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma expressly 
limited its conclusion that failure to make shut in payments does not 
terminate the lease on the condition that the lessee act reasonably and 
prudently in restoring production.671  Consequently, in Oklahoma, if shut-in 
royalty payments are not made and the lessor wishes to declare the lease 
forfeit, the lessor must bring an action before the court.672  The court must 
then determine whether under the facts the lessee acted reasonably and 
prudently in establishing a market.673 
Nevertheless, Oklahoma and Texas both agree that in order for shut-in 
royalty payments to preserve the oil and gas lease, there must be a well 
capable of producing oil and gas in paying quantities.  As the Texas Court 
of Appeals, stated in Hydrocarbon Management v. Tracker Exploration, 
Inc.,674 “for a well to be maintained by the payment of shut-in royalties, it 
must be capable of producing gas in paying quantities at the time it is shut-
in.”675  In this case, the issue before the court was whether the trial court 
erred in determining that the leases had terminated due to a failure of the 
lessee to establish production or satisfy the terms of one of the savings 
clauses included in the oil and gas lease.676  In its discussion, the court 
analyzed whether the lessee had properly ‘shut in’ the well.677  In so doing, 
it explained “that the phrase capable of production in paying quantities 
means a well that will produce in paying quantities if the well is turned 
“on,” and it begins flowing, without additional equipment or repair.”678  
The court concluded, based on this understanding, that the well was not 
capable of production and ultimately affirmed the judgment of the trial 
 
668. Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290, 295 (Tex. 1923); see 
also Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1941). 
669. Danne v. Texaco Exp. & Prod., Inc., 883 P.2d 210, 213 (Okla. 1994). 
670. Roye Realty & Dev., Inc., 791 P.2d at 823. 
671. Id. 
672. Danne, 883 P.2d at 213. 
673. Hydrocabon Mgmt. v. Tracker Exp., Inc. 861 S.W.2d 427, 430-31 (Tex. App. 1993). 
674. 861 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App. 1993). 
675. Id. at 432-33. 
676. Id. at 431. 
677. Id. at 433-34. 
678. Id. 
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court holding that the lessees failed to establish that the oil and gas lease 
was preserved by the savings clauses included in the lease.679 
Likewise, courts in Oklahoma have concluded a well cannot be shut-in 
or a lease preserved by the shut-in royalty provision unless the well is 
actually capable of production in paying quantities.680  Like the Supreme 
Court of Ohio, in James Energy Co. v. HCG Energy Corp.,681 the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma, has defined the phrase “capable of producing paying 
quantities” as, “capable of producing quantities sufficient to yield a return, 
however, small, in excess of ‘lifting expenses,’ even though well drilling 
and completion costs might never be repaid.”682  In this case, the court 
considered several issues, including whether the leases held by the 
defendants expired under the terms of the habendum clauses.  The court 
held that since the wells were capable of production in paying quantities, 
the leases were held by production.683 
V. SHUT-IN CLAUSES AND PAYMENTS – 
A MULTI-STATE ANALYSIS 
The approach regarding shut-in clauses and payments vary 
dramatically throughout different states nationwide.  In order to provide a 
better understanding of how each state approaches the issue of shut-in 
clauses and payments, this section will provide a state by state analysis of 
relevant case law.  States discussed include:  New York, Pennsylvania, 
West Virginia, Kentucky, Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, 
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Kansas, Arkansas, Arizona, New Mexico, 
Utah, Montana, and Colorado. 
A. NEW YORK 
It appears New York would treat a lease in its secondary term as a fee 
simple subject to condition.  However, New York has little case law 
regarding cessations of production during the secondary term of an oil and 
gas lease.  One appellate decision does indicate that New York follows the 
general rule that shut-in royalties need not be paid to prevent termination of 
a lease if the lease is preserved by operation of another clause.  In Oag v. 
Desert Gas Exploration Co.,684 landowners brought an action for damages 
 
679. Id. at 435; see also Blackmon v. XTO Energy, 276 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. App. 2008). 
680. See Fisher v. Grace Petrol. Corp., 830 P. 2d 1380, 1388 (Okla. Civ. App. 1991); see 
also Bixler v. Lamar Exp. Co., 733 P.2d 410 (Okla. 1987). 
681. 847 P.2d 333 (Okla. 1992). 
682. Id. at 339. 
683. Id. 
684. 659 N.Y.S.2d 654 (N.Y. Div. 1997). 
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against the assignee of a portion of an oil and gas lease for failure to pay 
shut-in royalties for that portion of the lease.685  In rejecting the 
landowner’s argument, the court stated “the habendum clause, and 
modifying clauses of the habendum clause such as the well completion, 
continuous drilling, shut-in royalty, and dry hole clauses, are treated as 
indivisible.”686  As such, shut-in royalties were not owed by the assignee 
because the lease was held by producing wells on the acreage retained by 
the assignor pursuant to the habendum clause.687 
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of New York dealt 
with the issue of whether an oil and gas lease was automatically terminated 
for failure to pay delay rentals during the primary term of a lease.688  In 
Wiser v. Enervest Operating L.L.C., a lessee ceased payment of delay 
rentals during the primary term of an oil and gas lease upon the issuance of 
an allegedly “de facto” moratorium on fracking by the governor of New 
York in 2008.689  As a result, landowners sought a declaration that the 
leases were null and void.690  The leases were still within their primary term 
and no wells had been drilled or operations commenced.691  Recognizing 
the “dearth” of New York oil and gas law, the federal court was forced to 
look entirely to other jurisdictions crafting its decision.692  In examining the 
provisions of the lease, the court deemed the lease was an “unless” lease, 
and such clauses impose a “special limitation” that will automatically 
terminate the lease in the event the enumerated acts were not performed.693  
As such, the court held the lease was automatically terminated upon the 
failure of lessee to pay delay rentals as provided for in the “unless” 
clause.694 
The court, however, was careful to limit application of its holding that 
a lease automatically terminates for failure to pay rentals to the primary 
term of a lease, noting that some courts “distinguish [] between occurrences 
of limiting conditions in the primary term and those that happen in the 
 
685. In addition, the landowners alternatively sought declaration that the lease was 
terminated for failure to pay shut-in royalties.  559 N.Y.S.2d at 654. 
686. Id. (quoting HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 9.10 (3d Ed. 1991)) (emphasis 
added.). 
687. Id. 
688. Wiser v. Enervest Operating, L.L.C., 803 F. Supp. 2d 109, 115 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). 
689. Id. at 114. 
690. Id. at 112. 
691. Id. 
692. Id. at 117-19. 
693. Id. at 119. 
694. Id. at 126. 
          
2012] THE QUICK AND THE DEAD 809 
secondary lease term[.]”695  For this rationale, the court cited Danne v. 
Texaco Exploration and Prod., Inc., an Oklahoma Appellate court case, for 
the proposition that a lessee becomes “vested” with an estate after drilling 
and proving hydrocarbons into the secondary term, the loss of which can 
only be effected through an action for forfeiture.696  In limiting the 
applicability of its holding to the primary term, the court stated that this 
“same concern does not exist here where defendants never conducted 
drilling operations on the property. . . .”697  As such, it can be said Wiser v. 
Enervest does not foreclose the possibility that a court following precedent 
would view a lessee’s leasehold estate as a fee simple subject to condition 
subsequent – at least during the secondary term of a lease. 
B. PENNSYLVANIA 
Pennsylvania takes an unusual view of the ongoing preservation of a 
lease where a well is not producing in paying quantities upon or after 
expiration of the primary lease term.  Specifically, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has held: 
in cases involving oil and gas leases containing lease terms of a 
period of years and “as much longer as oil and gas is produced” or 
similar language, that when oil and gas is no longer being 
produced, the lessee becomes a tenant at will and the tenancy can 
be terminated by either party upon notice being given.698 
These decisions have permitted terminations of leases where operators have 
failed to either produce in “paying quantities” or make payments due in lieu 
of production where the leases permitted such.699  In addition, in two more 
recent decisions, the courts refused to equitably extend leases where lessees 
voluntarily suspended operations pending litigation over title to the subject 
property700 and pending an action over the validity of the lease agreement 
itself.701 
 
695. Id. at 124 n.15 (citing Danne v. Texaco Exp. & Prod., Inc., 883 P.2d 210, 214 (Okla. 
App. 1994)). 
696. Id. at 124. 
697. Id. 
698. Derrickheim Co. v. Brown, 451 A.2d 477, 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (quoting White v. 
Young, 186 A.2d 919, 920 (Pa. 1963)). 
699. See, e.g., White, 186 A.2d at 922; Clark v. Wright, 166 A. 775, 778 (Pa. 1933); Cassell 
v. Crothers, 44 A. 446, 447-48 (Pa. 1899). 
700. See Derrickheim, 451 A.2d 479-80 (allowing a tenant to terminate a lease after the 
primary term where the lessee suspended production after discovering a “cloud on title” over the 
subject property and awaited judicial resolution of the issue). 
701. See Lauchle v. Keeton Group L.L.C., 768 F. Supp. 2d 757, 759-62 (M.D. Pa. 2011) 
(declining to equitably extend a lease where a lessee forewent drilling operations pending 
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None of the Pennsylvania cases have addressed the issue of lease 
termination where a producing well is shut-in in the absence of a shut-in 
provision.  However, courts have found termination of a lease for failure to 
produce or maintain production in “paying quantities” during the secondary 
term, where lessees were not justified in suspending operations pending the 
outcome of litigation,702 and where the courts, in reviewing the facts, found 
indications of “abandonment” of the operations or clear inactivity on the 
part of lessees.703  Additionally, Pennsylvania courts will place special 
emphasis on a lessee’s efforts to “produce” during the secondary term 
where the landowner’s sole compensation under the lease is royalty 
payments.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated this doctrine in 
recognizing an implied covenant to develop and produce under oil and gas 
leases.704 
C. WEST VIRGINIA 
West Virginia has not generated any cases dealing with the 
interpretation of shut in clauses.  However, in Howell v. Appalachian 
Energy, Inc.,705 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered a 
tender of a shut-in payment that was not expressly provided for in the 
lease.706  In that case, wells had been non-producing for at least eight years, 
while the leased properties were subject to bankruptcy proceedings and 
ownership changed hands.707  Prior to filing suit, plaintiffs sent a letter 
asserting abandonment by the lessee, who responded by tendering a check 
 
litigation with the lessor despite the fact that the lessor had initiated the action seeking to 
invalidate the lease over the royalty terms). 
702. Derrickheim, 451 A.2d at 480. 
703. Though the inquiry into abandonment is a fact-sensitive one, the case law is as follows:  
Babb v. Clemensen, 687 A.2d 1120, 1122-23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding the lease was no 
longer maintained where the wells had not produced in five years and had become in disrepair, no 
delay rentals were paid during that time, and no gas was stored on the premises in accordance with 
the lease terms); White, 186 A.2d at 922 (terminating a lease where no oil or gas was found in 
paying quantities and thus no royalties had been paid in over 3 years past the primary term); 
Clark, 166 A. at 778 (finding termination of the lease due to surrender by the lessee where the 
lessee had shut-in the wells, disconnected the pipeline, withdrew from the premises, and failed to 
pay any delay rentals or take any other action with respect to the property for 22 months); Cassell, 
44 A. at 447-48 (finding termination where a well, which was no longer producing in paying 
quantities, was shut-down while other wells in the area were not, and there was no activity by the 
lessee’s employees for a period of five months). 
704. “An implied covenant to develop the underground resources appropriately exists where 
the only compensation to the landowner contemplated in the lease is royalty payments resulting 
from the extraction of that underground resource.”  Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 772 A.2d 
445, 455 (Pa. 2001). 
705. 519 S.E.2d 423 (W.Va. 1991). 
706. Howell, 510 S.E.2d at 431. 
707. Id. at 426-27. 
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for a shut-in payment.708  Although there was no shut-in clause in the lease, 
lessee argued that its effort to offer a shut-in payment along with other 
actions showed intent not to abandon.709  Under the facts of the case, the 
court rejected the argument, finding the eight years of nonproduction and 
nonpayment, is determinative.710  Implicit in the decision is the prospect 
that West Virginia courts would be prepared to evaluate the application of a 
shut-in clause to preserve a lease in the secondary term by appropriate 
payment under a shut in clause. 
D. KENTUCKY 
Whether payments pursuant to a shut-in clause are considered rents or 
royalties in Kentucky is unclear.  In one case, the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals held payments pursuant to a shut-in clause are considered royalties, 
not rent, in accordance with the law in other jurisdictions, including 
Oklahoma, California, and Louisiana.711  In that case, the court 
distinguished between payments made under leases to mine coal or other 
“hard” minerals and payments made for “migratory” minerals such as oil 
and gas, as follows: 
In dealing with coal this court in Saylor v. Howard, 229 Ky. 826, 
18 S. W. (2d) 279, held that royalty to be paid on coal mined is 
regarded as rent.  And in Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 162 Ky. 486, 
172 S. W. 932, Ann. Cas. 1916 E., 223, when we had under 
consideration coal and clay, it was written that as the result of 
usage and custom the terms “rent” and “royalty” are often used 
interchangeably.  In Crain v. West, 191 Ky. 1, 229 S.W. 51, it was 
said that oil and gas royalties are “profits” if not “rents” under KS 
§ 2138, which provides that one-third of the rents and profits of 
the husband’s land shall go to the widow until dower is assigned.  
It will be noted that the three cases just referred to deal with “hard” 
minerals and not oil and gas, which are considered migratory.  In 2 
Thornton Oil & Gas, Sec. 363, p. 644, “rent” in an oil and gas 
lease is defined as money paid for delay in starting drilling 
operations, while “royalty” is defined as a certain proportion of the 
oil found or so much per well where gas is developed.  This 
distinction between “rent” and “royalty” appears to us to be sound 
when dealing with migratory minerals such as oil and gas and it is 
 
708. Id. at 430. 
709. Id.  
710. Id. at 432. 
711. Maynard v. Ratliff, 179 S.W.2d 200, 200-02 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944). 
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supported by courts of foreign jurisdictions where the question has 
been raised.712 
But, in an earlier case, the court treated shut-in royalty payments like 
rent, at least for purposes of apportioning them among the heirs of the 
original lessor.713  In that case, the court held that where land is partitioned 
among heirs of a lessor, royalties must be apportioned among the heirs in 
accordance with the principle of apportionment of rents, because the royalty 
is a rental payment not only for the oil taken out but also for the holding of 
the rest of the lands.714  The court noted Pennsylvania courts had reached 
the same result, but Arkansas, Oklahoma, Indiana and Ohio reached 
different results.715 
E. VIRGINIA 
Virginia would likely uphold a shut-in royalty provision in an oil and 
gas lease, because parties are generally free to contract as they please.  The 
more uncertain issue is whether the lease automatically terminates upon 
failure to pay shut-in royalties.  The answer turns on which position 
Virginia would take in interpreting the “production” requirement in the 
habendum clause.716  The majority of jurisdictions find the term 
“production” in the habendum clause requires actual production in paying 
quantities.717  In that case, failure to pay the shut-in royalty means failure to 
“constructively” produce; therefore, the lease should terminate 
automatically.  In a jurisdiction that follows the minority position, 
resembling West Virginia and Oklahoma, “production” means only 
discovery or a capability of production.718  Assuming the recent LeGard v. 
EQT Prod. Co.719 opinion fairly represents the leanings of Virginia courts, 
it might be expected that Virginia would look to Colorado for guidance on 
shuts-ins as set out in Davis v. Cramer.720 
 
712. Id. at 201. 
713. McIntire’s Adm’r v. Bond, 13 S.W.2d 772, 773-74 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929). 
714. Id. at 774. 
715. Id. 
716. See, e.g., Fox v. Thoreson, 398 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. 1966), (as an example of the use of 
the term “production” in a habendum clause:  “‘If . . . production is obtained, then this lease will 
remain in force for as long thereafter as oil, gas . . . is produced’”). 
717. 3-6 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 604.1 (3d ed. 
2012); see, e.g., Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co., 189 P. 920, 921-22 (Kan. 1920); Natural Gas 
Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. 2003). 
718. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 717, § 604.1; see, e.g., South Penn Oil Co. v. 
Snodgrass, 76 S.E. 961, 966-67 (W.Va. 1912); Cox v. Gulf Corp., 301 F.2d 122, 124 (10th Cir. 
1962); Christian v. A.A. Oil Corp., 506 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Mont. 1973). 
719. No. 1:10CV00041, 2011 WL 86598 (W.D. Va. Jan. 11, 2011). 
720. 808 P.2d 358, 360 (Colo. 1991). 
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F. ALABAMA 
The Alabama Supreme Court, in Jones v. Bronco Oil & Gas Co.,721 
held shut-in royalties paid on lands pooled with an oil and gas lease served 
to extend the lease beyond its primary term, when the lease itself is silent on 
the issue of pooled lands severing from non-pooled lands.722  Conversely, in 
Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Terra Resources,723 the court 
declined to apply the shut-in royalty clause as having been triggered by the 
facts at issue.724  In Jones, the Supreme Court of Alabama addressed the 
question of whether an oil and gas lease was extended into its secondary 
term by payment of shut-in royalties for a well on lands not subject to the 
instant lease but pooled with a portion of lands from that lease.725  The facts 
relevant to the court’s analysis are as follows:  a portion of an oil and gas 
lease was pooled with lands not subject to the lease and a well was drilled 
and shut-in on the non-leased property; following the expiration of the 
primary term, additional lands were added to the pooling unit and a well 
was drilled on and subsequently shut-in on those lands; shut-in royalty 
payments were made to the lessors of the non-leased lands.726  The court 
found “proper payment of the shut-in gas royalty preserved the validity of 
the lease beyond the primary term as to those leased lands outside, as well 
as within, the unit.”727  In Jones, the Court expounded that an oil and gas 
lease could be written such to sever lands subject to lease but not pooled 
from those that were pooled and that such a clause would affect its 
outcome.728 
In Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, the court was presented the 
question of the effect of failure to pay shut-in royalties on the validity of an 
oil and gas lease.729  The court rejected the premise that shut-in royalties 
were due under the facts at issue and found the oil and gas lease in question 
was valid.730  In that case, an oil and gas lease was entered into and 
subsequently delay rental payments were made.  Following the rental 
payments, the lease was pooled with other lands on which a well was 
completed and shut-in, and shut-in royalties were paid only to the lessor 
 
721. 446 So. 2d 611 (Ala. 1984). 
722. Jones, 446 So. 2d at 614-15. 
723. 373 So. 2d 314 (Ala. 1979). 
724. Fed. Land Bank of New Orleans, 373 So. 2d at 318-20. 




729. Fed. Land Bank of New Orleans, 272 So. 2d at 314. 
730. Id. at 315-20. 
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owning the property on which the well was located.  A producing well was 
then drilled on the lands subject to the lease at issue.731 The court held the 
shut-in royalty clause was not triggered, because no shut-in well was on the 
leased lands and actual production held the oil and gas lease valid.732 
G. MISSISSIPPI 
Because Mississippi has not expressly held that actual production is 
required to hold a lease past the primary term, it may be more flexible in 
allowing a lease to continue in such a situation.  The District Court for the 
Southern District of Mississippi has in fact held that a discovery well drilled 
during the primary term and diligently pursued after its expiration was 
enough to hold the lease.733  The general view of the lease construction 
expressed as construing leases in favor of a lessor where prepared by a 
lessee,734 and certainly imply the terms of a shut-in clause would need to be 
strictly observed to prevent lease termination. 
H. TENNESSEE 
Tennessee courts have repeatedly noted one of the “purposes of an oil 
and gas lease is to encourage the diligent operation of the well.”735  In light 
of that purpose, traditionally, leases required production to survive past 
their primary terms.  In fact, Tennessee has found that “the standard 
habendum clause736 requires either discovery or actual production of oil and 
gas to cause the lease to remain in effect beyond the primary term . . . .”737  
In that state, the term “production” means “production in paying 
quantities.”738  Therefore, questions naturally arise as to the survivability of 
a lease being maintained by a shut-in well. 
Tennessee courts recognize the validity of shut-in clauses, which 
generally allow for a payment in lieu of actual production to take the place 




733. D’Lo Royalties, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 389 F. Supp. 538, 548-49 (S.D. Miss. 1975). 
734. See generally Frost v. Gulf Oil Corp., 119 So. 2d 759, 761 (Miss. 1960). 
735. Cali-Ken Petrol. Co. v. Slaven, 754 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); Lone Star Oil 
& Gas, Inc. v. Howard, No. E2009-00428-CA-R3-CV, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 111, *9 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Feb., 12, 2010). 
736. A typical habendum clause includes the following language:  “If . . . production is 
obtained, then this lease will remain in force for as long thereafter as oil, gas, . . . is produced.”  
Fox v. Thoreson, 398 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. 1966). 
737. P.M. Drilling, Inc. v. Groce, 792 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). 
738. Lone Star Oil & Gas, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS, at *13; P.M. Drilling, 792 S.W.2d at 
721. 
739. P.M. Drilling, 792 S.W.2d at 723. 
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constructive production.  When a shut-in clause exists, it must be 
considered in light of the whole lease, which will be interpreted by using 
the rules of construction.740  Not only will the shut-in clause work to extend 
the lease as to the portion of the land from which production is obtained, 
but it will extend the lease as to the entire leased acreage.  This proposition 
has been decided in Tennessee: 
Where a part of a leased tract is included within a pooled or 
unitized area, a majority of jurisdictions have held that drilling or 
production within the unitized area during the primary term of the 
lease, which prevents the termination of the lease at the end of the 
primary term, prevents its termination as to the portion of the lease 
excluded from the unitized area as well as to that portion included.  
This is, of course, consistent with the express language of the 
provision.741 
One question relevant to shut-in clauses is whether failure to pay 
automatically terminates the lease held by constructive production.  
Tennessee has addressed this question, and held that the failure to pay shut-
in royalties terminates the lease automatically by its own terms.742  In that 
particular case, a lease provided for a one month primary term and “for so 
long thereafter as oil, gas, or either of them is produced from the leased 
premises.”743  While the lease was held past its primary term by production, 
the Lessee shut-in a well; thereafter, if Lessee wanted to maintain its well, 
the lease required Lessee to make shut-in royalty payments to lessor.  The 
court determined that if Lessee did not pay delay rental or produce in 
paying quantities, the lease would terminate by its own terms,744 which it 
did after lessee failed to make payments for four months.  Because the lease 
terminated by its own terms, the lessor was under no duty to notify lessee 
that the lease had terminated.745 
The court held such inquiries to be heavily based on the facts of the 
situation.  It “is appropriate for courts to consider the ‘good faith effort[s] 
by the lessee’ and other ‘equitable considerations’” construing the lease.746  
Lessees will be held to higher standards, however, especially in light of 
 
740. Lone Star Oil & Gas, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS, at *7. 
741. Asberry v. St. Joseph Petrol., 653 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (citations omitted). 
742. Lone Star Oil & Gas, Inc., 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 111, *17. 
743. Id. at *2. 
744. Id. at *8. 
745. Id. at *10 (“Lessee’s failure to produce oil or gas from the well or tender rental or 
royalty payments to Lessor for four months led to the termination of the Lease by its own terms.  
Lessee’s right to notice of default expired once the lease lapsed.”). 
746. Id. at *16 (quoting Waddle v. Lucky Strike Oil Co., 551 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Tenn. 
1977)). 
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their generally “superior position of knowledge,” related to their 
undertakings to drill or tender timely payments.747 
A unique consideration in Tennessee is found in Tennessee Code 
Annotated § 66-7-103.748  As it has been interpreted, this statute results in 
complete nullification of any lease provisions allowing a primary term of 
more than ten years if it is not held by production (with the possibility that 
shut-in payments may be able to extend a lease for only one additional 
year).749  Section 66-7-103 states: 
(a)(1) Any lease of oil or natural gas rights or any other 
conveyance of any kind separating such rights from the freehold 
estate of land shall expire at the end of ten (10) years from the date 
executed, unless, at the end of such ten (10) years, natural gas or 
oil is being produced from such land for commercial purposes.  If, 
at any time after the ten-year period, commercial production of oil 
or natural gas is terminated for a period of six (6) months, all such 
rights shall revert to the owner of the estate out of which the 
leasehold estate was carved.  No assignment or agreement to waive 
the provisions of this subsection shall be valid or enforceable. . . . 
(b)(1) For a period of one (1) year after the ten-year period 
provided for in subsection (a) has expired, “production,” as used in 
subsection (a), includes the actual production of minerals under 
any lease hereof or by the owner of any mineral interest, or when 
operations are being conducted by any owner of a lease or mineral 
interest for injection, withdrawal, storage, or disposal of water, 
gas, or other fluid substances, or when rentals or royalties are 
being paid by the owner of such lease for the purpose of delaying 
or enjoying the use of exercise of the rights thereunder or when the 
same is being carried out on any tract with which such leasehold 
interest may be unitized or pooled for production purposes.  
During the one-year period provided for herein, any act by the 
owner of any leasehold or mineral interest pursuant to or 
authorized by the instrument creating such interest shall be 
effective to continue in force all rights granted by such instrument, 
notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a). . . .750 
 
747. Id. 
748. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 66-7-103 (2012). 
749. Tengasco, Inc. v. E. Am. Energy Corp., No. 03A01-703-CV-00081, 1997 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 555, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1997). 
750. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-7-103 (emphasis added). 
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In the relevant case, the lessors leased the premises in 1979 for a 
primary term of ten years and included a broadly drafted thereafter 
clause.751  The lessee drilled a well on the property that was capable of 
producing gas, but no market existed, so the lessees paid and the lessors 
accepted shut-in rental payments during and after the primary term.752  In 
1995, the lessors executed a new lease to Tengasco.753 
The court determined that “production” in section 66-7-103(a)(1) 
meant actual production of minerals from the ground, not to include 
constructive production based on shut-in royalties.754  This decision was 
rendered in spite of the fact that the parties defined production more broadly 
in their lease.  This holding was based on the court’s interpretation of 
legislative intent, which was “to encourage a lessee to diligently pursue 
actual, commercial production of oil or gas; . . . [and to] discourage[] a 
lessee from allowing a well to lie dormant beyond a period of ten years.”755 
Furthermore, the court did not accept the lessee’s argument that the 
lessor’s acceptance of shut-in royalties after the expiration of the primary 
term created a holdover tenancy.756  “To adopt [this argument], we would 
have to find that shut-in payments made after the lease expired could 
achieve a result that the same kind of payments during the lease could not 
achieve–the continued long-term viability of the lease.”757  Rather, the court 
determined such payments could only work to extend the lease for one 
more year as provided in section 66-7-103(b)(1), although in that case, the 
one-year period had expired.758  This provision requires lessees to be 
exceedingly diligent in maintaining production after the ten-year term has 
expired.  It is questionable whether it is applicable to leases with a primary 
term of less than ten years or in which production was had within ten years. 
I. ILLINOIS 
The Illinois Supreme Court has addressed the impact of non-payment 
of shut-in royalties.  In Lamczyk v. Allen,759 the court rejected the lessee’s 
argument that because it capped the well in question during the secondary 
term for lack of market, which was justifiable under one provision, the lease 
 
751. Tengasco, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS, at *4-5. 
752. Id. at *6. 
753. Id. 
754. Id. at *12-13. 
755. Id. at *12. 
756. Id. at *20. 
757. Id. (emphasis in original). 
758. Id. 
759. 134 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. 1956). 
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remained intact despite the lessee’s failure to pay shut-in royalties required 
under a separate provision.760  The court found the language and intent clear 
that these provisions were essentially exclusive.  Under the lease, paying 
shut-in royalties served to “keep the lease alive where gas is 
found . . . [and] . . . not sold (and) to consider the well as a producing 
well[;]”761 however, reliance on the clause allowing suspension of 
operations for want of market “contemplates a condition where there has 
been production of gas together with its delivery and sale but that, due to 
certain conditions after production, suspension of operations is caused by 
no reasonable market being available.”762 
An intermediate appellate decision presented a more unique issue 
concerning the timeliness of the shut-in itself rather than royalty payments.  
In Doty v. Key Oil, Inc.,763 the lessee tendered shut-in payments to extend 
the lease beyond the expiration date of the primary term, but did not 
actually shut-in the well until a year later.764  The court found that this 
crucial fact reframed the issue to one of first impression:  “whether the lease 
was extended under the shut-in clause prior to the actual shutting in by the 
mere existence of a well capable of producing gas.”765  Relying on 
Lamczyk, the court answered in the negative and held that a well capable of 
production “is not enough to extend the lease until such time as the lessee 
should choose to comply fully with the requirements of the shut-in 
clause.”766  Because the primary term under the Doty lease expired between 
shut-in payment and the physical act of shutting in, the lease automatically 
terminated at the closing date of the primary term.767 
J. INDIANA 
There is limited judicial authority in Indiana on shut-in clauses. In 
Plymouth Fertilizer Co. v. Balmer,768 the lease included the following 
provision: 
In the event Lessee should encounter gas, and gas only, on said 
premises prior to the expiration of the primary terms, or any 
extension thereof, then Lessee may cap said gas well and continue 
 
760. Lamczyk, 134 N.E.2d at 755. 
761. Id. 
762. See id. 
763. 404 N.E.2d 346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
764. Doty, 404 N.E.2d at 349. 
765. Id. at 348. 
766. Id. at 349. 
767. See id. 
768. 488 N.E.2d 1129 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
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this lease by the payment of $50.00 per year as a rental until a 
market can be found for such production.769 
Thus, the lessee could continue the lease, which was executed in 1962, by 
paying rent even though there was no market for the gas.770  The lessees, 
however, did not take advantage of this provision and failed to make shut-in 
rental payments except for four years – 1963, 1967, 1968, and 1969.771  A 
lawsuit was brought in 1984 to quiet title and to recover the value of gas 
that defendants allegedly converted by beginning to operate the well in 
1983.772  In finding that the lease had expired [whether for nonpayment of 
shut in royalties or on an alternative theory of abandonment], the court 
noted that “[c]ertainly the lessees were aware of the above cited [shut-in] 
provision in the lease, since shut-in rentals were paid for certain years; and 
it follows that they knew that if rent was not paid the lease would 
expire.”773 
K. MICHIGAN 
In Michigan, one court has held that, pursuant to the terms of a lease 
agreement, a shut-in well on pooled land is considered a producing well, 
and the existence of a producing well holds a lease open past its 
expiration.774  However, a payment of shut-in royalties that is tendered 
more than a year after a well was shut in, near the expiration of the primary 
term, does not serve to extend the lease beyond its primary term where the 
lease requires payment within 90 days of shut in.775  In the latter case, the 
defendants also claimed that “constructive production” occurred by 
payment of the shut-in royalty.  “However the definition of constructive 
production requires timely payment in accordance with explicit lease 
provisions. . . .  As previously noted, the payment was not timely and thus 
no constructive production occurred.”776 
 





774. SHR, LP v. N. Lakes Petrol., Inc., No. 225484, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS 1341, at *5 
(Mich. Ct. App. Sep. 24, 2002). 
775. West Bay Exploration Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 384 N.W.2d 407 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), 
vacated and remanded for reasons not related to shut in royalties by Amoco Prod. Co. v. Ct. App., 
289 N.W. 2d 865 (Mich. 1986), decision on remand, West bay Exp. Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 399 
N.W.2d 549 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), affirming the trial court’s judgment. 
776. Id. at 410. 
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L. OHIO 
There are only a few cases in Ohio that address shut-in royalties and 
how they work to maintain a lease after the primary term.  As a general 
matter, the courts have held that “[a] shut-in royalty clause modifies the 
habendum clause so that the lease may be preserved between the time of 
discovery of product and marketing of the same.  It is a savings clause, but 
it certainly does not negate the duty to use due diligence to sell the 
production.”777 
In Wuenschel v. Northwood Energy Corp.,778 the appellants attempted 
to declare a forfeiture of a lease for two oil and gas wells on their property, 
alleging that the wells were not productive, and that they had not received 
royalty payments.779  It was undisputed that gas production had stopped for 
a period of time to allow for repairs to a leaking pipeline.780  During that 
time, oil production had continued.781  In light of the evidence adduced at 
trial, the appellate court agreed that the wells had not been shut in.782  The 
court noted: 
[A]t no time were the wells ‘shut-in’ for nonproduction as would 
have been required by the state of Ohio of a nonproducing well 
because the problem was not with the wells themselves, but rather, 
with the leaky pipelines, which were fixed . . . .  Thus, while the 
wells were not producing gas in 2000, they were not ‘shut-in’ for 
the purpose of closing the wells and stopping production, but 
rather production of gas was halted for reasonable repairs . . . .  
During that time period, oil was being produced in ‘paying 
quantities.’783 
Because the wells were not shut in, the appellees’ failure to pay shut-in 
royalties was not a breach of the lease, and did not trigger forfeiture.784  
“[A]s the wells were never ‘shut-in,’ there is no reason why they would be 
owed a shut-in royalty.”785 
In Moore v. Adams,786 a well was shut-in in late 2000 or early 2001.787  
No shut-in royalties were paid from 2001 to 2006.788  In 2006, the appellant 
 
777. Am. Energy Serv., Inc. v. Lekan, 598 N.E.2d 1315, 1322 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). 
778. No. 20008-A-0039, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5749 (Dec. 26, 2008). 
779. Id. at **1. 
780. Id. 
781. Id. at **2. 
782. Id. 
783. Id. at **18. 
784. Id. at **19. 
785. Id. at **28. 
786. No., 2007AP090066, 2007 WL 4907590 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2008). 
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sent appellee a check for shut-in royalties for January 2001 to January 2006, 
which appellee did not cash.789  A second check was sent to appellee in 
December of 2006 for shut in royalties for January 2006 through December 
2006.790  Appellee likewise did not cash that check either.791  Instead, 
appellee filed a complaint seeking forfeiture of the lease, due to appellant’s 
failure to produce or maintain operations over that time, together with the 
failure to pay shut-in royalties.792  Appellant argued that the lease should 
not be terminated because he had paid – or attempted to pay – shut-in 
royalties.793  The court found attempted payment to be too little, too late, as 
it was “contrary to the express language of the shut-in clause of the lease.  
The lease states the royalty payment should be paid before the end of each 
calendar year during which the well is shut-in.”794  Because appellant failed 
to comply with this requirement, the attempted payment of shut-in royalties 
did not work to preserve the lease.795 
In Morrison v. Petro Evaluations Services, Inc.,796 appellees filed a 
complaint alleging that a well drilled in 1987 was capable of producing oil 
and gas but had been shut-in in 1988 and was not producing.797  Appellees 
claimed that they had not been paid shut-in royalty payments since 1988, as 
required by the terms of the lease.798  The appellant, Petro Evaluation 
Services, Inc., argued the well was neither a producing well nor a well 
capable of production because all that it produced was sour gas.799  Because 
the well was not capable of production, appellant argued that the lease was 
not valid and no shut-in royalties were due; instead, the lease had expired 
by its own terms.800 
The court, having reviewed the evidence from the trial, concluded that 
contrary to appellant’s assertions, the well was capable of producing gas in 
paying quantities, because “[e]ven sour gas is marketable.”801  The fact that 
the appellant did not have ready access to a scrubbing facility to remove the 
 





792. Id. at *2. 
793. Id. 
794. Id. at *4. 
795. Id. 
796. No. 2004CA0004, 2005 WL 2715578 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2005). 
797. Morrison, 2005 WL 2715578, at *5-6 
798. Id. 
799. Id. at *6. 
800. Id. at *3. 
801. Id. at *15. 
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sulfur did not mean access was not available or possible.802  Moreover, the 
court was influenced by the appellant’s arguments to the Ohio Department 
of Natural Resources in 1991 that the well should not be plugged, because it 
was capable of production in commercial quantities and that pipeline rights 
were being negotiated.803  The court, in finding that the well was shut-in, 
held: 
If the well was capable of production in 1991, and in 2002, 
appellant was preparing to transport the sour gas for scrubbing, 
appellant has failed to demonstrate why it could not have made the 
well capable of production in 1988.  Because the well was capable 
of production, the lease did not terminate in September, 1988, and 
appellees were entitled to the shut-in royalties after such time.804 
M. KANSAS 
Under Kansas law, a well is shut-in when it is both complete and 
capable of producing, regardless of whether it previously achieved actual 
production.  As discussed herein, this definition holds true whether or not 
the well is connected to a pipeline, subject to dewatering and repairs, or 
open to a limited market for sale of its production.  The key factors 
considered by the courts are physical in nature, or “those factors that affect 
the properties and potential of the well itself.”805 
Kansas decisions focus heavily on fact related issues in oil and gas 
lease disputes, especially with regard to interpreting shut-in provisions.806  
Nonetheless, the Kansas Supreme Court has established “certain general 
characteristics” of shut-in royalty clauses to guide courts through this ad 
hoc determination.807  According to the court, the purpose of a shut-in 
royalty clause “is to enable a lessee, under appropriate circumstances, to 
keep a nonproducing lease in force by the payment of the shut-in royalty 
and that such a clause by agreement of the parties creates constructive 
production.”808  Depending on the lease language, a shut-in clause “can 
modify and become an integral part of the habendum clause, or extension 




804. Id. at *16. 
805. See Levin v. Maw Oil & Gas, LLC, 234 P.3d 805, 819 (Kan. 2010). 
806. See id. at 809 (quoting Welsch v. Trivestco Energy Co., 221 P.3d 609 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2009)). 
807. See id. 
808. See id. (quoting Welsch v. Trivestco Energy Co., 221 P.3d 609, 614 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2009). 
809. Id. 
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The Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion in Levin v. Maw Oil & Gas810 
provides a detailed overview of the state of Kansas law regarding shut-in 
royalty provisions.  In Levin, the Kansas Supreme Court considered 
whether shut-in royalty clauses extended a group of leases beyond their 
respective primary terms.811  The leases contained similar shut-in royalty 
provisions, which provided: 
If, at any time, while there is a gas well or wells on the above 
land . . . and such well or wells are shut in, and if this lease is not 
continued in force by some other provisions hereof or if a well has 
been completed and dewatering operations have commenced, then 
it shall, nevertheless, continue in force as long as said well or wells 
are shut in and it shall be considered that gas is being produced 
from the leased premises in paying quantities within the meaning 
of this lease by the LESSEE paying or tendering to LESSOR 
annually, in advance a substitute or shut-in gas royalty . . . .812 
The lessee drilled a gas well on each leased premises within the applicable 
primary term; however, with no pipeline in place to economically bring the 
gas to market, the lessee did not produce any oil or gas from these wells.813  
Instead, relying on the above provision, the lessee tendered shut-in and 
advance royalty payments to each lessor as a means to keep the leases 
intact.814 
The district court found the shut-in clause unclear, but interpreted its 
language to apply only to a well that is both shut-in and subject to 
dewatering operations.815  Because the absence of dewatering activities was 
undisputed, the court granted summary judgment in the lessors’ favor.816  
Based on a wealth of Kansas precedent construing shut-in clauses, the 
Supreme Court of Kansas reversed and found this interpretation inaccurate 
under the circumstances.817 
In the Kansas Supreme Court’s view, this shut-in clause 
unambiguously established three conditions that must be met to allow the 
shut-in royalty payments to extend the lease:  (1) “the existence of a gas 
 
810. 234 P.3d 805 (Kan. 2010). 
811. See Levin, 234 P.3d at 814. 
812. Id. at 810. 
813. See id. at 810-12. 
814. See id.  
815. See id. at 813 (quoting the district court’s finding the shut-in clause language to be “at 
best confusing and ambiguous and at worst nonsensical”). 
816. See id. 
817. Id. at 814-15; see also Classon v. Fed. Land Bank of Wichita, 617 P.2d 1255, 1262-63 
(Kan. 1988); Dewell v. Fed. Land Bank, 380 P.2d 379, 383 (Kan. 1963); Friesen v. Fed. Land 
Bank of Wichita, 608 P.2d 915, 930 (Kan. 1908). 
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well or wells on the subject land;” (2) that such well(s) qualify as shut-in 
under state precedent;818 and, (3) “[e]ither the leases must not be continued 
in force by some other provision[,] or the well or wells must be ‘completed’ 
and dewatering operations commenced.”819  The second of these conditions 
– whether the wells qualified as shut-in – was a crucial issue in Levin, 
prompting a detailed explanation of relevant Kansas precedent.820  The 
court discussed six prior cases concerning shut-in clause construction, 
which shaped the Levin holding.821 
After summarizing these six cases, the Levin court crafted the 
following description of shut-in clause construction:  “a well generally 
qualifies as shut-in under Kansas law when it is physically complete and 
capable of producing in paying quantities, even if it has not actually 
produced in paying quantities in the past.”822  The court further stated, [t]he 
fact that [a well] has not yet been connected to a pipeline does not 
necessarily make it incomplete or prevent it from being accurately 
described as shut-in,” nor is the “definition of shut-in entirely dependent 
upon whether dewatering has begun or upon whether equipment or repairs 
are still needed.”823  The court concluded that determining whether a well is 
shut-in is a question of fact and therefore, reversed and remanded.824  The 
court further instructed that the factors to be considered “are those that 
affect the properties and potential of the well itself, rather than the likely 
success of any processing or transport of product that remains to be 
attempted or accomplished.”825  The Supreme Court’s holding in Levin was 
 
818. See id. at 815. 
819. See id. at 815 (emphasis added). 
820. See id. at 815-20. 
821. Id.; see also Robbins v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 785 P.2d 1010, 1015 (Kan. 1990) 
(distinguishing non-payment of shut-in royalties from a breach of the covenant of diligent 
development); Pray v. Premier Petrol., Inc., 662 P.2d 255, 258-59 (Kan. 1983) (finding a well shut 
in despite no connection to marketing or transport facilities); Martin v. Kostner, 644 P.2d 430, 433 
(Kan. 1980) (clarifying that a well need not connected to a pipeline or turned on before qualifying 
as shut-in); Dewell, 380 P.2d at 381-82 (holding that a lease’s shut-in clause is “a privilege 
granted the lessee in lieu of production” but does not “make the payment of shut-in royalties the 
equivalent of production” under other contracts) (emphasis added); Welsh v. Trivestco Energy 
Co., 221 P.3d 609, 614-15 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (finding a lease expressly kept alive by shut-in 
royalties in lieu of production implies that the lessee’s failure to tender such payments causes the 
lease to expire absent actual production”).  Contra Tucker v. Hugoton Energy Corp., 855 P.2d 
929, 936 (Kan. 1993) (narrowly ruling that a shut-in clause may only be invoked in response to a 
total absence of a market). 
822. Levin, 234 P.3d at 819. 
823. See id. 
824. See id. at 820. 
825. Id. at 819. 
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followed by the Kansas Court of Appeals in Palmer v. Bill Gallagher 
Enterprises826 and RAMA Operating Co. v. Barker.827 
In Dewell v. Federal Land Bank,828 one of the cases relied on in Levin, 
the Kansas Supreme Court draws an important distinction between the 
effect of timely shut-in payments on the subject lease and similar 
production-contingent interests, such as term mineral interests, held by third 
parties.829  In Dewell, the shut-in clause stated the lease would survive with 
annual shut-in payments from the date that “the well was completed as a gas 
well capable of producing natural gas in paying quantities.”830  The third-
party plaintiff held a reversionary interest under a separate mineral deed 
that continued under the grant’s own condition – “so long thereafter as” 
production from the leased acreage continues.831  When the lessee exercised 
its option to shut-in wells and pay royalties, the plaintiff argued her 
reversion likewise survived actual cessation by virtue of the lessee’s 
payments.832 
The Dewell court explained that the lease’s shut-in royalty clause, did 
not extend the rights of any unnamed parties “nor make the payment of 
shut-in royalties the equivalent of production” under any other contract.833  
The plaintiff’s interest expired while the lessee’s remained intact under the 
court’s distinction between the shut-in clause’s applicability to any well 
“capable of producing” and the grant’s unsupported habendum language 
requiring “a well actually producing.”834  Accordingly, Levin defined shut-
in as: “[a] well is shut-in when it is completed and capable of producing 
natural gas in paying quantities.”835 
N. ARKANSAS 
In L&L Energy Company v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC,836 the court 
considered a case involving multiple oil and gas leases that had been 
produced into their secondary term, after which production ceased for a 
period of seven months and the lessor had accepted shut-in royalty 
 
826. 240 P.3d 592 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010). 
827. 286 P.3d 1138 (Kan. App. Ct. 2012). 
828. 380 P.2d 379 (Kan. 1963). 
829. See id. at 382-83. 
830. Id. at 380 (emphasis added). 
831. Id. 
832. Id. at 380-81. 
833. Id. at 381-82. 
834. Id at 382-83. 
835. Levin v. Maw Oil & Gas, LLC, 234 P.3d 805, 816 (Kan. 2010). 
836. 379 S.W.2d 42 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010). 
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payments during that period.837  The court ruled the acceptance of the shut-
in royalty payments did not serve to extend the leases as they had expired 
prior to the acceptance.838  Furthermore, the payments could not act to 
renew the lease because the leases were terminated by the time the shut-in 
payments were made.839 
In Hurley Enterprises Inc., v. Sun Gas Company,840 the court addressed 
an oil and gas lease covering lands within multiple sections, where the land 
covered by all but one section contained producing wells or were pooled 
with land containing producing wells.841  The court found the shut-in 
royalty clause of the lease was never triggered because the entire lease was 
held by the production of any portion of lease, stating:  “the Court is 
convinced that the lease agreement did not call for the lessee to make a 
shut-in royalty payment so long as gas is being produced in paying 
quantities from other lands covered by the lease.”842 
O. ARIZONA 
Arizona has a statutory program in place for oil and gas leasing of state 
owned lands that is primarily contained in Arizona Revised Statutes 
sections 27-555 and 27-556.843  Shut in royalties are addressed in section 
27-555.01.844  To take advantage of the provisions in the statute regarding 
shut in royalties, a lessee must first hold a qualifying lease.  This means 
“the owner of an oil and gas lease issued pursuant to this chapter has 
discovered oil or gas on the leased premises or on lands joined therewith in 
a cooperative or pooled unit.”845  Further, there must be a completed well 
on the leased premises or those lands pooled with the premises that is 
capable of production in paying quantities but that is unable to so produce 
for “lack of transportation or processing facilities or a market for the oil or 
gas that would support production in paying quantities.”846  Production in 
paying quantities exists where “the monthly proceeds of the well would be 
expected to exceed the well’s monthly operating expenses, if transportation 
and processing facilities were present and a market existed.”847  The statute 
 
837. Id. at 46. 
838. Id. at 46-47. 
839. Id.  
840. 543 F. Supp. 359 (W.D. Ark. 1982). 
841. Id. at 360. 
842. Id. at 362. 
843. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 27-555, -556 (2011). 
844. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 27-555.01 (2011). 
845. Id. § 27-555.01 A. 
846. Id. § 27-555.01 A, B(1). 
847. Id. § 27-555.01 B(3)(a). 
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also requires that a notice of well completion be filed with the Arizona State 
Land Department, which is the same department that determines if a lease 
on state lands will qualify for shut-in status.848 
P. NEW MEXICO 
The New Mexico Supreme Court has examined shut-in royalties in 
Maralex Resources Inc. v. Gilbreath849 and Greer v. Salmon.850  The 
analysis in Maralex holds that shut-in royalties cannot extend an oil and gas 
lease when a well is not capable of actual production.851  The Greer case 
held the reverse – namely, that when a well is capable of actual production, 
shut-in royalties can serve to save a lease from termination when there is no 
actual production.852 
In Maralex, the court, presented with an oil and gas leasehold with a 
producing well on the premises that over time had become a non-producing 
well, was asked whether shut-in royalties payments could save the lease 
from expiring under its terms.853  The Maralex court held that the lessee 
“could only rely on the shut-in royalty clause if the well in this case were 
capable of production. There is no evidence in the record to support a claim 
that the well was capable of production.”854  The court dismissed the notion 
that it should consider the question of shut-in royalties further.855 
The Greer court was presented with an oil and gas leasehold upon 
which a well capable of actual production had been drilled but was not 
actually producing oil and/or gas.856  In Greer, the court held a shut-in 
royalty payment can extend the term of the lease in question where the well 
is capable of production.857  The Greer court also held the shut-in royalty 
clause in that case was a covenant not a condition or that it created in the 
lessee a right not a duty.858 
Q. NEVADA 
In at least one case, Nevada has upheld a delay rental provision in an 
oil and gas lease, citing the rights of all parties to freely contract according 
 
848. Id. § 27-555.01 B(2). 
849. 76 P.3d 626 (N.M. 2003). 
850. 479 P.2d 294 (N.M. 1970). 
851. Maralex, 76 P.2d at 632. 
852. Greer, 479 P.2d at 297-98. 
853. Maralex, 76 P.3d at 630. 
854. Id. at 634. 
855. Id. at 634-35. 
856. Greer, 479 P.2d at 295. 
857. Id. at 299. 
858. Id. 
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to their wishes.859  In that case, the parties expressly contracted that in the 
event the lessee did not drill, it could pay an agreed-upon price-per-acre for 
each twelve-month extension.860  In fact, the contract set the price to be paid 
for the first ten years.861  The lessee chose to extend the contract and raised 
the price for extensions in years eleven through twenty-five.862  In year 
eleven, the lessee had not drilled but had paid to extend the lease; the lessor 
sued for termination of the lease, alleging the lessee violated an implied 
covenant to act with due diligence.863  The Supreme Court of Nevada 
reviewed a minority position held by some states that reads an implied 
covenant of due diligence into contracts, which “would directly contradict 
an express provision allowing delay in development upon payment of 
rent.”864  Nevada agreed with the majority that this minority approach 
“appears ‘violative of all settled interpretation and construction of contracts, 
and an unjustifiable interference with the privilege and power to 
contract.’”865  The court explicitly adopted the majority rule, refusing to 
imply a covenant to act with due diligence that would “defeat the express 
agreement of the parties.”866 
R. UTAH 
There are no Utah cases dealing directly with shutting in a well during 
the secondary term.  The state courts have produced little relevant case law 
in this area despite consistent production within Utah borders.  This absence 
of authority is largely because the majority of the state’s oil and gas is 
owned and leased by the government and thus subject to lease controls by 
federal statute. 
The only identified case with particular relevance is Resource 
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock, Co..867  In Weston, the Utah 
Supreme Court found adequate consideration in a lease clause allowing 
only the lessee to terminate in its “sole discretion” and opinion of 
profitability.868  The court rejected the lessor’s arguments regarding illusory 
promises on the express grounds that the lessee owes the traditional 
 






865. Id. at 1121 (citing 2 W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS §§ 397, at 547 (1959)). 
866. Id. 
867. 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985). 
868. Sandtana, Inc., 706 P.2d at 1034-38. 
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contractual duties of good faith in exercising this termination power.869  The 
court held: 
[R]eservation by a promisor of a power to cancel upon the 
occurrence of some event not wholly controlled by the promisor 
himself does not render his promise illusory or the contract 
invalid.  “Even if the promisor is himself to be the judge of the 
cause or condition, he must use good faith and an honest 
judgment.”870 
S. MONTANA 
The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted shut royalties in 
Sandtana, Inc. v. Wallin Ranch Co.871  In Sandtana, the court was presented 
with oil and gas leasehold where a producing well was completed and shut-
in on the final day of the primary term, after which shut-in royalty 
payments were made.872  The lease contained lands in multiple 
governmental sections with only one section containing a well.873  The lease 
in Sandtana contained a “Pugh clause” that functioned to segment the lease 
by governmental sections once the primary term had expired, further 
segmenting the lease depending on whether there was a productive well 
present.874  The court in that case held “[a] shut-in royalty clause provides 
for ‘constructive production,’ typically in the form of shut-in royalty 
payments.  The effect of the shut-in royalty clause is to provide for a 
substitute for production under the habendum clause.”875  The court 
considered the question as whether the well at issue was a “‘producing 
well’ or ‘production’” had been satisfied such to extend the lease term for 
the whole leasehold upon the payment of shut-in royalties.876  The court 
ruled Montana is a minority jurisdiction with regard to the definition of 
production requiring only that oil or gas be discovered and “‘discovery’ 
requires completion and capability of extraction and the lessee must make 
diligent efforts to market.’”877  Thus, the court held the well in Sandtana 
was producing under the language of the lease and could sustain the 
 
869. Id. 
870. See id. at 1038 (quoting 1A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 165, at 86-87 (1963)). 
871. 80 P.3d 1224 (Mont. 2003). 
872. Id. at 1229-31. 
873. Id. at 1231. 
874. Id. 
875. Id. 
876. Id. at 1231. 
877. Id. at 1230. 
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payment of shut-in royalties.878  Finally, the court held absent the ‘Pugh 
clause,’ the shut-royalty payments in this context would have extended all 
lands subject to the lease into the secondary term.879 
T. COLORADO 
The “fundamental purpose” of an oil and gas lease is the “exploration, 
development, production, and operation of the property for the mutual 
benefit of the lessor and lessee.”880  Often, lessees diligently pursue these 
objectives by drilling a well capable of production, but the surrounding 
infrastructure may not have kept pace.  Because of the nature of gas (i.e., it 
cannot be stored), it must be marketed directly upon production; 
consequently, if no market exists, or if the facilities do not exist to transport 
it to a market, a producing well must be shut-in.  Therefore, a “shut-in” well 
is one that is capable of production but which is currently not in production, 
usually due to lack of market. 
In recognition of the overriding purpose of oil and gas leases, parties 
are free to set out express provisions that obligate lessee to carry out acts to 
accomplish that purpose.  If the lease fails to provide these provisions, the 
law implies them.881  Settled Colorado case law identifies four such implied 
covenants:  “exploration, development, production (including marketing), 
and protection against drainage.”882  The implied duty to produce, i.e., to 
market, is the most relevant for a discussion of shut-in royalties.  After 
completion of a well, lessee has a reasonable time to comply with the 
implied covenant to market, absent express lease terms to the contrary.883  
The shut-in royalty clause, then, is an example of an express provision 
which alters the effect of failing to comply with the obligation to market 
implied into the lease.884 
Understanding the function of the shut-in royalty clause as interpreted 
in Colorado is aided by understanding the purpose of the habendum 
clause.885  A habendum clause is “[t]he clause in a deed or lease setting 
forth the duration of the grantee’s or lessee’s interest in the premises.”886  In 
 
878. Id. at 1232. 
879. Id. 
880. Davis v. Cramer, 808 P.2d 358, 360 (Colo. 1991). 
881. Id. at 361. 
882. Id. 
883. Id. 
884. See Davis v. Cramer, 837 P.2d 218, 223 (Colo. App. 1992). 
885. See generally id. 
886. Bledsoe Land Co. v. Forest Oil Corp., 277 P.3d 838, 840 n.2 (Colo. App. 2011). 
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order for an “unless” lease to extend a lease beyond the primary term, the 
lessee must satisfy the production requirement of the habendum clause.887 
The Colorado Court of Appeals has addressed this issue, and drew a 
distinction based upon whether marketing is considered an essential part of 
production, finding: 
Jurisdictions vary as to what is required to satisfy a habendum 
clause.  If marketing is not an essential part of production, the 
habendum clause is satisfied by commercial discovery of the 
product. . . .  In jurisdictions in which marketing is an essential 
part of production, the habendum clause requires that the product 
be removed from the earth, which necessarily involves marketing 
where the product is gas, and reduced to possession for use in 
commerce.888 
The court went on to state that neither the lease at issue in that case nor 
Colorado case law indicated that marketing is an essential part of 
production.889  Indeed, this position is reinforced by relevant Colorado case 
law.890  Therefore, the habendum clause is satisfied by discovery in 
commercial quantities.891 
The position taken in Colorado that a habendum clause is satisfied by 
mere discovery of paying quantities has implications in the analysis of shut-
in royalty clauses.  Once a lessee has successfully drilled a well capable of 
production in commercial quantities, he has fulfilled his obligation to drill, 
and his lease will be carried past its primary term.892  This raises the 
question of what would induce a lessee to include a shut-in royalty clause.  
The answer to this question revolves around the implied duties that 
Colorado case law applies to all lessees. 
Colorado implies four covenants into leases that lack contrary 
provisions.  They include: to drill or explore, to develop after discovery in 
paying quantities, to diligently and prudently operate, and to protect against 
 
887. See, e.g., Davis v. Cramer, 808 P.2d 358, 359 (Colo. 1991). 
888. Davis, 837 P.2d at 222. 
889. Id.  Note that the lease at issue was for a primary term of ten years and “as long 
thereafter as oil or gas or other minerals are produced from said land by lessee.”  Id. at 221.  
Therefore, in the absence of the requirement that minerals be produced from land “in paying 
quantities,” Colorado does not imply such a requirement. 
890. See Hoff v. Girdler Corp., 88 P.2d 100, 102 (Colo. App. 1939). 
891. See Davis, 837 P.2d at 222.  Parties remain free to draft the habendum clause to require 
production in commercial quantities, and in that instance mere discovery would presumably be 
insufficient.  See N. York Land Assoc. v. Byron Oil Indus., Inc., 695 P.2d 1188, 1192 (Colo. App. 
1984). 
892. Davis, 837 P.2d at 222. 
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drainage.893  The covenant to prudently operate entails the further duty to 
market the product, which requires the lessee to diligently market the 
product so that lessor will realize a return on his royalty interest.894 
The performance of a lessee in complying with the duty to market will 
be judged under the prudent operator standard; that is, lessee must exercise 
reasonable diligence, having regard for the interests of lessor and lessee, in 
commencing marketing within a reasonable time after completion of the 
well.895  Marketing includes the sale of the product and payment of royalties 
owing to lessor.896  A finding of compliance with the duty depends upon 
equitable consideration applied to the facts of each case.  Whether proper 
diligence was exercised is determined by answering the question, 
“whatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably expected of all 
operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of both lessor 
and lessee.”897 
A shut-in royalty effectively provides “constructive production” by 
allowing the lessee to extend his lease past the primary term without 
marketing product, and by allowing the lessor to collect royalties in the 
absence of a market.898  Where commercial discovery has been made during 
the primary term, thereby satisfying the habendum clause, the shut-in clause 
is not necessary to extend the lease beyond its primary term and does not 
operate as a special limitation to extend the term of the lease.899  The lease 
will be extended with or without the shut-in clause subject only to forfeiture 
for failure to comply with the implied covenant to market.900  However, 
parties may choose to insert a shut-in royalty clause to provide “an 
additional special limitation,” requiring payment of the shut-in royalty if 
gas is not marketed.901  Essentially, it is an avenue through which parties 
draft around the implied covenant to market.902 
The following shut-in royalty clause was found to be optional and not 
the exclusive method for maintaining the lease in force when production 
lapsed during the secondary term:  “[W]hen no reasonable or convenient 
 
893. Id.  See Davis v. Cramer, 808 P.2d 358, 361 (Colo. 1991) (setting out the implied 
covenants of exploration, development, production (including marketing), and protection against 
drainage); see also Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1984). 
894. See Davis, 837 P.2d at 222.  Note that this duty applies during both the primary and 
secondary terms.  See generally Davis, 808 P.2d at 358. 
895. Davis, 837 P.2d at 222. 
896. Id. 
897. Id. at 222-23. 




902. See id. 
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gas market is available, lessee may pay $1 per acre per annum for the total 
acres allotted to each while held as a shut-in well.”903  The Colorado Court 
of Appeals held failure to pay the shut-in did not terminate the lease, 
although the lessee was not excused from the duty to search for a market or 
to otherwise conduct himself as a reasonably prudent operator; it was on the 
latter ground that the lease was terminated.904  It is important to note the 
court found the duty to market to have applied and to have been breached 
during the primary term.905  Therefore, payment of shut-in royalties, if used 
as a saving mechanism, may be necessary both before and after the primary 
term expires if a well capable of production is shut-in. 
Colorado also has had occasion to determine how shut-in royalty 
payments affect wells shut-in on pooled acreage.906  In O’Hara v. 
Coltrin,907 the lease allowed acreage to be pooled with other lands and also 
provided that a well on pooled acreage but not physically located on the 
leased land was sufficient to maintain the lease as to the entire leased 
premises.908  Two wells were thus drilled on landed pooled with the 
leasehold, but not on the leasehold, and were subsequently shut-in.909  The 
lessee paid shut-in royalties in order to maintain the lease.910  The lessee 
challenged the payments because the shut-in clause spoke in terms of the 
“leased premises.”911  The court found that the shut-in clause should be 
combined with the pooling clause, such that the payments continued the 
lease in full force and effect.912 
VI. FILLING THE GAPS, FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN 
SELECTED SHALE STATES 
The states selected here for further discussion, beyond a survey of their 
existing case law regarding temporary cessation and shut-in clauses have in 
common ongoing or anticipated new development, to exploit substantial 
shale horizons using horizontal drilling.  In most of these states, the 
technology of horizontal drilling means a per well investment an order of 
magnitude, or more, greater than the investment in the wells and leases on 
which the existing jurisprudence is based.  While the shale revolution in 
 
903. Id. at 223-24. 
904. Id. at 224. 
905. Id. 
906. See generally O’Hara v. Coltrin, 637 P.2d 398, 401 (Colo. App. 1981). 
907. 637 P.2d 398 (Colo. App. 1981). 
908. O’hara, 637 P.2d at 400. 
909. Id. at 400-01. 
910. Id. at 400. 
911. Id. at 401. 
912. Id. 
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Texas or Louisiana will likely not create substantial new developments in 
case law, at least in regard to the topic of this article, a different result 
should be expected in the states here visited. 
Because both Texas and Oklahoma can be viewed as very supportive 
of oil and gas development, it may be somewhat misleading to suggest that 
the differing approaches of these two leading states, demonstrate different 
biases toward development.  Nevertheless, it does appear that Texas, with 
its view of a lease as a fee simple determinable, which is automatically 
terminated by a cessation of production, leans toward protecting lessors by 
eliminating leases that are not producing or being assertively developed.  
Oklahoma, on the other hand, seems to lean toward a development policy 
which weighs more heavily toward the risk and investment represented by 
the lessee or producers efforts.  This provides greater leeway in the 
evaluation of whether a lessee has acted appropriately in performing under 
the lease, in order to extend and preserve it into the secondary term.  It may 
be expected that in jurisdictions whose jurisprudence is incomplete, the 
current courts, may lean toward one model or the other based on a 
contemporary view of which development model, lessor leaning or lessee 
leaning, most closely reflects the economic and public policies of their 
respective states, without reference to century old efforts to describe or 
redefine property interests or contract rights which were last analyzed when 
the oil industry was in its infancy.  If this is the case, many of the states 
discussed in this section might be expected to take a restrictive, rather than 
expansive, view of the application of the legal doctrines or contractual 
provisions discussed in this Article. 
A. NEW YORK 
In the current context, it is fair to say that the relative absence of 
judicial decisions on savings clauses in New York is not the proverbial 
wrench in the works, holding up development of the state’s shale resources.  
Indeed, the ongoing assessment of what ought to be the appropriate New 
York policy for energy development suggests that any effort to evaluate 
New York’s treatment of saving clauses going forward may be somewhat 
premature. 
The federal district court decision in Wiser v. Enervest Operating 
L.L.C.,913 discussed in more detail earlier,914 is instructive in that the court, 
acknowledging an absence of New York precedent, looked to Oklahoma 
and the Danne decision, to conclude that an oil and gas lease creates an 
 
913. 803 F. Supp. 2d 109 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). 
914. See footnote 715-24 and accompanying text. 
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estate subject to a condition, which vests in the lessee upon production.915  
This, in turn, may indicate that New York would characterize itself as a 
“discovery” state in evaluating the application and effect of shut-in royalty 
payments in a manner similar to Oklahoma.  This approach seems to strike 
a more reasonable balance of equitable consideration of the risk and 
economic investment associated with horizontal development, protecting a 
lessee from the harsher requirements of actual production in the primary 
term but requiring a quid pro quo, diligent compliance with the payment 
obligations of a shut-in provision, and like diligence in proceeding to obtain 
and connect new wells to market. 
B. PENNSYLVANIA 
Pennsylvania law related to savings clauses in the secondary term is 
sparse, and as with some other aspects of Pennsylvania oil and gas law and 
mineral property law,916 the peculiar uniqueness of the case law makes 
analysis all the harder.  As an ownership-in-place state, it might be expected 
that Pennsylvania would take a firm position similar to Texas on the general 
effect of the cessation of production in the secondary term being 
termination of the lease.  Yet, the few cases all seem to support a different 
approach.  It is somewhat akin to Oklahoma or other “discovery” states, but 
seeming to come from a different set of considerations.  The Cole v. 
Philadelphia Co.917 case sets out a general proposition that a temporary 
cessation of production of short duration will not result in termination of a 
lease.918  However, this case, as it was presented to the court, was uniquely 
postured with the lessee asserting that the cessation caused a termination 
and the lessor arguing for continuation and enforcement of payment 
obligations under the lease.919  One wonders as to the applicability of this 
decision in the typical case where the lessor seeks to show that the cessation 
should result in lease termination.  Likewise, the Pennsylvania conclusion 
that upon cessation of production in the secondary term the lease creates a 
tenancy at will seems at odds to the majority view that automatic 
termination results, and more in line with the views of courts in Oklahoma 
or West Virginia as expressed in Derrickheim Co. v. Brown.920  And 
 
915. Wiser, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 133-34 (citing Danne v. Texaco Exp. & Prod., Inc., 833 
S.W.2d 210 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994)). 
916. See, e.g., Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 40 (1882) (creating a presumption that a 
reservation of “minerals” does not include oil absent clear contrary intention within the terms of a 
lease). 
917. 26 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1942). 
918. See generally Cole, 26 A.2d at 920. 
919. See id. at 921-22. 
920. 451 A.2d 477 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). 
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California, the other state that finds a holdover tenancy upon a cessation of 
production, can be classified as a discovery state.921 
Certainly, if presented with a typical cessation case, the existing case 
law suggests that Pennsylvania courts would favor some version of a 
temporary cessation of production doctrine, wherein the court would 
consider all the related facts, including: duration of the cessation; the effort 
of the lessee to return to production or acts which infer abandonment; the 
inclusion of a cessation clause in the lease; and where there is a clause, 
appropriate and timely performance by the lessee.  In the absence of a 
clause, the tenancy-at-will approach of Derrickheim suggests strongly that 
the duration of a temporary cessation would be brief, perhaps a few months 
at most, before a lessor might be expected to give notice that the tenancy at 
will was terminated. 
Likewise, the application of the reasoning in Derrickheim to shut-in 
royalty provisions suggests that, in the absence of very clear and specific 
language as to when payments should commence within the contractual 
agreement of the parties, Pennsylvania courts would require payment as of 
the time of shut-in to avoid opening a gap during which the lessor could 
declare the tenancy at will to be over.  In addition, a lessee would almost 
certainly expect to be required to use diligence in connecting the well to 
market or returning it to economic production, even while shut-in payments 
were being made.  The extent to which current Pennsylvania courts lean 
toward either the lessor or lessee, in balancing the equities of a case, may 
suggest whether Oklahoma or Colorado would be a better guide.  As 
indicated elsewhere in this Article, the authors see as the better view the 
lessee-leaning approach of Oklahoma.  This is because of the economic 
stakes, the relative risk to the parties, and the potential benefit to both the 
lessee and lessor from production, assuming the lessee, in its actions, has 
acted reasonably and prudently in the operation of the well and in meeting 
its lease performance obligation, including timely payment of required shut-
in royalties. 
C. WEST VIRGINIA 
As stated in Bryan v. Big Two Mile Gas Company,922 West Virginia 
has adopted a temporary cessation doctrine, which is fact-specific, but is 
comprehensible and reasonable in evaluating the facts.923  Coupled with the 
West Virginia view that “discovery” of productive quantities in the primary 
 
921. See Renner v. Huntington-Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co., 244 P.2d 895, 901 (Cal. 1952). 
922. 577 S.E.2d 258 (W.Va. 2001). 
923. Bryan, 577 S.E.2d at 266. 
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term is sufficient to hold the lease into the secondary term, there is some 
prospect that West Virginia would follow the Oklahoma model in 
interpreting shut-in clauses and their effect in preserving a lease in the 
secondary term.  The limited case law on this subject speaks only to the 
point that preservation by operation of a shut-in payment must be express in 
the lease and will not be implied in the absence of express language. 
In a recent case involving proper payment of royalty, Estate of Tawney 
v. Columbia Natural Resources,924 the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals looked to Colorado as a model for its holding.  Colorado, as 
discussed previously, does take the view that there is a duty to market in the 
primary term.925  While early West Virginia precedent like South Penn Oil 
Co. v. Snodgrass,926 stands for the proposition that discovery of oil or gas in 
paying quantities is sufficient to hold the lease into the secondary term, the 
Supreme Court might find an obligation to pay the shut-in royalty in the 
primary term to be required where a lease provided for such payments, as is 
the case in many contemporary leases used in West Virginia, even though 
this would not have been the practice in early 20th century leases in 
Appalachia.  However, given Colorado’s view that a well capable of 
producing will hold a lease into the secondary term, and West Virginia’s 
long-standing similar view, West Virginia could very well adopt some 
version of a Colorado or Oklahoma model. 
D. ALABAMA 
As indicated in the survey materials of this Article, Alabama has had 
opportunity to consider both temporary cessation issues and shut-in clauses 
in the context of specific contractual clauses in specific leases.  It appears 
Alabama accepts the majority position, as exemplified by Texas law, that a 
lease will expire at the end of the primary term in the absence of actual 
production, based on the Griffen decision.927  Likewise from that case, it 
appears that Alabama would ameliorate that result by the express terms of a 
lease savings clause on the same reasoning as its analysis of the drilling 
operations clause considered in that case.  It can be reasonably assumed that 
Alabama would likewise consider adoption of a temporary cessation 
doctrine, as a matter of equity, in the Texas vein demonstrated by the 
Scarborough decision928 and Watson v. Rochmill.929  And it may be 
 
924. 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006). 
925. See, e.g., Davis v. Cramer, 808 P.2d 358, 363 (Colo. 1991) (suggesting that the shut-in 
payment needs to be made in the primary term to preserve the lease into the secondary term). 
926. 76 S.E. 961 (W. Va. 1912). 
927. See Griffin v. Crutcher-Tufts Corp., 500 So. 2d 1008, 1011(Ala. 1986). 
928. See Scarborough v. New Domain Oil & Gas Co., 276 S.W. 331, 336 (Tex. App. 1925). 
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expected that Alabama would view an express contract provision to be 
controlling as to the condition and duration of a temporary shut-in, since 
both Texas and Oklahoma are in accord on that view, as reflected in Hoyt v. 
Continental Oil Co.,930 which Alabama looked to favorably in evaluating 
what constituted “reworking” in the Sheffield decision.931 
Further extrapolating the Alabama court view of shut-in clauses, as 
reflected in Griffen, suggests that Alabama would follow the Texas 
approach on questions of timely payment of shut-in royalties and with 
regard to treatment of shut-in payments as substitute production.  This 
seems likely, in cases where production had carried the lease into the 
secondary term, at which point, the well was shut in for some period, if 
timely shut-in payments were correctly made, following the reasoning in 
the Amber Oil decision.932 
Alabama has indicated a willingness to consider the relationship of 
various lease clauses to each other in evaluating the ongoing validity of a 
lease in the secondary term, as indicated in the Federal Land Bank of New 
Orleans case.933  In this regard, Alabama could be expected to consider the 
applicability and timing of the shut-in payments in conjunction with any 
drilling operations provisions or cessation provisions found in a lease in 
keeping with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid.934 
E. OHIO 
While Ohio historically lacks the extensive body of oil and gas law of 
Texas or Oklahoma, on many issues its case law on temporary cessation is 
reasonably well developed.  Certainly, based on  cases, which appear to 
treat a lease as a profit or incorporeal heriditament, rather than a fee simple 
determinable,935 recognition of a fact-based, equity-driven doctrine on 
temporary cessation is rational in the context of the survival of a lease in the 
secondary term.  However, in evaluating further legal developments on 
saving clauses in Ohio, it is worthwhile to note recent oil and gas cases at 
the appellate court level, expressing the view that in Ohio oil and gas leases 
create a fee simple determinable estate, rather than a profit or 
 
929. See Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1941). 
930. See Hoyt v. Cont’l Oil Co., 606 P.2d 560, 563 (Okla. 1980). 
931. See Sheffield v. Exxon Corp., 424 So. 2d 1297, 1302 (Ala. 1982). 
932. See Amber Oil & Gas Co., v. Bratton, 711 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). 
933. See Fed. Land Bank of New Orleans v. Terra Res., Inc., 373 So. 2d 14, 319-20 (Ala. 
1979). 
934. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, 337 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. 1960). 
935. See, e.g., In re Estate of Faulkner, 64 Ohio Law Abs. 420 (Ohio C.P. 1952); Jones v. 
Wood, 9 Ohio C.C. 560, 568 (1895). 
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hereditament.936  While not controlling, the rationale of the Tisdale court is 
informative where the court states that the typical habendum clause 
language is “generally construed to create a determinable fee interest.”937  
This case suggests a possible movement toward Ohio following Texas 
precedents going forward.  In any event, it seems unlikely that the 
temporary cessation doctrine in Ohio will see any expansion as a defense by 
lessees.  Rather, it could be expected that case law developments will likely 
narrow the rule, particularly if the cessations are associated with long-lived 
marginal wells, where, in attempting to balance the equities between lessor 
and lessee, a fact finder is more likely to conclude that the lessee has 
received substantial prior economic benefit over a long period. 
With the new intense leasing and drilling activity and a very large 
number of old held by production leases kept alive by marginally producing 
wells, one would expect to see the temporary cessation doctrine in Ohio 
revisited.  And if Ohio courts are moving toward a more clearly defined 
view of leases as fee simple determinable estates, no expansion of the 
doctrine is likely, insofar as what constitutes “temporary cessation” with 
long-producing historic wells.  Lessees seeking to preserve leases from 
claims by lessors regarding cessation of production are likely to have an 
uphill climb where the facts show a lack of economic production for a 
period much in excess of a year. 
A recent statutory change in Ohio could impact a court’s view of this 
issue.  Section 1509.062(A)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code, enacted in 2010, 
permits an owner of a well with no reported production for two years or 
longer to obtain from the state, approval for the well to be treated as 
temporarily inactive for up to a year, with the ability to apply for additional 
renewals.938  The application must include a plan to utilize the well within a 
reasonable time.  This procedure, if followed, could be weighed by a court 
as part of its consideration both as to diligence of the lessee to return to 
production, and as to what constitutes reasonable duration of a temporary 
cessation.  However, such an approach would go considerably beyond the 
logical extension of any current Ohio cases on the subject. 
With regard to the applications of shut-in clauses, early Ohio law 
clearly requires that there must be actual production at the end of the 
 
936. See, e.g., Tisdale v. Walla, No. 94-A-0008, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5941, at *9-10 
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1994); see also Stocker & Sitler, Inc. v. Metzger, 250 N.E.2d 269, 276 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1969). 
936. See, e.g., Kramer v. PAC Drilling Oil & Gas, LLC, 968 N.E.2d 64, 68 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2011). 
937. Tisdale, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5941, at *10. 
938. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.062(A)(1) (2010). 
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primary term, consistent with the law in Texas.  Thus, it should be expected 
that Ohio would adhere to this rule regarding current shale development.  
This, in turn, suggests that where a producible well exists prior to the end of 
the primary term, but cannot be produced, shut-in payments should be 
initiated prior to the end of the primary term.  Nevertheless, with regard to 
gas wells, given the substantial investment represented by each horizontal 
well and current constraints on infrastructure, the Oklahoma approach 
seems the better rule.  Particularly where a well is drilled and completed 
near the end of the primary term and capable of production in paying 
quantities, but production is delayed due to pipeline to market availability 
issues ultimately controlled by third parties, the payment of shut-in royalties 
pursuant to the terms of a lease should preserve the lease into the secondary 
term for a reasonable period of time.  Such an approach is entirely 
consistent with the equity-driven origins, from which the temporary 
cessation doctrine developed in Ohio. Moore v. Adams939 addresses timely 
payments of shut-in royalty.  While Moore is not a holding from the Ohio 
Supreme Court, it speaks to the current view of Ohio courts, which will 
likely expect diligence by lessees on being in compliance with the clear 
terms of a savings clause in order to have the court give the clause effect to 
preserve the lease.940 
F. MICHIGAN 
While Michigan has not considered temporary cessation of production 
issues in the typical circumstances, Michigan Wisconsin941 indicates a 
willingness to consider the circumstance of a temporary cessation in an 
equitable sense.942  Moreover, the fairly developed law on the temporary 
cessation doctrine found in Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana, with similar legal 
histories and similarities in the development of each state’s historic oil and 
gas fields, suggests that Michigan would adopt a version of temporary 
cessation in the appropriate factual circumstances.  This is consistent with 
Barrett v. Dorr,943 and would follow Ohio and Texas to find that lease 
termination is otherwise automatic in the secondary term if the cessation is 
unduly long or if the lessee fails to show prudence and diligence in 
restoring production.  With regard to shut-in clauses, Michigan’s limited 
case law appears to be fully in accord with Texas law, both with regard to 
 
939. No. 2007AP0900662008, Ohio App. LEXIS 4998 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2008). 
940. Moore, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4998, at **13. 
941. 324 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
942. Mich. Wis. Pipeline Co., 324 N.W.2d at 546. 
943. 212 N.E.2d 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965). 
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timeliness of payments and the effect of payments as constructive 
production if timely made.944 
G. NORTH DAKOTA 
As indicated in the survey materials, North Dakota appears to have 
adopted a lessee-oriented approach to temporary cessation of production, 
which seems to place North Dakota closer to Oklahoma’s view regarding 
oil and gas leases.945  However as indicated previously, the Greenfield 
decision looks to a Kansas case, Wagner v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil 
Co.,946 to identify the factors which a trier of fact should consider in 
evaluating whether a cessation is temporary or permanent, and distinguishes 
North Dakota from Oklahoma, on the issue of applying the temporary 
cessation doctrine to determinable mineral interests.947 
Although no reported cases dealing with shut-in clauses were noted in 
North Dakota, Feland’s holding that a cessation of production does not 
automatically terminate a lease in the secondary term, seems in accord 
Oklahoma’s approach to the secondary term of a lease.  This suggests that 
North Dakota would view, the similar analysis applied to shut-in clauses 
reflected in Roye Realty and other Oklahoma cases, as persuasive on the 
application and interpretation of shut-in clauses,948 including issues of 
timely payments or non-payment and looking at the facts on a case by case 
basis.  Where Texas and Oklahoma are in accord, as in requiring a well 
capable of producing in paying quantities, in order to permit application of 
a shut-in clause, accord in North Dakota seems likely.949 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The issue of when a cessation of production is sufficient to terminate a 
lease is fact specific and grounded in principals of equity.  This in turn 
suggests that new jurisprudence in the various states will not likely expand 
the duration of “temporary cessation.”  As a result, developers seeking to 
rely on held by production leases to build a land position, will be wise to 
focus attention on lease production histories.  Developers should seek to 
 
944. See generally SHR, LP v. N. Lakes Petrol., Inc., No. 225484, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS 
1341 (Mich. Ct. App. Sep. 24, 2002). 
945. See generally Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829 (N.D. 1969). 
946. 318 P.2d 1039 (Kan. 1957). 
947. See Greenfield v. Thill, 521 N.W.2d 87, 89-91 (N.D. 1994). 
948. See, e.g., Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson, 791 P.2d 821, 823 (Okla. Ct. App. 
1990). 
949. See James Energy Co. v. HCG Energy Co., 847 P.2d 333, 338-39 (Okla. 1992); Fisher 
v. Grace Petrol. Corp., 830 P.2d 1380, 1387 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991). 
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manage land assets by careful and thorough drafting of lease instruments 
and amendments and by diligence in performance to the standard of a 
“reasonably prudent operator” in operating producing wells. 
Historic leases should be evaluated carefully as to the extent and 
meaning of shut in provisions, as well as to past and current performance 
under the terms of such clauses.  Indifferent compliance to the obligations 
of shut in clauses is likely to result in unfortunate outcomes for the 
producer.  Certainly it can be expected that lessors and attorneys 
representing them will be exercising diligence in their review of both 
obligation and performance, given the current market value of prospective 
shale development lands. 
Without question, the shale boom states discussed herein will see 
significant developments in their substantive oil and gas law in the next five 
to eight years.  Hopefully individual trial and appellate courts, in 
jurisdictions lacking fully developed jurisprudence, will be as attentive in 
their review of the facts and in consideration of applicable law as lessors, 
lessees, and their advocates are now becoming. 
